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TRADITIONAL EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY
PROCEDURE
Thomas 0. Main*
Abstract: This Article offers extensive background on the development and eventual
merger of the regimes of law and equity, and suggests that the procedural infrastructure of a
unified system must be sufficiently elastic to accommodate the traditional jurisdiction of
equity. As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure become increasingly more elaborate and
technical, strict application of those procedural rules can generate mischievous results and
hardship. This Article suggests that equity remains a source of authority for district judges to
avoid the application of a procedural rule when technical compliance would produce an
inequitable result. A separate system of equity provided a forum for hardship created by the
procedures of the common law system. Because the jurisdiction of equity was preserved by
the procedural merger of law and equity, mischief and hardship created by the contemporary
procedures of a unified system of law and equity need not be tolerated and may be corrected
in a manner consistent with traditional principles of equity.

"Let judgment run down as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream."'
Much of the grand history of Anglo-American law could be
characterized as an epic struggle between the regimes of law and equity. 2
The roots of this conflict run deep and straight-to Aristotle, who
recognized that universal laws could promote injustice as well as justice,
Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I wish to thank
Professors Greg Pingree, Kevin Stack, and Peter Nicolas for their insights and comments on an early
draft. And I wish to thank my student-colleagues Grant Wahlquist, Mat Larsen, and William
Diedrich for their able research assistance. This work was supported by the law school's generous
summer research grant, for which I am grateful.
1. Amos 5:24. See also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, act 4, sc. 1, lines
184-87 ("The quality of mercy is not strain'd / It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven / Upon the
place beneath. It is twice blest: / It blesseth him that gives and him that takes."); 2 THE WORKS OF
JOHN MILTON 307 (F. Patterson ed., 1931) ("temper... Justice with Mercie").
2. See generally ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54 (rev. ed.

1954) ("Almost all of the problems of jurisprudence come down to a fundamental one of rule and
discretion, of administration of justice by law and administration of justice by the more or less
trained intuition of experienced magistrates."); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 17 (1969) ("Every governmental and legal system in world history has
involved both rules and discretion. No government has ever been a government of laws and not of
men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every government has always been a
government of laws and of men."); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 24-25

(1990) ("[F]or more than two millennia, the field of jurisprudence has been fought over by two
distinct though variegated groups. One contends that law is more than politics and in the hands of
skillful judges yields ... correct answers to even the most difficult legal questions. The other
contends that law is politics through and through and that judges exercise broad discretionary
authority.").

See also BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAINTY IN SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY ENGLAND: A STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCE, RELIGION,

HISTORY, LAW, AND LITERATURE 163-93 (1983).
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and thus fashioned a notion of juridical equity to temper the strict
application of laws.3 Equity moderates the rigid and uniform application
of law by incorporating standards of fairness and morality into the
judicial process. 4 Equity assures just results in each application of strict
law and eliminates the need for elaborate legislative drafting to
contemplate all conceivable applications.5 Naturally, there exists some
tension between the two regimes: law ensures strict uniformity and
predictability, while equity tempers law to offer relief from hardship.6
Yet although there is tension between the two regimes, they are also

3. Aristotle's jurisprudential philosophy of equity unfolds in a sequence of his ethical works:
Magna Moralia, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford at the Clarendon Press
1925); Nichomachean Ethics, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross trans., Oxford at the
Clarendon Press 1925); and Art of Rhetoric, in 2 THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 593-675 (W. Roberts
trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952), See generally Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle's
Conception of "Equity" (Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119 (1942-1943); MAX HAMBURGER,
MORALS AND LAW: THE GROWTH OF ARISTOTLE'S LEGAL THEORY 96 (1965); HENRY SUMNER
MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 62 (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1861); GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE

4-77 (1973). The roots of a broader concept of equity, of course, run deeper still: notions of mercy,
grace, clemency and forgiveness have existed throughout recorded history. See generally History of
the Peloponnesian War, in 3 THUCYDIDES 37-40 (Richard Crawley trans., Encyclopedia Britannica
1952); The Laws, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 757d-e, 736d-e, 875c (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); The Statesman, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 294a (Benjamin
Jowett trans., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952); GEORGE SPENCE, THE EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OF

THE COURT OF CHANCERY 326 (1846) (associating the royal prerogative with sovereignty itself).
4. Equity presupposes that certain applications of law can frustrate the laws of nature, the
administration of "justice," or the common good. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, The "Common
Good" and the Problem of "Equity" in the Philosophy of Law of St. Thomas Aquinas, 18 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 114, 117 (1942-1943) ("Equity does not intend to set aside what is right and just, nor
does it try to pass judgment on a 'strict Common Law rule' by claiming that the latter was not well
made. It merely states that, in the interest of a truly effective and fair Administration of Justice, the
'strict Common Law' is not to be observed in some particular instance."); Colin P. Campbell, The
Court of Equity-A Theory of its Jurisdiction, 15 GREEN BAG 108, 111 (1903) (Equity can
"recognize and enforce principles which actually govern society in general, whether embodied in the
so-called rules of law or not."). See also infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Campbell, supra note 4, at 111-12 ("No set of prohibitive or declaratory words
which the ingenuity of legislatures or courts can devise will do justice in all cases or will provide for
all situations. Hence, both the statutes and the opinions must some time fall short in future cases of
that which the peculiar demand of the occasion requires."). See also ROSCOE POUND, "TOWARD A
NEW JUS GENTIUM," IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES AND WORLD ORDER 1, 9 (1949) ("Men with very

different conceptions of the social order, groups of men with one ideal or picture of what ought to be
and other groups with wholly divergent pictures, must live together and work together in a complex
social organization.").
6. See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.

Equity and Procedure
complementary, and for centuries separate systems of law and equity
combined to administer the laws with both certainty and discretion.7
The image of separate systems of law and equity is, however, an
increasingly fading memory. In the middle of the nineteenth century,
procedural codes merged law and equity into a single unified system in
most American state courts.8 The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875
accomplished much the same for law and equity courts in England.9
Since 1938 the federal district courts of the United States have
recognized one merged form of action under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' Under these unified systems, memories of a divided bench
have receded into the past." Law schools have eliminated the separate
course in Equity, 2 and all that remains of separate systems of law and
7. See FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, EQUITY AND THE FORMS OF ACTION 17 (Chaytor ed.
1909) ("[F]or two centuries before the year 1875 the two systems had been working together
harmoniously."). See also infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 213-34 and accompanying text.
9. See 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (Eng.); 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (Eng.). See also infra notes
284-88 and accompanying text.
10. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action."'). See
also infra notes 235-83 and accompanying text.
I1. See generally Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1993) (construing a statutory
reference to "equitable remedies" and stating "memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with
its technical refinements recede into the past"). See also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 212-17 (2002) (discussing legal and equitable origins of restitution).
12. See generally Walter Wheeler Cook, The Place of Equity in Our Legal System, 3 AM. LAW
SCH. REV. 173 (1912) (urging the elimination of equity as a separate law school course); Ralph E.
Kharas, A Century of Law-Equity Merger in New York, I SYRACUSE L. REV. 186, 186 (1949)
(discussing Harvard Law School's decision to abolish the course in Equity and to teach those
principles instead in Contracts, Torts, Procedure and other courses); Jerome Frank, Civil Law
Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104
U. PA. L. REV. 887, 895 (1956) ("In several of our leading university law schools, there is now no
course on 'equity.' I teach a course on the subject at Yale Law School, but until June 1956, 1 have
been required to call it 'Procedure Ill.' One of my esteemed colleagues, Judge Charles Clark, has
been a leader in this sort of eradication of the word 'equity' from the law school curriculum,
rejecting it almost as if it were an obscene term."); Lester B. Orfield, The Placeof Equity in the Law
School Curriculum, 2 J. LEG. EDUC. 26, 27 (1949-1950) ("The movements to abolish Equity as a
separate course have appeared at twenty-year intervals, first in 1909, then in 1930, and now
following World War 11when so many law schools are revising their curricula."); Douglas Laycock,
The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53 (1993) ("Most lawyers I meet are
incredulous that anyone my age ever taught a course in equity."); Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B.
Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 272 (1991) ("equity
was taught as a separate course until the 1950s"); Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the
Civil Procedure Course: A Study in Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397 (1998); Stephen B.
Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition,History and Limitations on FederalJudicialPowerA Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2000) (civil procedure teachers instead have
long filled their courses with a heavy diet of constitutional topics, such as choice of law and personal
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equity are a few vestigial distinctions and labels, such as joining claims
for legal and equitable relief in a single action, 3 or determining the
availability vel non of a jury trial. 4
This Article argues that in merging the regimes of law and equity,
reformers may have swept away part of the wisdom that had guided the
development and operation of dual systems. One virtue of an
autonomous system of equity was its authority to act in opposition to the
strict law when the unique circumstances of a particular case demanded
intervention. 5 The architects of the merger took great pains to sustain
this virtue by preserving the substantive principles of both law and
equity; only the procedure was modified, they insisted.' 6 But even
assuming that the antagonistic substantive regimes of law and equity can
co-exist and be applied contemporaneously within a single unified
procedural system, a fundamental flaw inheres in the procedural
infrastructure of a merged system. In denying equity any structural
autonomy, there remains no relief from the procedures of the merged
system itself when the modes of proceeding in that system are
inadequate.' 7 Indeed, the jurisdiction of equity is impaired if equity
cannot operate as a check upon the "strict law" that is codified in the
procedures of the merged system.18
Parts I, II and III of this Article are but a history lesson. "People need
not so much to be told as to be reminded,"' 9 and the reminder is essential
context for my thesis. Part I discusses the development of law and equity
as separate systems from the Middle Ages through the eighteenth
jurisdiction). For a statement in support of a separate course in equity, see Robert S. Stevens, A Brief
on Behalfof a Course in Equity, 8J.LEGAL EDUC. 422 (1956).
13. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a) ("A party asserting a claim to relief... may join ...as
many claims, legal [or] equitable... as the party has against an opposing party."). See also FED. R.
Civ. P. 1-2.
14. See generally Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531 (1970); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Fleming James, Jr., Right
to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); John C. McCoid, 11,
Procedural Reform
and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. I
(1967). See also infra notes 289-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 221, 278-81, 288 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 306-84 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
19. Melvin M. Johnson, Jr., The Spirit of Equity, 16 B.U. L. REV. 345, 345 (1936) (quoting "a
former president of the United States" without further attribution). See also infra notes 289-90 and
accompanying text.
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century. I emphasize the utility and uniqueness of having complementary
and rival systems effect the "wise adjustment of law to experience."2
Part II focuses primarily on the publication of Sir William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England.2 1 Blackstone recognized
substantive rights apart from procedural remedies and, in doing so,
marginalized the law/equity distinction by suggesting that the difference
between
the
two systems was
merely
procedural.22 A
substance/procedure distinction assumed primary significance, with
substance as the actual rules that we apply; and procedure no more than a
practical and ancillary means to an end. 23 The perceived elasticity of
procedure made change in the light of practical details inevitable, if not
noble. Broad acceptance of this paradigm ultimately paved the way for
the so-called merger of law and equity, beginning in the mid-nineteenth
century.24 In Part III, I present the history of that merger, which
purported to fuse only the procedure of law and of equity, while leaving
the substance of each regime otherwise intact. The reformers envisioned
a unified procedural apparatus that would permit judges to jointly
administer the jurisprudence of both law and equity.2
In Part IV, I argue that an important ingredient of the jurisprudence of
equity was displaced by the procedural merger of law and equity in the
federal courts. A merged system offers no recourse from insufficiency
created by the procedural apparatus of the merged system.26 The
argument for institutional autonomy is compelling even though unified
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporated much of the philosophy

20. Sidney Smith, The Stage of Equity, II CAN. B. REV. 308, 311 (1938).
21. 1-4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769).
22. See infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
23. Put another way: in the household of the law, procedure ceased to be the materfamilias and
became the handmaiden. See In re Coles I (King's Bench 1907) (Collins, MR.). See also Roscoe
Pound, Some Principlesof ProceduralReform, 4 U. ILL. L. REV. 388, 402 (1910); Charles E. Clark,

The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938); ROBERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 4-5 (1952); THEODORE F. T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 381 (5th ed. 1956); Stephen N. Subrin,

How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 929 (1987).
24. See infra notes 195-212 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 211-88 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 349-83 and accompanying text. Cf infra notes 385-400 and accompanying

text (discussing the traditional role of equity in curing procedural insufficiencies).
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and practices of equity procedure.27 First, the Federal Rules have not
been immune to the complication, trivialization and ossification
pathogens that have plagued earlier procedural systems.28 Second,
procedural rules featuring discretion and flexibility within a unified
system cannot replicate the administration of justice pursuant to a
separate system of equity. The Federal Rules, like any codification, are
unavoidably a product of experience developed by reason, and reason
tested by experience.2 9 Yet generalizations in laws cannot always be
completely general, and human calculations are imperfect.3" Indeed, the
unimaginable is inevitable and, when the unexpected occurs, some
authority must stand in the breach and supply that which prevents the
general rules from meeting the immediate necessity. 3' A separate system
of equity viewed each lawsuit from the standpoint of the "wrong"
presented.32 The powers of that court were as vast, and its processes and
procedure as elastic, as all the changing emergencies of increasingly
complex relations could demand.33 By contrast, the common law system

27. For a description of the equitable origins of the Federal Rules, see infra notes 262-77 and
accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 307-48 and accompanying text. For a contrary view, expressed by the current
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, see Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of
Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1795 (2002), stating that "It may be inevitable that a
continuing revision process lengthens the rules and adds complexity to them. Doubts grow up
around old solutions, and new problems appear. The Civil Rules have not escaped this effect. Yet
time and again, the Rules adhere to a pervading characteristic. The effort is less to provide detailed
controls and more to establish general policies that guide discretionary application on a case-specific
basis. Many a district judge may view one provision or another as an unwarranted intrusion on the
proper sovereignty of a trial court, but vast discretion remains at virtually every turn. It does not
seem fair to charge the revision process with a descent into the naggling detail and sterile
ossification that have overtaken earlier procedural systems."
29. See generally POUND, supra note 5, at 2.
30. Aristotle was quick to point out that such imperfection is not the fault of the law or of the
legislature. Rather "the law is no less correct on this account; for the source of the error is ... the
nature of the object itself, since that is what the subject-matter of actions is bound to be like."
Nichomachean Ethics, supra note 3, at 17-19. See generally Eric G. Zahnd, Note, The Application of
Universal Laws to ParticularCases: A Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American
Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (1996). See also supra note 5.
31. See generally Campbell, supra note 4, at 111-12.
32. See Charles D. Frierson, A Certain FundamentalDifference in Viewpoint Between Law and
Equity as Illustratedby Two Maxims, 22 CASE & COMMENT 403, 410 (1915). See also supra notes
173-82, 385-400 and accompanying text.
33. See Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. Co. v. Pa. Co., 54 F. 746, 751 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) (quoting
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 47 F. 15 (C.C. Neb. 1891)) as cited in Rhonda
Wasserman, Equity Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70
B.U. L. REV. 623. 623 (1990).
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viewed 34every lawsuit as a test of the existence and scope of the alleged
"right." Whether by design or by unfortunate evolution, the procedural
infrastructure of the unified system today increasingly resembles the
latter vision, compromising fair and just results at the behest of
35
formalism.
I offer contemporary procedure in mass tort cases as an illustration of
the problem. The impact of mass torts on the justice system has been
labeled
"overwhelming, ' 36
"elephantine, '' 37
"unprecedented," 38
3
9
4
°
"bizarre,, "pathological," and an "emergency."'" Mass tort cases may
be especially likely to present new and unforeseeable challenges for trial
courts trying to process these cases fairly and efficiently.42 Yet the
administration of these cases is governed largely by the procedural
templates that also govern all other types of civil cases.43 As applied in
34. See Frierson, supra note 32, at 410. See also infra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 307-48 and accompanying text.
36. In re Johns-Manville Corp., No. 90-3973, slip op. at 61-63, 1991 WL 86304 (E.D.N.Y. May
16, 1991).
37. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (Souter, J.).
38. Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 12, at 270.
39. Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts andLitigation Disasters,20 GA. L. REV. 429, 450 (1986).
40. Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi Billion Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 383, 395 (1993).
41. In re Joint E. & S.Dists, 769 F. Supp. 85, 87 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991). See generally
John Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990, 991-92 (1995).
42. See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Aggregation and Settlement of Mass Torts, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1943, 1944 (2000) ("It is often observed that each new mass tort presents different problems,
requiring different procedural solutions than any of its predecessors."); Martha Minow, Judgefor the
Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 2010, 2019 & n.51 (1997) (discussing mass torts and the traditional model of adjudication);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlement of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1160 (1995) (suggesting that resolution of mass torts presents novel issues).
See also infra notes 349-84 and accompanying text. But see Linda S.Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public
Law Litigation: ParadigmMisplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 581 (1994) ("[T]he essential mass tort
case is nothing more or less than an injured plaintiff, represented by a personal-injury, contingencyfee lawyer, suing the product's manufacturer."); Siliciano, supra note 41, at 991 (noting there are
"few interesting or novel questions of doctrine" in mass tort cases and the problems attributed to the
size of such cases are not unique).
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[t]hese rules govern the procedure in the United States district courts
in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity"). For background on the
transsubstantivity of Federal Rules, see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court
Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy and ProceduralEfficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887 (1999); Carl Tobias,
More Modern Civil Process, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 801 (1995); Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil
Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation:A Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special
Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REV. LITIG. 113 (1994); Jeffrey Stempel, Halting
Devolution or Bleak to the Future, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994); Richard Marcus, Of Babies and
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certain circumstances, then, existing procedural rules may be inefficient,
too complicated, or otherwise deficient for the unique circumstances
presented in some mass tort cases.44
In the current system, the procedural rules typically are applied as
drafted, and the response to the procedural mischief is to amend the rules
specifically to address that problem. But amendment, if any,45 may come
too late for the problem that occasioned the amendment. 46 Furthermore,
the amended language itself may become the "strict law" that, in turn,
creates the insufficiency for the next generation of mass tort. Because
equity traditionally complemented the administration of justice by
Bathwater: The Prospectsfor Procedural Progress,59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993); Carl Tobias,
The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501 (1992); Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-SubstantiveRules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989); Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court,
Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693 (1988); Subrin, supra note 23, at
929-30; and Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494 (1986).
44. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (Souter, J.) ("this litigation
defies customary judicial administration"). See also infra notes 349-84 and accompanying text.
45. The amendment reflex consistently leads to reform proposals, even if not to procedural
amendment. The history of Federal Rule 23, for example, is largely a narrative recounting decades of
unsuccessful reform efforts. The most concentrated of these efforts have originated from one of three
sources: the United States Department of Justice, the American Bar Association, or the United States
Judicial Conference. See generally ARTHUR MILLER, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS:

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 58-59 (1977) (reviewing criticisms and proposed reforms); Responses
to the Rule 23 Questionnaire of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, reprinted in 5 CLASS
ACTION REP. 3, 10, 17 (1978) (reporting results of survey suggesting that a majority of practitioners
and judges favored prompt revision of Rule 23); Stephen Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to
Procedure: The Imperativefor Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 299 (1980) (surveying flaws and suggesting reforms to Federal Rule 23); Report and
Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 199
(1986); Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Fairness to the Absent Members of a Defendant Class: A Proposed
Revision of Rule 23, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 909 (1990); Jean Wegman Bums, Decorative
Figureheads:Eliminating Class Representatives in Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1990);
Mark W. Friedman, ConstrainedIndividualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class Members to
Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745
(1990); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The PlaintiJ]t'Attorney'sRole in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. I,
27-33 (1991); Report ofAdvisory Committee on Civil Rules, 167 F.R.D. 535, 537 (1996); George F.
Sanderson, CongressionalInvolvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative Proposals
Past and Present, 2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 315 (1999); Thomas Merton Woods, Wielding
the Sledgehammer: Legislative Solutionsfor Class Action JurisdictionalReform, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
507 (2000). See also infra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
46. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 1944 (referring to "statutes and rules framed for the last war").
47. See generally id.

Equity and Procedure
offering, as an independent ground for equitable relief, relief from such
procedural insufficiencies,4 8 I argue here that the tradition of equity is
impaired in a merged system if the trial judge cannot escape the rigors of
that infrastructure in the exercise of her magisterial good sense and offer
relief from such hardship.
Finally, in Part V, I offer a proposal to resurrect the curative purpose
of equity in circumstances when the procedural apparatus of our merged
system fails to provide plain, adequate and complete relief. I urge judges
to use and credit equity as a source of authority to avoid applications of
the Federal Rules that, although achieving technical compliance, result in
inequitable outcomes in violation of the spirit of the Rules. Also, I urge
procedural rulemakers to draft amendments to the Federal Rules that
better accommodate the enduring jurisprudence of equity.
1.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS OF
LAW AND EQUITY

Much has been written about the origins of law and equity.49 We know
that both of these legal systems are derived from the royal prerogative of
English kings to interfere with the ordinary legal processes of the
communal courts.5" The ultimate and supreme power of kings to do
48. See infra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
49. For a more complete discussion of the history of law and equity, see generally PLUCKNETT,
supra note 23; SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1895); WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (7th ed.

1956) [hereinafter HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW]; JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE: AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (12th ed. 1877); Warren B. Kittle,

Courts of Law and Equity-Why They Exist and Why They Differ, 26 W. VA. L.Q. 21 (1919-1920);
D.M. KERLY, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1890);

Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV. L. REV. 195
(1914) [hereinafter Pound, The End of Law]; George Burton Adams, The Origin of English Equity,
16 COLUM. L. REV. 87 (1916); Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696

(1913) [hereinafter Pound, Justice]; William Searle Holdsworth, The Early History of Equity, 13
MICH. L. REV. 293 (1915) [hereinafter Holdsworth, Equity]; Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, The
Relations Between Law and Equity, 11 MICH. L. REV. 537 (1913); Robert L. Munger, A Glance at
Equity, 25 YALE L.J. 42 (1915); and Henry H. Ingersoll, Confusion of Law and Equity, 21 YALE L.J.
58(1911).
50. Until the latter part of the twelfth century, ordinary law and justice in England was governed
by custom and was administered rather informally (if not crudely) by the shire courts and the courts
of the hundred motes (in the time of Saxons and Danes, dating back to the seventh century) and by
the county, borough and manor courts (in the early Norman period beginning with the Norman
Conquest in 1066). The forms of trial were, in large part, appeals to the supernatural. See generally I
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 49, at 14-22; 1 HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at
40; GEORGE L. CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (1948); Adams, supra note 49, at 91 & n.10
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justice in any case between their subjects extended, of course, to any
matter brought to their attention." To exercise that authority, kings
issued brevia or writs which had the effect of removing the cause directly
to the king's court or council. 2 The repeated issuance of writs based
upon similar circumstances led an astute King Henry 11" to realize that
certain standardized writs could be issued.54 He established a Curia Regis
to administer a national law based on these writs.55 The Chancellor was
56
then the king's secretary, and Chancery was the secretariat of the state.
Writs, like all other state papers, were prepared there, and the clerks in
Chancery issued the standardized writs whenever a complainant

(discussing the king's "prerogative machinery"); Frederick Pollock, English Law Before the Norman
Conquest 14 L.Q. REV. 291, 297 (1898).
51. The operative principle was that the king was the fountainhead of all justice, and in him,
resided the final power to do whatever was just and righteous. See MILLAR, supra note 23, at 12-13;
WILLIAM F. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 69-70 (1923).

The king, of course, was the source of all power and authority-whether legislative, executive or
judicial-and the sovereign lord of all land; he was the state. See Kittle, supra note 49, at 23 ("It was
the firm policy of the Norman kings to concentrate all power within themselves."); I POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 49, at 85-87; KERLY, supra note 49, at 13-14. The administration of justice
in England was originally confided to the Aula Regis, or great Court or Council of the King. See I
STORY, supra note 49, § 39, at 30.
52. See Adams, supra note 49, at 89 (discussing the new "judicial machinery" brought into
England at the Norman Conquest); Garrard Glenn & Kenneth Redden, Equity: A Visit to the
Founding Fathers,31 VA. L. REV. 753, 760 (1945) ("Justice did open the door, of course, and it was
the royal hand that was on the knob."); W. R. Vance, Law in Action in Medieval England, 17 VA. L.
REV. 1, 9-10 (1930) (discussing writ to gain seisin of land held by the King in reversion);
MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 4-5.
53. Henry 11(Curtmantle) reigned from 1154-1189. For relevant background on King Henry 1I,
see GOLDWIN SMITH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 82-121 (1990); 1
POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 49, at 138-46; WILLIAM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON EQUITY 2

(1930).
54. Petitioners generally had to purchase writs from the king's secretary, the Chancellor. The
writs constituted the king's law, derived personally from his power and authority as the fountain of
all justice. Accordingly these were not natural rights. See Adams, supra note 49, at 89 (noting the
new procedure and the new machinery were "the king's private property"); William Searle
Holdsworth, The Relation of the Equity Administered by the Common Law Judges to the Equity
Administered by the Chancellor,26 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1916) (discussing writs de cursu "which any
litigant could purchase").
55. The judges of the Curia Regis (court of the king) were the king's councilors and advisors, a
group of secular and ecclesiastical dignitaries. See Kittle, supra note 49, at 25 (the curia regis "may
be regarded as the parent stem from which the courts of law and equity have sprung").
56. See William F. Walsh, Equity Prior to the Chancellor'sCourt, 17 GEO. L.J. 97, 100 (19281929) (discussing role of the Chancellor); William Q. deFuniak, Origin and Nature of Equity, 23
TUL. L. REV. 54. 55-56 (1948-1949) (same).
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presented facts contemplated by a writ. 57 Forms of action developed
around the writs. 8
The writs largely displaced the customary laws of the different parts
of the country and became the foundation of our common law actions. 9
In the earliest stage of this new common law, writs were construed
liberally to apply to new cases where justice seemed to require that an
action be allowed.6" Many forms of action and relief, including those that
we would now label "equitable," were administered by the king's judges
as part of the common law during this period.6' However, this dynamic
vision of justice threatened the power of entrenched English barons, and
later the Parliament, who perceived the power to issue writs as a power

57. See Walsh, supra note 56, at 100-01; MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 3; Robert Sevems,
Nineteenth Century Equity: A Study in Law Reform, 12 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 81, 92 (1934) ("[B]y the
end of the thirteenth century the number of petitions had become very large and the work of reading
them was onerous."); see also infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. For a sampling of early
writs, see JOHN H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 437-47 (2d ed. 1979).

58. See Sherman Steele, The Origin and Nature of Equity Jurisprudence, 6 AM. L. SCH. REV. 10,
10-11 (1926). See also infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
59. See BAKER, supra note 57, at 49; WALSH, supra note 51, at 86-88; POLLOCK & MAITLAND,
supra note 49, at 129-130. See also JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, COMMON LAW
PLEADING 18 (1969) ("Substantive law grew out of procedure. Courts were organized to handle a
series of specific cases, the division of which gradually developed theories of rights and liabilities.
Our rights and liabilities as defined by substantive law, then, had their origin in and developed out of
procedural law."). Of course, it bears emphasis that the rights that were recognized were almost
exclusively property rights; there were no personal rights, political rights, civil rights as we
understand them. See deFuniak, supra note 56, at 56.
60. Henry de Bracton described a class of writs, breve magistralia, that were very freely issued.
See MILLAR, supra note 23, at 18 (1952). See also 2 HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at
245 (use of these writs was the immediate and effective cause of the rapid development of the law
during this period).
61. See Willard Barbour, Some Aspects of Fifteenth-Century Chancery, 31 HARV. L. REV. 834,
834 (1918) ("It is now more than thirty years since Justice Holmes in a brilliant and daring essay set
on foot an inquiry which has revealed the remote beginnings of English equity. Equity and common
law originated in one and the same procedure and existed for a long time, not only side by side, but
quite undifferentiated from each other .... There was no equity as a separate body of law; for the
king's justices felt themselves able to dispense such equity as justice required."); Adams, supra note
49, at 91-92 (recognizing common law and equity as an "undifferentiated system in the effort of the
king to carry out his duty of furnishing security and justice"); Holdsworth, supra note 54, at I
(accumulating evidence that common law judges in the twelfth through fourteenth centuries
"administered both law and equity"); Aaron Friedberg, The Merger of Law and Equity, 12 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 317, 318 n.2 (1938) ("during the reign of Henry II, both equity and common law
were administered under the same system of procedure and were quite undistinguishable from each
other"); Severns, supra note 57, at 91 ("It is obvious that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,
no distinction can be drawn between common law and equity.").
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to make new law.62 To limit the king's authority, the common law system
became "a hard and fast system with certain clearly defined things which
it could do and with equally clearly defined things which it could not
do."63 The universe of writs was fixed and their construction by law
judges narrowly circumscribed;6 4 precise and technical rules of pleading,
procedure and proof cabined judicial discretion within the form of
action.65 The only remedy that the law courts could award in personal
actions was monetary damages.66
The common law courts gradually became an institution that was
separate from the king,67 but the royal prerogative endured.68 Litigants
62. See Holdsworth, supra note 54, at 3. See also Adams, supra note 49, at 96, n.27, n.28
(discussing various attempts to regulate and limit the issue of writs); PLUCKNETT, supra note 23, at
26.
63. Adams, supra note 49, at 96. See also deFuniak, supra note 56, at 57 ("A growing worship of
formalism and technicality also began to obsess the courts of law."); George Palmer Garrett, The
Heel of Achilles, II VA. L. REV. 30, 30 (1924-1925) ("The common law made a fetish of
procedure.").
64. For example, a provision in Magna Charta (1215) significantly diminished the scope of the
royal writ in respect to titles to land. Also, the Provisions of Oxford (1258) expressly forbade the
Chancellor to issue any new writs "without the commandment of the King and his council who shall
be present." The Provisions were annulled five years later, but the common law courts nevertheless
were transformed during the 13th century into a rigid system of formal actions. See I HOLDSWORTH,
ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at 196; 2 HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at 291;
MILLAR, supra note 23, at 18 (citing FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION 41
(1936); 1 HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at 58-59).
65. See Steele, supra note 58, at 10-11 ("In accordance with its technical mode of procedure,
every species of legal wrong was supposed to fit into some one of a limited number of classes; for
each class an appropriate remedy was provided, obtainable only by the use of some one of a limited
number of 'forms of action.' An action was begun by the issuance of a writ appropriate to the form
of action; in time these writs became standardized, and, where the facts of a case were without
precedent, no writ to cover them was found, and hence no action could be brought."); Garrett, supra
note 63, at 31 (discussing "form-mad common lawyers"); JAMES FOSDICK BALDWIN, THE KING'S
COUNCIL IN ENGLAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES 61-62 (1913) (referring to the common law's
"formulaic procedure"); Holdsworth, supra note 54, at 22 (discussing the "complicated machinery"
of the law courts). See also infra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
66. See ELIAS MERWIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 17 (1895)
(discussing inability of common law courts to compel the performance of duties); Kittle, supra note
49, at 28 ("[T]he remedies which the law courts gave were often wholly inadequate. They were as
bad as no remedy at all.").
67. See Adams, supra note 49, at 96, n.27, n.28 (discussing the multiplication and classification of
writs in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as an indication of this separation); Leonard J.
Emmerglick, A Century of the New Equity, 23 TEX. L. REV. 244, 246 (1945) (noting independence of
common law courts as of the fourteenth century); Holdsworth, Equity, supra note 49, at 294 ("In the
latter half of the 14th and in the 15th centuries the common law tended to become a fixed and rigid
system. It tended to be less closely connected with the king, and therefore less connected with, and
sometimes even opposed to, the exercise of... royal discretion.").
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confronting the power of a great lord who could unduly influence the
regular common law officials, juries and judges continued to petition the
king for relief.69 The Crown remained the only source of relief for
circumstances that did not fit within the narrow range of available
writs.70 As England transitioned from an agricultural to a commercial
nation, the more frequent became situations involving rights not
previously contemplated and for which no writ and, thus, no remedy, was
available. 7'
Appeals to the king, instead of to his courts, became numerous, and
about the time of Edward I,72 it became usual to refer such petitions for
consideration and disposition to the Lord Chancellor.73 As "the keeper of
the king's conscience," the Lord Chancellor was a churchman who was
familiar with both the ecclesiastical and the civil or Roman law.74 The
68. See HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY § 2 at 3 (1936) ("As the common-law
courts came to be recognized more clearly as separate legal institutions ... [t]he justices in eyre,
who were the king's representatives, as well as legal judges, continued to exercise the[ir] power.");
Friedberg, supra note 61, at 318 n.2 ("[T]he provisions of Oxford in 1258, by forbidding the
Chancellor to frame new writs without the consent of the king and Council, drew a definite line of
demarcation between the two systems of law.").
69. Common law writs were expensive luxuries for individuals too poor to avail themselves of the
remedy. See supra note 54. Further, the adversary could be so rich and powerful that it would be
hopeless to proceed in the law courts. See Barbour, supra note 61, at 856 (reprinting sample petitions
filed in chancery). See also Hohfeld, supra note 49, at 547, n.9 (noting until nearly the end of the
fifteenth century, most petitions to the king were founded on some suggestion of inequality between
the parties); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Early English Equity, I L. QUART. REV. 162-63 (1885)
(discussing different substantive doctrines developed in chancery); Glenn & Redden, supra note 52,
at 763-69 (reprinting and translating sample bills filed in Chancery). There was no charge for
obtaining a bill in equity. See Severns, supra note 57, at 88.
70. See Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 760 (discussing the limited range of the law courts);
MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 3 ("Though these great courts of law have been established (King's
Bench, Common Pleas, etc.) there is still a reserve ofjustice in the king.").
71. See deFuniak, supra note 56, at 56.
72. Edward I reigned from 1272-1307. For relevant background on King Edward 1, see SMITH,
supra note 53, at 162-187.
73. See Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 760-61 (describing that the Chancellor took over the
task of reviewing the petitions and ultimate had them addressed to him directly); Walsh, supra note
56, at 106 (same).
74. See Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 760-61 (1945). According to Professor Glenn, much
pomp accompanied the early chancellors when they marched in state. A graphic description appears
in GEORGE CAVENDISH, THE LIFE OF THOMAS WOLSEY (1893), which was written by a gentleman
usher of a chancellor. See also Walter E. Sparks, The Origin, Growth, and Present Scope of Equity
Jurisprudence in England and the United States, 16 W. JURIST 473, 475 (1882) ("From the time of
the reign of Henry VI [chancery] constantly grew in importance, and in the reign of Henry VII it
expanded into a broad and almost boundless jurisdiction under the fostering care and ambitious
wisdom and the love of power of Cardinal Wolsey.").
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Chancellor unrolled a vast body of legal principle that we know as
"equity" to offer relief in those cases where, because of the technicality
of procedure, defective methods of proof, and other shortcomings in the
common law, there was no "plain, adequate and complete" remedy
otherwise available. 75 Equity channeled extraordinary powers to afford
relief when there were procedural or substantive deficiencies of the law
courts.76 Intervention was premised on the notion that justice
incorporated the moral sense of the community, existing as a function not
only of a community's technical rules, but also of "magisterial good
sense, unhampered by rule. '77 The Chancellor had "the right and the
powers, in fact, to do as he likes, whatever hard law and still harder
practice may dictate. 76
In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Court of Chancery
developed into a distinct court. 79 There were no writs and no forms of
75. See MILLAR, supra note 23, at 24 (1952); I STORY, supra note 49, § 33, at 22-26. See also
infr-a notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
76. Severns, supra note 57, at 84.
77. See Pound, Justice, supra note 49, at 701-02 ("[O]ne function of the administration of justice
is to adjust the relations of individuals to each other so as to accord with the general moral sense.
Rules in many of these matters are needed to guide the weak judge and to save us from his lack of
will and lack uf judgment. But these same rules may serve only to hamper the strong judge and to
prevent application of the full
measure of his good sense and sound judgment to the case in hand.").
See also infoi notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
78. Severns, stpra note 57, at 89.
79. See Steele, supra note 58, at I I (the "practice of referring to the Chancellor all of these special
appeals to the kind led to the establishment of a tribunal which by the time of Edward III (13271377) had become recognized as a distinct and permanent court, with its separate jurisdiction and
mode of procedure and its seat at Westminster"); Holdsworth, supra note 54, at 6 (describing that all
cases which called for equity were "handed over to a tribunal which, in time, came to be perfectly
distinct from any of the common law courts"); Walsh, smpra note 56, at 107 (suggesting that
Chancery as a court of equity was taking form "around the 14th century"); Adams, supra note 49, at
97 (dating origins of a separate system of equity to the fourteenth century); George Burton Adams,
The Continuity qfEnglish Equit,, 26 YALE L.J. 550, 556 n.17 (1917) ("The chancellor's court had
become distinct from the Council before the end of the 15th century."); I HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH
LAW, supra note 49, at 404 (suggesting that the Chancellor first made a decree on his own authority
in 1474); Sevems, supra note 57, at 96 ("It was not until the end of the fifteenth century that purely
equity matters go to the chancellor alone."); Sparks, supra note 74, at 474 (quoting the proclamation
of 22 Edward IIl
addressed to the sheriffs of London "commanding them that, whatsoever business
relating as well to the common law of our kingdom, as our special grace, cognizable before us, from
henceforth to be prosecuted as followeth; viz., The common law business before the Archbishop of
Canterbury, elect, our chancellor, by him to be dispatched, and the other matters grantable by our
special grace be prosecuted before our special chancellor, or our well beloved clerk, the keeper of
the privy seal, so that they, or one of them, transmit to us such petitions of business which, without
consulting us, they cannot determine, together with their advice thereupon, without any further
prosecution to be had before use forthe same."). In an effort to date the commencement of a court of
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action.8" Equity as administered by this court served as both an
"appendix" and a competitor for the common law."' On one hand, as
already described above, Chancery was doing some convenient and
useful works that could not be done, or could not easily be done by the
law courts.82 By requiring the specific performance of contracts,
developing a law for vendors and purchasers of land, enjoining some of
the more common torts such as waste, trespass, and nuisance before they
were committed in the first instance, and by reforming or rescinding
contracts that were tainted by fraud and mistake, equity supplemented
the common law.83 Chancery could "adjust their decrees so as to meet
most, if not all, of these exigencies; and they [would] vary, qualify,
restrain, and model the remedy, so as to suit it to mutual and adverse
claims, controlling equities, and the real and substantial rights of all the
parties."84 In these instances, the "appendix" characterization is
especially appropriate, because equity also served as a catalyst for
significant reforms to the common law.8
Yet in every case in which the result reached in equity differed
materially from the judgment a court of law would give, there was a rival
chancery, it bears mention that the earliest writers of the common law, such as Bracton, Glanville,
Britton and Fleta make no reference to an equitable jurisdiction of a court of chancery. See also 10
SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY A.D. 1364 TO 1471 (William Paley Baildon ed.,

London, Bernard Quaritch 1896); id. at xix ("It seems clear that the Chancellor had and exercised
judicial functions of his own as early as the reign of Richard II if not Edward ll."). See generally
JOSEPH PARKES, A HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1828).

80. See Severns, supra note 57, at 88 ("No form was necessary and no strict procedure had to be
followed."); Walsh, supranote 56, at 106 ("Relief was given without a writ. The bill [in equity] was
generally in simply form, without formality, and free from the technical rules which applied to
writs."); Barbour, supra note 61, at 854 ("Less exactness of pleading was required than by the law,
and even if a bill were 'misconceived' the complaint was not out of court."); see also infra notes
173-82 and accompanying text.
81. See MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 19 ("1do not think that any one has expounded or ever will
expound equity as a single, consistent system, an articulate body of law. It is a collection of
appendixes between which there is no very close connection.").
82. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
83. See WALSH, supra note 53, at 28 (describing purpose of uses was to avoid the rigors of the
common law which forbad testamentary gifts of land as well as inter vivos transfers except by livery
of seisin); MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 4-7; Sidney Post Simpson, Fifty
Years of American Equity,
50 HARV. L. REV. 171 (1936).

84. I STORY, supra note 49, § 28, at 19.
85. For example, although law courts initially would not enforce instruments that had been lost or
destroyed, they ultimately adopted the equity practice of admitting secondary evidence of contents.
See generally Glenn & Redden, sapra note 52; MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 6-7; William F. Walsh,
Is Equity Decadent?, 22 MINN. L. REV. 479, 483-86 (1938) (discussing "the reforming influence of
equity"). See also infra note 297.
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system. 6 Broad categories of cases fared differently in the two systems.17
Equity also incorporated standards of morality into the calculus of
resolving any dispute. Indeed, equity corrected the law by applying, in
circumstances where the ordinary rules would lead to unwarranted
hardship, considerations of what was fair and just.8 "[W]hen the social
needs demand one settlement rather than another, there are times when
we must bend symmetry, ignore history and sacrifice custom in the
pursuit of larger ends."89 The regimes of law and equity thus approached
a given set of facts from opposite angles-invoking distinctive traditions,
applying different reasoning, and pursuing separate aims.9"
The principles of equity are, of course, merely a part of the larger
concept of fairness and justice upon which all law must be based.9 The
law's dilemma long has been to develop a jurisprudence that recognizes
when unique circumstances justify a departure from rigid rules.92 On the
one hand, there is no more fundamental social interest than that law
should be uniform and impartial.93 Commenting upon Lord Mansfield's
statement that "we must act alike in all cases of like nature," Judge
Henry J. Friendly termed this "the most basic principle of
jurisprudence."94 Indeed, "the normal and necessary marks, in a civilized
community, of justice administered according to law, are generality,
equality, certainty., 95 At the same time, however, hardly any two cases

86. See Holdsworth, supra note 54, at 15 (referring to law and equity as rival systems); Smith,
supra note 53, at 211 (crediting Professor A.B. White's characterization of equity as "the upstart
jurisdiction").
87. See Barbour, supra note 61, at 834 ("[E]quity is outside the common law, even antagonistic to
it."). See also infra note 19 1.
88. See Holdsworth, Equity, supranote 49, at 293 ("the root ... of equity [is] the idea that the law
should be fairly administered and that hard cases should as far as possible be avoided").
89. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, TitE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 65 (1921).
90. See Frierson, supranote 32, at 411.
91. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 110 (noting the intimacy of the relations among the basic
principles of "natural justice, equity, honesty, generosity and good conscience").
92. RALPit A. NEWMAN, EQUITY AND LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 19-20 (1961). See also
supranote 2.
93. CARDOZO, supra note 89, at I 12.

94. Henry J. Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion,31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
95. NEWMAN, supra note 92, at 19-20 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, JURISPRUDENCE 37 (5th ed.

1923)). See also GIORGIO DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE 173 n.13 (Edinburgh ed., 1952) ("the worst
misfortune of a civilized people is doubt about the impartiality of justice") (internal citation and
quotation omitted); GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 25-27 (1988); inf!ia note 436.
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are the same: 96 every case presents a moral problem, 97 and almost all
moral problems are unique.98
The expanding role of equity in the broader administration of justice
was controversial, yet constant. 99 The early chancellors decided cases
with little or no regard for precedent,' 0 basing their decisions largely
upon their idiosyncratic ideas of "conscience."'' The applicable rule
depended upon the notions of right and wrong possessed by each
chancellor, leading to Selden's well-known aphorism: "Equity is a
roguish thing. For law we have a measure ... equity is according to the
conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so
is equity. Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure
a Chancellor's foot."'0 2 Echoing the institutional resistance centuries
96. ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 65 (1924) ("Cases are seldom exactly alike.").
97. Felix S. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COL. L. REV. 809,
833 (1935) ("Every case presents a moral question to the court.").
98. NEWMAN, supra note 92, at 20. See Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588, 590 (2d Cir.
1951) (Hand, L., J.) ("Nor is it possible to make use of general principles, for almost every moral
situation is unique; and no one could be sure how far the distinguishing features of each case would
be morally relevant to one person and not to another.").
99. See Severns, supra note 57, at 82 ("no court has been so vigorously hated as the system called
Equity and the tribunal known as the High Court of Chancery"); Sparks, supra note 74, at 473 (as
equity "slowly but surely [was] enlarging and extending its mighty arm ... the encroachments it was
making.., seemed almost sacrilegious, so detestable, owing to the fact that its principles were
largely derived from the Roman or civil law, and its chancellors were generally ecclesiastics, and the
people generally did not desire to have the church gain so strong a hold upon their courts of justice
or the affairs of State, and it was evident the Court of Chancery was gaining, for fear that the church
would eventually assume control, dictate to the people, usurp their rights, and virtually subject to
them to the Church of Rome").
100. See Severns, supra note 57, at 99 (at least through the Fifteenth century, "the Chancellor did
not consider himself bound by any sort of fixed principles .... [T]here was no tendency, as in the
common law courts, to feel bound by precedent."). See generally W.H.D. Winder, Precedent in
Equity, 57 L.Q. REV. 245 (1941).
101.

See I JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 385, at 524 (2d

ed. 1892) ("[lit is undeniable that courts of equity do not recognize and protect the equitable rights
of litigant parties, unless such rights are, in pursuance of the settled juridical notions of morality,
based upon conscience and good faith."); Pound, Justice, supra note 49, at 698, n.9; Vidal v.
Girard's Exrs., 42 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 193 (1846) (Justice Story describing the Chancellor's reports
as "shadowy, obscure and flickering"); see also 3 JOHN REEVES, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 384-85

(2d ed. 1880) ("[i]ts jurisdiction did not comprehend a great extent and the exercise of it was feeble
and imperfect"). Cf Barbour, supra note 61, at 840 (suggesting that such a contemptuous view was
erroneous); Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 758, n.15 (chancellors were guided by a system of
law); Walsh, supra note 85, at 481, n.4 (discussing the jurisdiction of equity); Grupo Mexicano de
Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (suggesting that
equity is flexible but not omnipotent).
102. JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE-TALK 64 (The Legal Classics Library 1989). See also 6
BULSTRODE WHITELOCKE, COMMONS JOURNALS 373 (1650) ("The proceedings in Chancery are
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earlier to the establishment of the common law courts, 10 3 Parliament
again was threatened and-with the support of the common law
judges'14-- resisted the kings' and chancery's discretionary exercise of
power under the guise of equity and natural law.'05
Jealousy and conflict persisted until the relative authority of the two
rival systems was decided in the early seventeenth century, in a contest
between two of the great lawyers of all time, Coke and Bacon, in a drama
that could carry an opera.0 6 Throughout his career, Coke had defended
his venerable law-what he called "the perfection of reason"--against
the encroaching jurisdiction of equity.' The contest began with the
entry of a judgment in an action before Coke, apparently because the
defendant's material witnesses were somehow detained at an inn by
agents of the plaintiffs. Defendant thereafter sought relief in equity, and
Coke induced the plaintiffs to secure indictments against their opponents
for attacking a judgment of the King's Court.' The case was referred to
secendum arbitrium boni viri, and this arbitriun differeth as much in several men as their
countenances differ. That which is right in one man's eyes is wrong in another's."); Sevems, supra
note 57, at 82 (mocking the jurisprudence of equity as "some sort of Philosopher's Stone by which
injustice is whisked into justice by the simple method of preparing a form of petition lately called a
'bill').
103. See supranotes 57-66 and accompanying text.
104. See Sparks, supra note 74, at 477 (noting that equity was "strenuously opposed by the courts
of common law and its hosts of disciples, who, with watchful and jealous eyes, were the first to see
the encroachments [equity] was making").
105. Shortly after Edward III (1327-1377) had issued an ordinance directing that matters of grace
be referred to the Chancellor, Parliament denounced with severe penalties those "who so sue in any
other court to defeat or impeach the judgment given in the King's [common law] Court." 27 Edw.
I1l, c. 1. (1353). See Severns, supra note 57, at 88 ("[C]riticism came from the ruling class ... [In
the fourteenth century,] the bitterest criticism comes from the very defendants before the
chancellor."); EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

82-84 (1797). The House of Commons petitioned against Chancery ten times between the reigns of
Richard 11(1377-1399) and Henry VI (1422-1461). In 1653, the House of Commons voted that the
High Court of Chancery of England should be eliminated. See generally ALFRED HENRY MARSH,
HISTORY OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY (1890); Munger, supra note 49, at 52 (linking the resistance
to equity with a greater respect for English constitutional law and lex scripta); Pound, Justice, snpra
note 49, at 711, n.48 (suggesting that rigid laws discourage corruption); CHARLES E. PHELPS,
JURIDICAL EQUITY § 10 (1894); Holdsworth, Equit,, supra note 49, at 297 (suggesting that progress
of equity was hindered by Parliament).
106. Cf W. S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, IOLANTHE, act 1 (1882) reprinted in W. S. Gilbert,
THE SAVOY OPERAS 212 (1926) ("The Law is the true embodiment/Of everything that's excellent/It
has no kind of fault or flaw,/And 1,my Lords, embody the Law."). See generallv Joseph Z. Fleming,
The Privatization Precedent Set by the Lord Chancellor in lolanthe: An Analysis of Walker v.
McKnight, 30 URB. LAW 233 (1998).
107. See Munger, supra note 49, at 45-46.
108. See id. at 46.

Equity and Procedure
the law officers who, under the leadership of Bacon in 1616, sustained
Chancellor Ellesmere." °9 Recognizing that justice required not only the
certainty of law but also the discretion of equity, King James I"'°
established both the legitimacy and the primacy of equity within a dual
system. "'
Shortly thereafter, in 1618, Bacon became the Lord Chancellor, and a
fundamental transformation of chancery was underway." 2 For many
centuries the sweeping jurisdiction of equity had been untrammeled by
any definite rule." 3 But chancery could not remain a "fountain of
unlimited dispensations."' " To reform the "heterogeneous medley of
empirical remedies,""' 5 Bacon issued one hundred rules of equity that
were "wisely conceived, and expressed with the greatest precision and
perspicuity.""1 6 Continuing thereafter, particularly under the

109. King James I had little inclination to act otherwise since upholding the authority of the
chancellor was consistent with the royal prerogative. This finally settled the power of Chancery to
make good its decree, though directly opposed to the results in the same controversy at law, by the
exercise of its power in personam over the parties to the litigation. See Munger, supra note 49, at
45-46. See also Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 777 (contrasting Coke with Sir Thomas More
who, nearly a century earlier, averted such conflict by "inviting the judges to dinner, so that the
matter could be pleasantly discussed").
110. James I reigned from 1603-1625. For relevant background on King James 1, see SMITH,
supra note 53, at 303-18.
111. See Munger, supra note 49, at 45-46.
112. Barbour, supra note 61, at 858-59 (dating "the change" in equity to the era of James 1). See
generally Jack Moser, The Secularization of Equity: Ancient Religious Origins, Feudal Christian
Influences, and Medieval Authoritarian Impacts on the Evolution of Legal Equitable Remedies, 26
CAP. U. L. REV. 483 (1997); Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW
& HIST. REV. 245 (1996).
113. See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text. See also I JOHN FONBLANQUE, A TREATISE
OF EQUITY § 3 (London, A. Strahan & W. Woodfall, Ist ed. 1793) ("So there will be a necessity of
having recourse to natural principles, that what is wanting to the finite may be supplied out of that
which is infinite. And this is properly what is called equity, in opposition to strict law .... And thus
in chancery every particular case stands upon its own particular circumstances; and, although the
common law will not decree against the general rule of law, ye chancery doth, so as the example
introduce not a general mischief. Every matter, therefore, that happens inconsistent with the design
of the legislator, or is contrary to natural justice, may find relief here.").
114. Frederick Pollock, The Transformation of Equity, in FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 293 (1882) (Chancery became "as regular a court ofjurisdiction as any
other"); MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 9 ("In the second half of the sixteenth century the jurisprudence
of the court is becoming settled.").
115. Smith, supra note 20, at 315.
116. 2 JOHN LORD, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL OF

ENGLAND 134 (5th ed. 1868) ("They are the foundation of the practice of the Court of Chancery, and
are still cited as authority.").
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Chancellorships of Lord Nottingham and Lord Hardwicke," 7 the exercise
of equity became more circumscribed, if not predictable.' 8 Chancery no
longer "decide[d] every individual case according to the result of a sort
of ransacking search for the particular set of conscientious principles
applicable to the case." ' ' 9 Indeed, as Nottingham and Hardwicke
"deliberately set out to reduce equity to a system of rules established by
' 2
precedent,"' 2 0 the jurisdiction of equity "crystallized."' '

But one commentator's crystallization is another's ossification. As the
jurisdiction of equity lost its youthful exuberance, so also its freedom,
elasticity and luminance. 22 The administration of equity, much like the
administration of law became bound and confined by the channels of its
own precedents and the technicalities of its own procedures.' 23 Chancery,
117. Lord Nottingham served as Lord Chancellor from 1673 to 1682. See generallv 4 CAMPBELL,
supra note 116, at 236-79. Lord Hardwicke served from 1736 to 1756. See generally 6 CAMPBELL,
supra note 116, at 158-304.
118. See Sparks, supra note 74, at 477 ("as time passed on ... opposition gradually diminished").
See, e.g., Bond v. Hopkins, I Sch. & Lef. 413, 428 (1802) ("The cases which occur are various, but
they are decided on fixed principles. Courts of equity have in this respect no more discretionary
power than courts of law. They decide new cases, as they arise, by the principles on which former
cases have been decided, and may then illustrate or enlarge the operation of those principles; but the
principles are as fixed and certain as the principles on which the courts of common law proceed.").
119. H.G. Hanbury, The Field of Modern Equity, 45 L.Q. REV. 196, 205 (1929).
120. Severns, supra note 57, at 105-06. For an example of Chancery recognizing a doctrine of
stare decisis, see Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swans. 585, 591 (1672). Hardwicke "labored indefatigably to
forge those positive precepts which in his estimation would best 'externalize the traditional
philosophy of Chancery."' Brendan F. Brown, Lord Hardwicke and the Science of Trust Law, II
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 319,319 (1935-1936).
121. See Hanbury, supra note 119, at 205 (Nottingham "stiffened and rationalized old ideas and
turned them to permanent and practical use."); id. at 196 (detailing "the transformation from a
heterogonous medley of isolated, empirical beliefs into a stable and increasingly rigid system of
rules."). See also James O'Connor, Thoughts About the Common Law, 3 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 161, 164
(1928) (referring to the "crystallized conscience" of equity). See generallv MAITLAND, supra note 7,
at 9 (noting that during the sixteenth century, "[tihe day for ecclesiastical Chancellors is passing
away"); Paul Vinogradoff, Reason and Conscience in Sixteenth Century Jurisprudence, 24 LAW Q.
REV. 373 (1908); SHAPIRO, supra note 2.
122. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 345 ("Equity became handcuffed by a rigorous body of rules
and concepts."); see also id. at 351 ("The times were not suitable for reasoned discretion. The public
demanded certainty.").
123. See Charles Synge Christopher & Baron Bowen, Progress in the Administration of Justice
During the Victorian Period, in I SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 516, 529

(1907) ("'No man, as things now stand,' says in 1839 Mr. George Spence, the author of the wellknown work on the equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, 'can enter into a Chancery suit
with any reasonable hope of being alive at its termination, if he has a determined adversary."'). A
vivid picture of the technicalities, delays, and expense involved in a suit in chancery is to be found in
the case of Jarndyce v. Jarndyce, as related in Charles Dickens' BLEAK HOUSE (Houghton Mifflin
Co. 1956) (1853). Some have suggested that Dickens' negative depiction is exaggerated. See

Equity and Procedure
too, became ajus strictum differing little from the common law except in
point of identity of the judicial decisions it had made its own..24 Indeed,
by the first quarter of the nineteenth century, equity had become "so
fixed, so125certain, that lawyers could say, 'There is nothing new in
'
equity. 1
Meanwhile, the early American courts were modeling the English
method of complementary systems of law and equity.' 2 6 Even prior to the
American Revolution, "courts of chancery had existed in some shape or
other in every one of the thirteen colonies.'

27

Pursuant to Article Ill,

generally WILLIAM SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN (Yale Univ.

1929).
124. See Douglas M. Gane, The Birth of a New Equity, 67 THE SOLICITORS' JOURNAL 572, 572
(1923). See also Brown, supra note 120, at 325 ("In the eighteenth century... not only was
Chancery following the law, but the Common Law in turn was becoming more and more
equitized."); I HOLDSWORTH, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 49, at 74-75.
125. Sevems, supranote 57, at 106.
126. See MILLAR, supra note 23, at 39-42; I STORY, supra note 49, § 56, at 46-48; WILLIAM F.
WALSH, The Growing Function of Equity in the Development of Law, in LAW: A CENTURY OF
PROGRESS, 1835-1935 (N.Y.U. Press 1937); WALSH, supra note 51, at 69-70; Ingersoll, supra note
49, at 65; Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 757. See also United States v. King, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
833, 846-47 (1849) ("The distinction between law and equity is recognized everywhere in the
jurisprudence of the United States."); Livingston v. Story, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 351, 394 (1835) ("The
separation of cases in law, from those in equity, is a necessary incident of the common law.").
127. Solon Dyke Wilson, Courts of Chancery in the American Colonies, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS,
supra note 123, at 779. For the early history of equity in the United States, see also Robert von
Moschzisker, Equity Jurisdictionin the FederalCourts, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 287 (1927). Cf Joseph H.
Beale, Equity in America, I CAMBRIDGE L.J. 21, 23 (1923) ("In New England there was no equity
jurisdiction and very little admixture of equity in the law. The law administered was the strictly legal
portion of the law; and the books cited, when they came to cite books, were the reports of the
common law courts ....Pennsylvania never had any court of equity. The law, however, had more of
what they regarded as equitable doctrines in it than the law of Massachusetts ....In New Jersey and
Delaware, however, and throughout the South, there was set up at the time of our Revolution a
separate Court of Chancery, sitting beside the Common Law Court and administering the principles
of English equity."). There was some hostility to the notion of equity and discretion, which ran
counter to the notion of certain Puritan ideals. See generally WILLIAM HENRY LOYD, THE EARLY
COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA CH. 4 (1910); Sydney George Fisher, The Administration of Equity
Through Common Law Forms in Pennsylvania, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS, supra note 123, at 810, 811
(detailing particular objections raised by mernbers of the Quaker faith); Edwin H. Woodruff,
Chancery inMassachusetts, 5 L.Q. REV. 370 (1889); Wilson, supra, at 795; von Moschzisker, supra,
at 288-89 (describing hostility toward equity, which was perceived "as an appendage of the Crown's
prerogative); Sparks, supranote 74, at 478 ("In New York the first court of chancery was established
in 1701; but it was so unpopular, from its powers being vested in the governor and council, that it
had very little business until it was reorganized in 1778 ....Courts of chancery did not make much
progress in this country until after the Revolution, and even after this period they did not increase in
number in a very rapid manner, the people in our own country looking upon it with suspicion and
jealousy, the idea generally prevailing that it was a court arbitrary in its nature."); cf ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE & JOHN P. MALONEY, CASES ON EQUITY 9 (2d ed. 1946) (suggesting that the failure to
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Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts could extend to certain cases "in Law and Equity.' ' 28 Although
Congress did not create a separate court of equity in the Judiciary Act of
1789, it contemplated that the federal court system would administer law
and equity on different "sides" of the court and by different
procedures. 29 The federal courts tried cases at law and suits in equity
within a "temple of justice ... [metaphorically]

constructed with a

partition extending from the foundation to the roof."'13' Federal judges
131
thus alternately played the role of common law judge or of chancellor.
Suits in equity were decided in accordance with the principles and
practice of equity jurisdiction as established in the High Court of
32
Chancery in England. 1
embrace equity was the result primarily of practical difficulties, not hostility); deFuniak, supra note
56, at 58 (noting the financial strain on states that could not afford to establish and maintain two sets
of courts).
128. U.S. CONST. art. 111,§ 2. See generally Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 64 (1907) (federal
judicial power extends to cases in law and in equity). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XI (declaring
that judicial power shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law and equity prosecuted against
the States).
129. See Schurmeier v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 F. 1, 16 (1909) (Sanbom, J., dissenting)
("The union of legal and equitable causes of action in one suit is prohibited by § 913, Revised
Statutes (United States Comp. St., 1901, at 683), and in removal cases, when such a union is
permitted in the state courts from which they come, the causes of action must be separated into
distinct actions at law and suits in equity in the national courts."). See generally Ingersoll, supra note
49, at 63-65 (recognizing two sides to the court "and between them there is no possible
connection"); Glenn & Redden, supra note 52, at 757 ("the same judge would do equity work one
day and sit as a common law judge on another"); U.S. COMP. STAT. § 913 (1901) (the forms and
mode of procedure in equity shall be according to the rules and usages of courts of equity); id. § 917
(authorizing Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice in courts of equity); JAMES LOVE
HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 2-4 (7th ed. 1930).
For cases discussing a separate jurisdiction in equity, see, e.g., Fenn v. Hohne, 42 U.S. (I
How.) 484, 485, 487 (1858) (distinction explicitly declared in the constitution and separate
jurisdiction carefully defined and established); Berkev w. Cornell, 90 F. 717, 718 (1898) (separate
equitable jurisdiction extends to cases involving purely legal rights); Thompson v. Central Ohio
Raihoad, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867) (law and equity not to be blended together in one suit);
and Noonan v. Lee, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 499, 509 (1862) (separate jurisdiction is constitutionally
required). See also Twist v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 274 U.S. 684, 690-91 (1927).
130. Gustavus Ohlinger, Problems of Jorisdictionand Venue, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 240, 255 (1944).
13 1. See Charles T. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equitv, 6 N.C. L. REV. 283, 284 (1928).
132. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. at 318 (citing
Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939)); Alger v. Anderson, 92 F. 696, 700
(1899) (stating foundation of equity jurisprudence lies in the system of the English court of
chancery); Blackburn v. Selma, M. & M. R. Co., 3 F. 689, 692-93 (1880) (citing Federal Equity
Rule 90); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 563 (1851) (stating usages of
High Court of Chancery govem); Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 205 (1893) (setting forth that
equity jurisdiction is the same authority possessed by high court of chancery in England and is
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The test of equitable jurisdiction long has been whether the law courts
could provide "plain, adequate and complete" relief. 33 Whenever a court
of law was competent to take cognizance of a right and had the power to
proceed to a judgment that afforded plain, adequate and complete relief,
the plaintiff had to proceed at law because, inter alia, the defendant had 3a4
right to a trial by jury, which was available only in the law courts.
Courts of equity thus steadily refused to entertain jurisdiction of actions
where the law courts both recognized a right and offered a remedy. 135 In
order to 3deny the jurisdiction of equity the remedy at law had to be as
,,adequate," 131 "full,",40 "practical,"141
"plain,"1 "certain,""' "prompt,"

subject neither to limitation nor restraint by state legislation, and is uniform throughout the United
States).
133. See Kittle, supra note 49, at 29 ("It was not... until the law courts began to administer
justice in a more fixed and certain manner that the equity courts adopted the rule that they would not
take jurisdiction where there is a complete, adequate and plain remedy at law."); I STORY, supra
note 49, § 33, at 22-26; GEORGE COOPER, A TREATISE OF PLEADING ON THE EQUITY SIDE OF THE
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 128-29 (1813); MERWIN, supra note 66, at 17 ("equity will not take
jurisdiction whenever there is a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at common law"). See, e.g.,
Earl of Oxford's Case, I Ch. Rep. 1 (1615). See also U.S. COMP. STAT. § 723 (1901); Jones v. Mut.
Fid. Co., 123 F. 506, 517 (1903); Thompson v. Cent. Ohio R.R., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134, 137 (1867);
Farwell v. Colonial Trust Co., 147 F. 480, 482-83 (1906); Williams v. Neely, 134 F. 1 (1904);
Brown v. Arnold, 131 F. 723, 727 (1904); Wiemer v. Louisville Water Co., 130 F. 246, 250 (1903);
Monmouth Invest. Co. v. Means, 151 F. 160, 165 (1906); Miller v. Steele, 153 F. 714 (1907); Wolf
v. Lovering, 159 F. 91 (1908); Root v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 105 U.S. 207, 215-16 (1881);
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Bonner Mercantile Co., 44 F. 151, 155 (1890); McMullen Lumber Co. v.
Strother, 136 F. 295, 302 (1905); Payne v. Kan. & Ark. Valley R.R., 46 F. 546, 552 (1891); Lewis v.
Cocks, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 466, 470 (1874); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 460, 462 (1855); Grether v. Wright, 75 F. 742, 749 (1896).
134. See, e.g., Hipp v. Babin, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 271, 277 (1856); Smyth v. Banking Co., 141
U.S. 656, 660 (1891); Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 573 (1884). The right to a jury trial
remains "the sword in the bed that prevents the complete union of law and equity." EDWARD D. RE
& JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES 47 (5th ed. 2000) (quoting an unpublished lecture of Professor Zechariah
Chafee, Jr.). See also Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat'l Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242 (1922) ("The most
important limitation upon a federal union of the two kinds of remedies in one form of action is the
[jury trial] requirement of the Constitution."); Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local 391, 484 U.S.
558 (1990) (describing two-fold inquiry for determining whether action is legal or equitable, and
thereby determining the availability vel non of a jury trial right: first, locating an eighteenth century
analog in the courts of England; and second, examining the remedy).
135. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Hannan, 26 F. 657, 663-64 (1885) (no equity jurisdiction where plain
and adequate remedy at law by an action of ejectment for the recovery of the possession of the lands
the mesne profits); Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124-25 (1892).
136. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 591
(1892); Smith v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. 832, 839 (1898);
(1896); Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801, 816
505, 505-15 (1889).
137. Brun v. Mann, 151 F. 145, 154 (1906); Brewster,

(1858); Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79, 95
W. Assurance Co. v. Ward, 75 F. 338, 342
(1905); Kilboum v. Sunderland, 130 U.S.
140 F. at 816.
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"complete, '' 144 and "efficient ' ' 4' as the remedy in
equity. 46 Naturally, this language left much to the discretion of the
chancellor, and consistent with the general principle of equity to address
new or unforeseen circumstances,' 47 the equities in each case controlled
48
the court's exercise of that broad discretion.
just,

final, ''

43

138. Tiller, 143 U.S. at 95; Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. at 839; W. Assurance Co., 75 F. at 342; Brun,

151 F. at 154; Brewster, 140 F. at 816; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 12
(1898); Springfield Mill Co. v. Barnard & L. Mfg. Co., 81 F. 261, 266 (1897).
139. Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868); Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. at 839; W.
Assurance Co., 75 F. at 342; Mann, 151 F. at 154; Brewster, 140 F. at 816; Walla Walla, 172 U.S. at
12; Sunderland, 130 U.S. at 505-15; Springfield Mill Co., 81 F. at 266.
140. Brewster, 140 F. at 816.
141. Tyler, 143 U.S. at 95; Payne, 74 U.S. at 430; Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. at 839; W.Assurance
Co., 75 F. at 342; Walla Walla, 172 U.S. at 12; Springfield Mill Co., 81 F. at 266.
142. Brun, 151 F. at 154.
143. W.Assurance Co., 75 F. at 342; Springfield Mill Co., 81 F. at 266.
144. Tyler, 143 U.S. at 95; Payne, 74 U.S. at 430; Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. at 839; W.Assurance
Co., 75 F. at 342; Brun, 151 F. at 154; Brewster, 140 F. at 816; Walla Walla, 172 U.S. at 12;
Kilbourn, 130 U.S. at 505-15; Springfield Mill Co., 81 F. at 266.
145. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 591 (1858); Tyler, 143 U.S. at 95; Payne, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) at 430; Am. Natl Bank, 89 F. at 839; W.Assurance Co., 75 F. at 342; Brun, 151 F. at 154;
Brewster, 140 F. at 816; Walla Walla, 172 U.S. at 12; Kilbourn, 130 U.S. at 505-15; Springfield Mill
Co., 81 F. at 266.
146. See generally Pokegarna Sugar Pine Lumber Co. v. Klamath River Lumber & lmprov. Co.,
96 F. 34, 55 (1899); Bank of Ken. v. Stone, 88 F. 383, 390 (1898); Am. Nat'l Bank, 89 F. at 839;
Schmidt v. West, 104 F. 272, 273 (1900); Beloit v. Morgan, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 619, 623 (1868).
147. See, e.g., Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 79-80 (1866); Boyce v. Grundy, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 218-20 (1830); Sullivan v. Portland & K. R. Co., 94 U.S. 806, 811-12 (1876);
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pearson, 114 F. 395, 396 (1902). See also Toledo, A.A. & N.M. Ry. v. Penn.
Co., 54 F. 746, 751 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) ("[T]he powers of a court of equity are as vast, and its
processes and procedure as elastic, as all the changing emergencies of increasingly
complex ... relations and the protection of rights can demand.") (quoting Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v.
Union Pac. Ry., 47 F. 15 (C.C. Neb. 1891)), cited in Wasserman, supra note 33, at 623. This same
principle is reflected centuries later in the legislation enabling the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of equity procedure. See U.S. COM'. STAT. § 913 (1901) ("The forms and modes of proceeding
in suits of equity ... shall be according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of
equity ... except when it is otherwise provided by statue or by rules of court made in pursuance
thereof.").
148. See supra notes 84 and 101.
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1I.

THE DISAGGREGATION OF SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE

In 1753, with the process of transforming equity into a regular system
of settled principles and rules well underway, 4 9 Sir William Blackstone,
in opening the first course on English law ever offered in an English

university said that "law is to be considered not only as a matter of
practice but also as a rational science."' 5 ° Blackstone undertook to
discern these scientific principles in four immensely influential volumes
of Commentaries on the Laws of England published from 1765 to
1769. '' We might have expected the Commentaries to provide as
valuable a picture of the condition of equity as Blackstone has given us
of the condition of other parts of English law at the same period.' 52 Yet
that expectation is not realized. In fact, Blackstone largely ignored
equity,' 3 finding the law/equity distinction to be superficial. 54 The
scientific
approach
advanced
by
Blackstone
placed
a
149. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
150. Harold J. Berman & Charles J.Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science:
From Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J.437, 442-43, n.8 (1996) (quoting 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1st ed. 1766); WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1756)). See generally William Searle
Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1929-1930). See also infra
note 194 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 21. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A
CRITICISM OF WILLIAM BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (C. Everett ed.,

1928); William Blake Odgers, Sir William Blackstone (Part 1),27 YALE L.J.
599 (1918); William
Blake Odgers, Sir William Blackstone (Part 2), 28 YALE L.J.
542 (1919); Holdsworth, supra note
150; William Searle Holdsworth, Some Aspect of Blackstone and His Commentaries, 4 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 261, 263 (1932); LEWIS C. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE (1938); DAVID A.
LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE (1938); DANIEL J.BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE

OF THE LAW (1958); Dennis R. Nolan, Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A
Study of Intellectual Impact, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 731, 735 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of
Black-stones Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); John W. Cairns, Blackstone, An English
Institution: Legal Literature and the Rise of the Nation State, 4 OXFORD J.LEGAL STUD. 318, 327
(1984); DAVID LIEBERMAN, FROM BLACKSTONE TO BENTHAM: COMMON LAW VERSUS
LEGISLATION IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1989); Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering

Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1996); David Lemmings, Blackstone and Law Reform by
Education: Preparation for the Bar and Lawyerly Culture in Eighteenth Centuty England, 16 L. &
HIST. REV. 211 (1998); Douglas H. Cook, Sir William Blackstone: A Life and Legacy Set Apart for
God's Work, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 169 (2000-2001).
152. See Holdsworth, supra note 150,at 1.
153. See Munger, supra note 49, at 49 ("Writing his treatise in 1765 in volumes comprising more
than a thousand pages, [Blackstone] finds room only for a scant eight pages for a discussion of
equity.").
154. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 78:429, 2003

substance/procedure dichotomy as the fundamental elements of law
worthy of attention. 55 The new paradigm had a significant effect on both
the law courts and the equity courts, where substance and procedure long
had been inextricably intertwined.
A.

The Integrationof Substance and ProcedurePriorto Blackstone

For centuries prior to Blackstone the substance of the English
common law had been buried in the cumbersome procedure of the law
courts-and particularly in its pleading rules. 5 6 The two defining
characteristics of common law pleading were its processes of issue
formation and its system of forms of action.' 57 Regarding the former, the
parties by successive pleadings conceding or contesting the various
contentions would reduce the dispute to a single issue then to be triedoften by a jury. 5' Single-issue pleading precluded the joinder of multiple
claims or defenses, the joinder of multiple parties, and pleading in the
alternative.' 59 The system required an intricate network of highly
155. See inji'a notes 183-93 and accompanying text; see also Subrin, supra note 23, at 929-30
("Blackstone atomized the study of law by separating not only rights from wrongs, but also the
methods of enforcement from both. He treated English law as a rational, objective science,
congruent with natural law. Blackstone, thus, disassociated the leaming of rights, wrongs, and
methods of enforcement from the socialeconomic-political environment.").
156. For general background on the role of pleading in procedure, see HENRY JOHN STEPHEN,
PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 7 (2d ed. 1901) ("The subjects of Pleadings, Practice
and Evidence comprise what is commonly called the law of procedure."); Henry R. Gibson, The
Philosophy of Pleading, 2 YALE L.J. 181 (1893).
157. For the historical significance and uniqueness of single-issue pleading and the forms of
action, see STEPHEN, supra note 156, at § 132 ("As the object of all pleading or judicial allegation is
to ascertain the subject for decision, so the main object of that system of pleading established in the
common law of England is to ascertain it by the production of an issue. And this appears to be
peculiar to that system. To the best of the author's infornation, at least, it is unknown in the present
practice of any other plan ofjudicature. In all courts, indeed, the particular subject for decision must,
of course, be in some manner developed before the decision can take place; but the methods
generally adopted for this purpose differ widely from that which belongs to the English law."); and
KOFFLER & REPPY, supra note 59, at 32 ("The Common-Law Forms of Action had their Origin in
the Action and Inter-action which took place between the Chancellor and the Three Royal Courts,
King's Bench, Exchequer and Common Pleas, whereby individual litigants applied to the chancery
for Original Writs authorizing one of the three Courts to try a Specific Action.").
158. See general' STEPHEN, supra note 156; BENJAMIN SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW
PLEADING (1894);

R. Ross PERRY, COMMON-LAW PLEADING (1897); KOFFLER & REPPY, supra

note 59, at 532 ("The reduction of the controversy to Issues is the great Object of Pleading.").
159. See supra note 62; see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON
LAW 70-81 (2d ed. 1981); PERRY, supra note 158, at 109 ("No action could be grounded on two

original writs, nor could one writ be in two forms. Consequently only such counts could be joined as
could properly be grouped under one and the same original writ.").

Equity and Procedure

technical rules designed to aid or force the parties' dispute to converge
upon a single issue of law or fact. 60 These rules earned common law
pleading the dubious distinction as "the most exact, if not the most
'6
occult, of the sciences.' '
The other distinguishing feature of common law pleading was the
form of action. Each writ incorporated a distinct method of procedure
adapted to that particular form of action.1 62 The writ governed the whole
course of litigation from beginning to end, and the plaintiff selected the
most appropriate writ at his peril. 63 Comparing litigation to battle and

160. There are three fundamental rules to single-issue pleading. First, after a declaration, the
parties must at each stage (i) demur; (ii) plead by way of traverse; or (iii) plead by way of confession
and avoidance. Second, upon a traverse issue must be tendered. And third, the issue when well
tendered must be accepted. Either by virtue of the first rule a demurrer takes place which is a tender
of an issue in law, or, by the joint operation of the first two rules, the tender of an issue in fact. And
then, by virtue of the second and third rules, the issue so tendered, whether in fact or in law, is
accepted and becomes finally complete. It is by these rules that the production of an issue is effected.
See generalli STEPHEN, supra note 156, at § 136. Encyclopedic volumes of supplemental rules and
principles ensure the production of an issue that is truly but one issue, see, e.g., id. §§ 137-69, 264339, that is material, see, e.g., id. §§ 170-74, 340-45, and is unified, see, e.g., id. §§ 175-90, 34671, and is certain, see, e.g., id §§ 191-228, 372-430, and is neither obscure nor confusing, see, e.g.,
id. §§ 229-43, 431-52, and will lead to neither prolixity nor delay in pleading, see, e.g., id. §§ 24449, 453-65. See also id. §§ 250-59, 466-81 ("Certain Miscellaneous Rules"); PERRY, supra note
158, at 231-81 (explaining the rules and mechanics of issue pleading).
161. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, sutpra note 49, at 612. See also I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, su)ra
note 49, at 559 (explaining that, within this system "the whole fate of a lawsuit depends upon the
exact words that the parties utter when they are before the tribunal"); MILSOM, supra note 159, at
335 ("it is only by confusing the issues that legal development becomes possible"); supra notes 6366. For a more positive depiction of the common law writ system, see Robert Bone, Mapping the
Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of/deal Lawsuit Structure ftom the Field Code to the Federal
Rides, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 20-21 n.41 (1989).
162. See MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 3 ("'a form of action' has implied a particular original
process, a particular mcsne process, a particular final process, a particular mode of pleading, of trial,
of judgment"); 2 SAMUEL WARREN, A POPULAR AND PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO LAW STUDIES,
759 (3d ed. London 1863) (a form of action is the "technical mode of framing the writ, and pleadings
appropriate to the particular injury"); KOFFLER, stupra note 59, at 66 ("[A] form of Action" may be
defined as a Procedural Device whereby the primitive mind gave concrete expression to a theory of
liability; it is a mechanism through which the doctrine or principle of Law applicable to the
Statement of a Plaintiffs Cause of Action may be enforced.").
163. See BAKER, supra note 57, at 52; KOFFLER, supra note 59, at 39 ("When the plaintiff
petitioned the Chancellor for an Original Writ, he was tinder great pressure to select the right Writ
for the facts of his case ....If he selected a Form of Writ which did not fit his case ... he could not
succeed."); CHARLES HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA
AND ENGLAND 46 (1897) ("If a wrong action was adopted, the error was fatal to the whole
proceeding, however clearly the facts of the controversy might have been brought before the proper
court ....It was not enough that he stood within the temple of justice, he must have entered through
a particular door.").
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the forms of action to an armory, Pollock and Maitland offer this vivid
imagery:
[The system of common law forms of action] contains every
species of medieval weapon from a two handed sword to the
poniard. The man who has a quarrel with his neighbor comes hither
to choose his weapon. The choice is large; but he must remember
that he will not be able to change weapons in the middle of the
combat and also that every weapon has its proper use and may be
put to none other. If he selects a sword, he must observe the rules of
sword-play; he must not try to use his cross-bow as a mace. 164
The procedural apparatus was fundamental to the common law, not
simply because lawyers were more punctilious about forms than they
now are, but also because the procedural institutions preceded the
substantive law as it is now understood.' 65 Indeed, this glorification of
form led Sir Henry Maine to suggest "that substantive law has at first the
look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.' 6 6 Prior
to Blackstone, these forms of action were the objects of both legal reform
and legal study. 167 The principles of the common law had not been
mapped out in the abstract, but instead grew around the forms by which
justice was centralized and administered by the law courts. 168 "There was
no substantive law to which pleading was adjective. These were the
' 69
terms in which the law existed and in which lawyers thought."'
164. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 49, at 559. See also HEPBURN, supra note 163, at 4748 (using the same metaphor, "[a]ll the weapons ofjuridical warfare are here").
165. See BAKER, supra note 57, at 49. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
166. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (Arno Press
1975) (1886). For a broader discussion of the procreative significance of procedure vis-a-vis
substance, see PLUCKNETT, supra note 23, at 379-81; MILLAR, supra note 23, at 3 ("Procedure

belongs to the institutions of earliest development .... At a time when substantive legal conceptions
are visible only in the faintest of outline, procedure meets us as a figure already perfected and
exact."); MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 3.

167. See Steele, supra note 58, at 10-1I; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, sutpra note 49, at 559 ("Our
forms of action are not mere rubrics nor dead categories; they are not the outcome of a classificatory
process that has been applied to pre-existing materials; they are institutes of the law; they are, we say
it without scruple, living things."); PERRY, supra note 158, at 3 ("It may be thought these are
extravagant expressions of men who were educated to see excellence in anything that was technical
and abstruse. When Littleton says that the law is proved by the pleading, and when Coke adds,
approvingly, 'as if pleading were the living voice of the law itself,' they are not using mere figures
of rhetoric."); see also infja note 170.
168. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 23, at 380-81 (discussing efforts of Glanville, Bracton and
Littleton). See also BAKER, sutpra note 57, at 49-52.
169. MILSOM, supra note 159, at 59.
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Accordingly, a substantive law of, say, torts, could only be explained
through the actions of trespass, case and trover. 7 ° "[O]ne could say next
to nothing about actions in general, while one could discourse at great
length about the mode in which an action of this or that sort was to be
pursued and defended."'' The common law "became
so interested in
172
forms that they allowed the substance to escape."'
Meanwhile in equity courts, for centuries prior to Blackstone,
procedure had been consumed by a broad substantive mandate. Whereas
the common law over-emphasized form, chancery historically had
eschewed it.' 73 There were no forms of action nor emphasis upon the
74
formation of a single issue: 1

In the equity procedure one encounters no bewildering rules as to
the name or classification of the particular suit, or according to the
nomenclature at law, "forms of action." When from an
investigation of the law and facts, counsel has determined that the
client has a good cause for equitable relief, he is saved the problem
of wasting brain-sweat in deciding whether he shall sue in debt,
assumpsit, or covenant, in trover or replevin, in trespass vi et armis
or trespass
on the case. He simply decides to file a "bill in
' 75
equity."'
The bill in equity was to perform only two functions: to state the facts
upon which the claims were based and to outline the discovery sought

170. See KOFFLER, supra note 59, at 65 ("The Law was required to express itself through the
Limited System of Writs and Forms of Action sanctioned by precedent.").
171. MILLAR, supra note 23, at 3-4 (quoting 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 49, at 562).

172. Garrett, supra note 63, at 31.
173. See supra note 80. See also Garrett, supra note 63, at 33, 36 (with its "crazy-quilt of
allegation and counterallegation .. .procedure is, to Chancery, the vulnerable spot in an otherwise
almost perfect legal system").
174. In its earliest stages, a bill could be filed informally and there were no technical rnles of
pleading. See, e.g., the bills contained in SELDEN SOCIETY, supra note 79. See generally Holdsworth,
supra note 54, at 12-14 (discussing procedure on bills in chancery). Over time, equity procedure
became rather technical, drawing upon the principles of the English ecclesiastical courts. See JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADING § 13 (1857); see also supra notes 122-25. Because

the pleadings were swom statements providing the facts upon which the case was decided, they
tended to be quite detailed. See CHARLES A. KEIGWIN, CASES IN EQUITY PLEADING (2d ed. 1933);
MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 6; Kittle, supra note 49; CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL,
SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING 9-11 (2d ed. 1883).
175. EDWIN B. MEADE, LILE'S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 95, at 59 (3d ed. 1952).
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from the defendant.' 76 After the filing of the answer by the defendant, the
only other pleading was a formal replication by the plaintiff. 77 Indeed,
animated by the juristic principles of discretion, natural justice, fairness
and good conscience, 78 the essence of a jurisprudence of equity is
somewhat inconsistent with the establishment of formal rules. 1 79 Efforts
to define the jurisdiction of equity surrendered to circularity-e.g., "that
body of rules which is administered only by those courts which are
known as Courts of Equity."' 8 Hence the characterization of equity as
176. See LANGDELL, supra note 174, at 9-11.
177. See id.; see also MEADE, su)ra note 175, § 93, at 58 (explaining that the replication is "[t]he
very brief pleading by which the plaintiff takes issue on the facts set up in defendant's plea or
answer. It is a bare denial of such facts, and its purpose is simply to put the defendant on notice that
his defensive allegations of fact are not admitted, but must be established by evidence. On the filing
of the replication, the parties are supposed to be at issue, and the cause matured and ready for the
taking of testimony."); MILLAR, sttpra note 23, at 25-26 (explaining procedure); W. S. SIMKINS, A
FEDERAL EQUITY SUIT 462-64 (2d ed. 1911) (same). See generallv Richard Marcus, Completing
Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 726 (contrasting trial practices of law and equity courts).
178. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence qf Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 20 (1905); see also
supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
179. See generally MAITLAND, stlpranote 7, at 12-22; JOHN SALMOND, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF
JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1893) (suggesting there is no body of riles for equity). See BALDWIN, supra note
65, at 64 (equity a court "of indefinite powers and unrestricted procedure"). This same principle is
reflected centuries later in the legislation enabling the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of equity
procedure. See U.S. COMP. STAT. § 913 (1901) ("The forms and modes of proceeding in suits of
equity... shall be according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of
equity ... except when it is otherwise provided by statue or by rules of court made in pursuance
thereof.").
180. MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 1. See also I POMEROY, supra note 101, § 67, at 70-71
(defining equity as "those doctrines and rules, primary and remedial rights and remedies, which the
common law, by reason of its fixed methods and remedial system, was either unable or inadequate,
in the regular course of its development, to establish, enforce, and confer, and which it therefore
either tacitly omitted or openly rejected"); EDMUND H.T. SNELL, Tim PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 2 (18th
ed. 1920) ("Equity... may be defined as that portion of natural justice which, though of such a
nature as properly to admit of being judicially enforced, was, from circumstances hereafter to be
noticed, omitted to be enforced by the Common Law Courts-an omission which was supplied by
the Court of Chancery."); MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, ELEMENTS OF EQUITY 9 (1879) ("The
jurisdiction of courts of chancery now extends to all civil cases proper in good conscience and
honesty for relief or aid as to which the procedure of the common-law courts is unsuited to give an
adequate remedy, or as to which the common-law courts, when able to extend their aid, have refused
to do so."); PHELPS, supra note 105, at 192 ("By juridical equity is meant a systematic appeal for
relief from a cramped administration of defective laws to the disciplined conscience of a competent
magistrate, applying to the special circumstances of defined and limited classes of civil cases the
principles of natural justice, controlled in a measure as well by considerations of public policy as by
established precedent and by positive provisions of law."); I STORY, supra note 49, § 25, at 18
("[E]quity jurisprudence may ... properly be said to be that portion of remedial justice, which is
exclusively administered by a court of equity, as contradistinguished from that portion of remedial
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"loose and liberal, large and vague."'' The broad substantive mandate
dominated the jurisprudence of equity much as the procedural forms
captured the jurisprudence applied in the law courts.'82
B.

Blackstone Introduces the Substance/ProcedureParadigm

Against this backdrop, Sir William Blackstone introduced a new
paradigm for understanding English law. Blackstone restated the entire
corpus of English law in the form of substantive rules that he derived
from fundamental principles through "solid, scientifical method."' 83 The
Commentaries purport to expose and then resolve a discontinuity
between fundamental moral principles, on one hand, and certain
technicalities of the legal system, on the other. Blackstone constructed "a
general map of the law," connecting its "primary rules" with "the law of
nature" and "the civil transactions of the kingdom."' 84 Setting to one side
the maze of legal precedents and modem procedure, Blackstone focused
on the fundamental moral rights that, he argued, represented the wisdom
of the ages and underlay all of English law.8 5
According to Blackstone, these moral rights transcended the
boundaries of the traditional court systems of law and of equity:
Equity then, in its true and genuine meaning, is the soul and spirit
of all law: positive law is construed, and rationallaw is made, by it.
In this, equity is synonymous to justice; in that, to the true sense
and sound interpretation of the rule. But the very terms of a court of
justice, which is exclusively administered by a court of common law."); GEORGE TUCKER

BISPHAM,

THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF

CHANCERY 1 (1 th ed. 1931) (1874) ("[equity] is that system of justice which was administered by
the high court of chancery in England in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction").
181. Holdsworth, Equity, supra note 49, at 295 (quotation omitted). See also Steele, supra note
58, at 13 ("The process of delimiting the jurisdiction of chancery was largely one of selfdetermination.").
182. See JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE I-5 (13th ed. 1906) (suggesting that the true and
original distinction between law and equity is one, not between two conflicting bodies of rules, but
between a system of judicial administration based on fixed rules and a competing system governed
solely by judicial discretion). See also MILLAR, supra note 23, at 25-26 n.29.
183. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *34, at 18 (Cooley
ed. vol. 1 1872) (1765). See also 3 BLACKSTONE, supra, * 115, at 71 (Cooley ed. vol. 2 1872) (1768)
("I shall, first, define the several injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, with the
respective remedies applicable to each particular injury; and shall, secondly, describe the method of
pursuing and obtaining these remedies in the several courts.").
184. Lemmings, supra note 151, at 226.
185. See Holdsworth, supra note 150, at 5-6.
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equity, and a court of law, as contrasted to each other, are apt to
confound and mislead us: as if the one judged without equity, and
the other was not bound by any law. Whereas every definition or
illustration to be met with, which now draws a line between the two
jurisdictions, by setting law and equity in opposition to each other,
will be found
either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a certain
6
degree. 1

Indeed, he attempted to demonstrate that the rules administered by the
courts of law and of equity were substantially the same.'87 The difference
between the two systems, he argued, was not in their primary rules but
rather in their judicial machinery: "Such then being the parity of law and
reason which governs both species of courts, wherein (it may be asked)
does their essential difference consist? It principally consists in the
different modes of administering justice ' 8in each; in the mode of proof,
the mode of trial, and the mode of relief."' 1
Blackstone may have underrated the effect of these procedural
differences upon the substantive rules of the two systems.'89 The
procedural differences had "given rise to many substantial differences,
which tended to grow more fundamental, as the variant effects of the
procedures were worked out in detail."' 90 By taking sides on the heady
19 1
jurisprudential question about the role of equity vis-d-vis law,
186. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 183, *429, at 269 (emphasis added).
187. See Holdsworth, sutpra note 150, at 5-6.
188. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 183, *436, at 272.
189. See generally James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 435,
443-44 (1913) ("Blackstone has asserted that the common-law judges, by a liberal interpretation of
the Statute of Westminster, by means of the action on the case, might have done the work of a court
of equity. Such an opinion betrays a singular failure to appreciate the fundamental difference
between law and equity, namely, that the law acts in rein, while equity acts in personam. The
difference between the judgment at law and the decree in equity goes to the root of the whole
matter.").
190. Holdsworth, supranote 150, at 14.
191. For support of the Blackstone vision, see, e.g., HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES, PRINCIPLES OF
EQUITY 42 (2d ed. 1767) ("equity commences at the limits of the common law, and in certain
circumstances neglected by common law .... And thus a court of equity, accompanying the law of
nature in its general refinements, enforces every natural duty that is not provided for by common
law"); MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 17 (equity came "not to destroy the law but to fulfil it"); E. C.
CLARK, PRACTICAL JURISPRUDENCE 1 (1883) (equity "supplements" existing rules of law by
reference to current standards of morality); Christopher Columbus Langdell, Brief Survey of Equitry
Jurisdiction, I HARV. L. REV. 55, 58 (1887) ("Equity cannot therefore, create personal rights which
are unknown to the law... nor can it impose upon a person or a thing an obligation which by law
does not exist .... To say that equity can do any of these things would be to say that equity is a
separate and independent system of law, or that it is superior to law."); JOHN ADAMS, JR., THE
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Blackstone offered little guidance on vexing if practical questions
presented by separate systems of law and equity. Even if, at some level
of abstraction, equity and law were the same or, at least, consistent, at a
practical level, the discretionary nature of equity lacked the formal

characteristics that made the common law rationally separable into parts
substantive and procedural. Indeed, as a practical matter, the jurisdiction
of equity could not even be defined,'92 much less parsed. In Blackstone's

defense, it may be important to note that his Commentaries were
intended for teaching purposes, and were not necessarily intended as a

blueprint for reform.'9 3
C.

The Substance/ProcedureDichotomy Finds Traction

Blackstone's systematic exposition resonated with the scientific
rationalism of the eighteenth century.'94 Moreover, by downplaying the

significance of any meaningful conflict between law and equify,
DOCTRINE OF EQUITY: A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW AS ADMINISTERED

BY THE COURT OF

CHANCERY xxix (8th ed. 1890) ("The principle by which [the chancellor's authority] was regulated
appears to have been . . . that of affording an effectual remedy when the remedy at common law was
imperfect, but not, as has sometimes been erroneously supposed, that of creating a right which the
common law denied."); and Henry Schofield, Discussion, 3 AM. LAW SCH. REV. 178, 178 (1912)
("The idea of equity as a system distinct from law is, and always has been, of course, a wrong
idea.").
And for the contrary view, see, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 49, at 543 ("[W]hile a large part of
the rules of equity harmonize with the various rules of law, another large part of the rules of equity
...conflict with legal rules and, as a matter of substance, annul or negative the latter pro
tanto ....[T]here is... a very marked and constantly recurring conflict between equitable and legal
rules relating to various jural relations; and whenever such conflict occurs, the equitable rule is, in
the last analysis, paramount and determinative."); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Supplemental Note on
the Conflict of Equity and Law, 26 YALE L.J.
767, 770 (1917) (referring to the denial of conflict as a
"venerable fiction"); Pound, Justice, supra note 49, at 696 (referring to the technical and the
discretionary-or the "legal" and "non-legal" elements of judicial administration-as "antagonistic
ideas."); Pound, supra note 178, at 20 (acknowledging discretion, natural justice, equity, and good
conscience to be "anti-legal" elements); I AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 4 (1939)
(recognizing conflict in substance, if not in form); Harlan F. Stone, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L.
REV. 97, 97 (1918) ("it seems extraordinary that any writer should ever have asserted broadly that
there was no conflict between the doctrines of law and equity, and that anyone should have found it
necessary or desirable to have written a book to assert the contrary doctrine"); SPENCE, supra note 3,
at 326; and JOSEPH HENRY IEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 151 (1916).
192. See supra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
193. See Alan Watson, Comment, The Structure of Blackstone s Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J.
795, 810 (1988).
194. See

DANIEL

J. BOORSTIN,

THE MYSTERIOUS

SCIENCE OF THE

LAW: AN

ESSAY ON

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 20 (1941) ("Everywhere in English law 'principles' were waiting to
be found."); SHAPRIO, supra note 2.
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Blackstone's approach had the additional virtue of imparting coherence
and simplicity, familiar touchstones of successful reform efforts.

95

One

may fairly question whether the substance/procedure dichotomy is
primarily theoretic, 96 but the theory was well-received, and the
consequences of its broad acceptance were very real. 97 Blackstone
demoted "procedure" to secondary status within a new hierarchy of legal
precepts.' 98 Procedure was a conceptually separate apparatus, and one
that was neither sacred nor fundamental.' 99 Procedure was but a set of
practical and ancillary functional rules designed to remedy the wrongs
that transgressed substantive rights.2"' Commentators often credit
Blackstone for liberating the substance of law from the antiquated
procedural machinery that stunted the growth and progress of substantive
law.2 ' True though that may be, it is procedure that was then destined to
be transformed. The perceived elasticity for procedure made change in
the light of practical details inevitable, if not noble. In this view
procedure could be based on the experience of the ages, but unlike

195. See generallv Janice Toran, "Tisa Giftto Be Simple ":Aesthetics and Procedural Reform,
89 MICII. L. REV. 352, 353-54 (1990) (discussing aesthetic appeal of simplicity); Thomas 0. Main,
Procedural Unijbrnit, and the Exaggerated Role ol Rules, 46 VILL. L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2001);
Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniforinit,, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2002-05 (1989).
196. See generally Stephen M. Feldman, From Premodern to Modern American Jurisprudence:
The Onset of Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1411-12 (1997) (arguing that substance and
procedure fundamentally are inseparable); Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and
Procedure in the Legal Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932) ("The difference between
procedure and substantive law is a movable dividing line which may be placed wherever an
objective examination of our judicial institutions indicates is necessary."); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1701 (1976) (arguing from a
critical perspective that form and substance are linked in subtle ways); Alan Watson, Comment, The
Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 97 YALE L.J. 795, 804-05 (1988) (discussing Blackstone's
largely unsuccessful effort to disentangle substantive and adjective law).
197. See generally JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY (1981); LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985); Subrin, supra note 23, at 929 n.1 10,
n. I l; Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology and the Evolution of the Adversaiy System, 64 IND. L.J. 301,
325-26 (1988/1989) (noting that the separation of substance and procedure aided formation of the
adversary system).
198. See PLUCKNETT, supra note 23, at 381 (discussing the lowly status of procedure); Pound,
The End ofLaw, supra note 49, at 204-08.
199. See generally Lemmings, supra note 15 1.
200. See generally id; see also Watson, supra note 196, at 811, n.62.
201. See, e.g., MILLARsupra note 23, at 4; PLUCKNETT, supra note 23, at 381.
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substance, aged°2 procedure is more likely to be viewed as senility, rather
than wisdom.
As noted above, early American federal jurisprudence modeled the
English experience. Consistent therewith, the early American court
structure recognized substantive and procedural categories throughout
the new systems of law and equity. 2 3 The power was expressly conferred

upon the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure for equity
cases,2 0 4 and Chief Justice Marshall upheld the delegation of powers to
the courts to make rules in regulation of their practice.2 °5 The Court
exercised this procedural rule-making power, and the equity rules were
subject to several revisions. 2 6 By the Act of 1792, commonly known as
the "Process Act," Congress confirmed the modes of common law
proceeding then used in the federal courts.20 7 Subsequent process and
conformity acts repeated the pattern of requiring federal trial courts to
apply the procedure of the state in which the federal court sat. 208 Formal
substantive and procedural differences were recognized throughout the
regimes of law and equity, and the substance-procedure dichotomy
became a fundamental characterization issue for many legal doctrines.20 9
202. See Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, 45
HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932).
203. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 197, at 56-57. See also Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 119-

20 (1885) (discussing English authorities for applying the adopted English practice). For a general
discussion of the reception of the Commentaries in America, see Nolan, supra note 151; Julian S.
Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstones Connentaries,27 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (1932).
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 723 ("The forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity.., shall be
according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts of equity ... except when it is
otherwise provided by statue or by rules of court made in pursuance thereof."); id. § 730. See also
Act of September 30, 1789, c. 21, I Stat. L. 93; Act of May 8, 1792, c. 36, 1 Stat. L. 276.
205. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 22-23 (1825).
206. See generally HOPKINS, supra note 129 (reprinting and discussing the equity rules of 1822,
1842, 1866 and 1912); von Moschzisker, supra note 127, at 294 (explaining that equity rules always
reflected the original assumption of Chief Justice John Jay, in 1792, that such procedure would be
guided by the great tradition of equity jurisprudence as developed in the English chancery courts).
207. See REV. COMP. STAT. § 913.
208. See I JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:

ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 509-51 (1971) (discussing the process acts of the 1780s
and 1790s); HENRY HART & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 17-18, 581-86 (1963) (discussing the repeated pattern of state law governing unless
superseded by federal law in the process and conformity acts of the 1700s and 1800s) cited in
Subrin, supra note 23, at 930 n. 114.
209. For early cases recognizing the substantive, formal and procedural differences of law and
equity, see, e.g., Green v. Mills, 69 F. 852, 857 (1895) (jurisprudence of the United States has always
recognized substantive and procedural distinctions between common law and equity); Owens v.
Heidbreder, 78 F. 837, 839 (1897) (distinction between actions at law and suits in equity is one of
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Reinforcing Blackstone's vision, scholars have referred to the
disaggregation of substance and procedure as a sign of the "maturity" of
210
a legal system.
Ill.

THE PROCEDURAL MERGER OF LAW AND EQUITY

The perception that parallel court systems were applying substantially
similar substantive rules of law under different procedural schemata led
inevitably to the notion of merger. There was no tolerance for the delays,
the expense, and the technical complications that resulted from the
separation of the courts of law and equity. 21' Widespread and escalating
contempt for procedure suggested that any distinctions were impractical
and unnecessary. Procedure could better fulfill its functional and
secondary role if a single set of procedural rules facilitated the joint
212
administration of the substantive principles of both law and equity.

This Part briefly details the experience of the merger of law and equity in
American state and federal courts, as well as in the English courts. My
effort here is a modest one, with a limited focus on establishing the
procedural nature of these mergers. I demonstrate here that in each of
these instances merging law and equity, the merger purportedly left the
substantive principles of both law and equity in each jurisdiction intact.
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, a reform effort to
simplify legal procedure originated in the State of New York. 2 3 The
form and of vital substance); Gravenburg v. Laws, 100 F. 1,4 (1900) (distinction between common
law and equity must be maintained); and Berkey v. Cornell, 90 F. 711, 717 (1898) (principle that
legal and equitable claims cannot be blended together in one suit is well established). For a general
discussion of the divisibility of substance and procedure, see supra note 196; see also Allan Ides,
The Supreme Court and the Law to Be Applied in Diversity Cases: A Critical Guide to the
Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19 (1995);
Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935 (1991); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B.
Abrams, Putting Erie on the Right Track, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 937 (1988); Alfred Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution, Part 2, 53 Nw. U. L. REV. 541 (1958); D. Michael Risinger,
"Substance" and "Procedure" Revisited, 30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982); and Lehan Kent Tunks,
Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 34 U. ILL. L. REV. 271 (1939).

210. See, e.g., PLUCKNET, supra note 23, at 381 ("the power to think of law apart from its
procedure... can only develop when civilisation has reached a mature stage"). See Pound, The End
of Law, supra note 49, at 204-08.
211. See Holdsworth, supra note 150, at 7.
212. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
213. Texans may disagree. See Emmerglick, supra note 67, at 244-45 (upon being admitted into
the Union in 1845, Texas provided in its constitution that jurisdiction in equity would be exercised
by its law courts); SIMKINS, supra note 177, at 7 (referring to Texas as "a pioneer in this blended

464
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reformers were frustrated with the practical and theoretical complexities
of parallel systems of law and equity.214 Enticed by the rhetoric of
uniformity,215 these reformers sought to unify law and equity into a single
system of codes.2" 6 Such codes offered a simple set of uniform rules
better suited for the practical task of procedure to efficiently process the
more important issues of substantive law."1 7 One commentator described
the technicalities of common law pleading as "needless distinctions,
scholastic subtleties and dead forms which have disfigured and
encumbered our jurisprudence."21 The reform effort was successful, as
Section 62 of the new New York Code of Civil Procedure declared for
New York state courts:
The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the
forms of all such actions and suits heretofore existing, are
abolished; and there shall be in this state, hereafter, but one form of
action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the
redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be
denominated a civil action.2t 9

procedure"). Nevertheless, credit for the reform generally is accorded David Dudley Field, a New
York City commercial lawyer and legal reformer. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley
Field and the Field Code: An Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV.
311 (1988) (discussing the roles of Field and another New Yorker, Aprhaxed Loomis, who also
played a prominent role in drafting the original code); Subrin, supra note 23, at 928; Mildred Coe &
Lewis Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q.
238 (1942); Kharas, supra note 12, at 186; CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE
PLEADING 15 (1928) ("In 1848 came the first of the American reforms of pleading with the adoption
of the New York Code."). For an account of the nearly simultaneous English reform effort, see infra
notes 284-88 and accompanying text.
214. See generally Subrin, supra note 213; ALISON REPPY, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY
ESSAYS (1949).

215. For a discussion of the rhetoric of procedural uniformity, see supra note 195 and
accompanying text.
216. See generally Charles E. Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 &
n.39 (1925) ("The union of law and equity is justly considered to be the foundation principle of the
Code reform."). See also JOHN NORTON POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES §§ 4-5 (4th ed. 1904); Edward
Taylor, The Fusion of Law and Equity, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 17 (1917); Edward Taylor, Law
Reform, II U. ILL. L. REV. 402, 405 (1917); James Edward Hogg, Law and Equity-The Test of
Their Fusion, 22 JURID. REV. 244, 246 (1910).
217. For a discussion of the subservience of procedure to substance, see supra notes 198-200.
218. John Worth Edmonds, An Address on the Constitution and Code of Procedure, in I I LAW
REP 232-35 (1848), cited in CARL SWISHER, THE TANEY PERIOD 349 n.39 (1974).
219. N.Y. LAWS, c. 510 § 62 (71st Sess., Apr. 12, 1848).
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The Field Code abolished the common law forms and merged law and
equity in a greatly simplified procedure.220 Code reforrrers took great
pains to emphasize that the new codes reorganized only the procedure of
law and equity. 22 ' Accepting Blackstone's view that substance and
procedure

were conceptually distinct, 222 the Field Code took the

additional step of recognizing the divisibility in fact of substance and
procedure: "The legislative mandate of the Commissioners was reform in
procedure-not alteration of the substantive rules of equity or the
common law.

22 3

The merged procedure of the codes borrowed heavily from equity
practice.224 Much like the old bills in equity, the Field Code provided that
the pleadings should state the facts; 225 thus the codes, like equity, deemphasized the importance of framing an issue. 226 The Code adopted for
all actions numerous equity practices and processes, including latitude in
the joinder of claims and parties. 22 7 Further, echoing King James l's

220. Id. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 27 (1846) (commission appointed to "revise, reform, simplify,
and abridge the rules of practice, pleading, forms, and proceedings of the courts of record of this
state, and to report thereon to the legislature."). See also Bone, supra note 161.
221. See Kharas, supra note 12, at 187. See also PHILEMON BLISS, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW
OF PLEADING 15 (3d ed. 1894) (codes "affect modes of procedure"); Coe & Morse, supra note 213,
at 240-43; Subrin, supra note 213, at 329-30.
222. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
223. FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS 74 (1878). See also
Kharas, supra note 12, at 187; Walsh, supra note 85, at 488 ("Law and equity are simply brought
together in code merger, without changing equity and without changing law, except that in cases of
former conflict the equity rule necessarily displaces the legal rule."); Gould v. Cayuga County Nat'l
Bank, 86 N.Y. 75, 83 (1881) ("The distinctions between legal and equitable actions are as
fundamental as that between actions ex contractu and ex delicto, and no legislative fiat can wipe it
out.").
224. Walsh, supra note 85, at 497 (emphasis added) ("Code merger makes equity far more
important than before. Instead of eliminating equity or converting it into law, code merger has
brought it into the modem legal system freed of the old restraints, with all its principles and practices
unchanged and unimpaired, and operating directly in all cases.").
225. The Field Code complaint was to provide "[a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of
action, in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended." N.Y. LAWS., c. 379 § 120(2) at 521
(71st Sess., Apr. 12, 1848) (reorganized in 1849 as N.Y. LAWS, c. 438 § 142 (1849)). See also N.Y.
LAWS, c. 479 § I (1851) ("A plain and concise statement of the facts showing a cause of action
without unnecessary repetition.").
226. CLARK, stprO note 213, at 23 ("Instead of the issue pleading of the common law there was to
be fact pleading."); Subrin, supra note 213, at 327-38.
227. Under the Field Code, plaintiffs could be joined if they had "an interest in the subject of the
action, and in obtaining the relief demanded," and defendants if they had "an interest in the
controversy, adverse to the plaintiff." N.Y. LAWS, c. 379 §§ 97-98 (1848). Several identified causes
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resolution of the dispute between Bacon and Coke three centuries
prior,228 any conflict between the substantive doctrines of law and equity
was to be resolved in favor of equity 29
The innovative codes proved popular elsewhere and were adopted in
most states. The system inaugurated by the New York Code of 1848 was
adopted promptly by Missouri and Massachusetts in 1849 and 1850,
respectively.230 In 1851, California adopted a version of the Field Code,
and prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, Iowa, Minnesota, Indiana,
Ohio, the Washington Territory, Nebraska, Wisconsin and Kansas
likewise enacted similar procedural codes.2"' Within twenty-five years,
procedural codes had been adopted in a majority of the states and
territories.232 Additionally, the Field Code had at least some influence in
all states, as all states departed somewhat from the common law system
of pleading in response to the proliferation of the codes.233 For example,
some of the states that did not model the codes nevertheless modified
their pleading rules by statutes, allowing the assertion of equitable
defenses in actions at law.234
Nevertheless, the reform effort that was remarkably successful in the
state courts initially drew only skepticism from the federal courts.
Although law and equity were administered on different "sides" of the
of action could be joined if the "causes of action ... equally affect[ed] all the parties to the action."
Id. § 143. See O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 624-26 (1925);
Subrin, supranote 213, at 332.
228. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
229. See Ingersoll, supra note 49, at 70 ("whenever there is a conflict between Law and Equity,
the doctrines and maxims of the latter are dominant in all civil controversies in all their courts"). See
also supra note 223. See generally MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 17 (in matters of conflict or variance,
"the rules of equity shall prevail").
230. See Timothy Walker, Law Reform in Missouri, 6 W. LAW JOURNAL 431 (1849); see also
SWISHER, supra note 218, at 349; Report of Commissioners Appointed to Revise and Reform the
Procedurein the Courts of Justice of this Commonwealth, in 2 BENJAMIN R. CURTIS, A MEMOIR OF
BENJAMIN ROBINS CURTIS 149 (1879) (discussing a partial merger of law and equity under
procedural codes). But see CLARK, supra note 213, § 8 (classifying Massachusetts as a "quasi-code"
state, and admiring a system that "may serve as a model for code pleaders").
231. See FRIEDMAN, supra note
In 1861 Nevada adopted the Field
Arizona, Montana, the Carolinas,
FRIEDMAN, supranote 197, at 394;

197, at 394; HEPBURN, supra note 163; MILLAR, supra note 23.
Code, and by the end of the century so had the Dakotas, Idaho,
Wyoming, Utah, Colorado, Oklahoma and New Mexico. See
CLARK, supranote 213, § 8.

232. See CLARK, supra note 213, at 19-20 (detailing the spread and contemporary extent of code
pleading).
233. See id. at 20-22; see also Subrin, supra note 23, at 938-39.
234. See CLARK, supra note 230, at 19-20. See generally E.W. Hinton, Equitable Defenses, 18
MICH. L. REv. 717 (1920); Walter Wheeler Cook, EquitableDefenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645 (1923).
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same federal courts, 2 35 a commitment to the formal separation of law and
equity was venerated and, arguably, constitutionally grounded. Justice
Grier emphasized the significance of the separation in an 1858 opinion of
the Court:
This [dual] system, matured by the wisdom of ages, founded upon
principles of truth and sound reason, has been ruthlessly abolished
in many of our States, who have rashly substituted in its place the
suggestions of sociologists, who invest new codes and systems of
pleading to order. But this attempt to abolish all species, and
establish a single genus, is found to be beyond the power of
legislative omnipotence. They cannot compel the human mind not
to distinguish between things that differ. The distinction between
the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring
different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely
inseparable from the correct administration of justice in common
law courts.236
Bolstered by constitutional references to systems of law and of equity,237
commentators long sustained the argument that "the Federal courts
cannot adopt the blended system, nor can Congress change the present
Federal system, because it is fixed by the Constitution of the United
'
States. 238

However, the resolve for separate systems weakened as popular
confusion and dissent mushroomed. A primary source of the confusion
and dissent was federal procedure, which, both prior and subsequent to
state adoption of the procedural codes, followed state procedure in law
235. See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
236. McFaul v. Ramsey, 61 U.S. 523, 525 (1858).
237. See supra note 128; see also Bennett v. Butterworth, 52 U.S. 669 (1850). See THE
FEDERALIST No. 83, at 569 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (advocating separate
equity courts, he wrote "to unify the [equity] jurisdiction ... with the ordinary jurisdiction, must
have a tendency to unsettle the general rules, and to subject every case that arises to a special
determination; while a separation of the one from the other has the contrary effect of rendering one a
sentinel over the other") (emphasis added).
238. SIMKINS, supranote 177, at 3. See also Alexander Holtzoff, Equitable and Legal Rights and
Remedies Under the New Federal Procedure, 31 CAL. L. REV. 127, 130 (1942-1943) ("While the
explanation for the separation is to be found in what may be called accidents of history rather than
any a priori reasoning, this circumstance does not detract from the conclusion that the distinction
between substantive rules of law and equity is so much a part of the warp and woof of our
jurisprudence and is so deeply imbedded in it, that the classification cannot be discarded without
completely demolishing some of the foundation stones of our legal system. It is clear that no such
result was intended by the draftsmen of the rules.").
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cases and a uniform federal procedure in equity cases.239 Thus, there was
a uniform simplified procedure in equity for the federal courts
throughout the country. Yet in law cases the various federal courts were
applying the procedure of the corresponding state court.
Federal equity practice was a model of simplicity and uniformity.
Somewhat paradoxically, federal procedure in equity cases was actually
a product of a certain hostility toward equity among the early colonists.24 °
Conformity to state practice seems to have been demanded, but it became
necessary to follow the English equity procedure because a number of
the states adopted no equity procedure to which conformity could be
had.24' The first set of Federal Equity Rules, promulgated by the
Supreme Court in 1822, contained thirty-three very concise rules of
practice and procedure.242 A few of the rules were mandatory,243 but most
244
generously accorded federal judges with broad discretionary authority.
Moreover, after the extension of the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,245 to
equity cases in 1851, the federal courts enunciated their own views of the
principles of equity jurisprudence, without restriction by the decisions of
state courts.246 The Federal Equity Rules proved quite durable and were

239. Prior to the proliferation of the codes, federal procedure in law cases was governed by
Congressional enactments that adopted the corresponding state court procedure as a given date; this
static conformity usually was keyed to the date of the state's admission to the union. To address
some of the confusion caused by the codes, Congress passed the Conformity Acts, which required
federal procedure in law cases to conform dynamically with the corresponding state procedures. See
generally Subrin, supra note 23, at 957-58, n.284; Stephen Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1038-42 (1982). See also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
240. See generally von Moschzisker, supra note 127. See also supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
241. See Charles Warren, Federal Process and State Legislation, 16 VA. L. REV. 421, 425-27
(1930).
242. See Miller v. Kerr, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 1, 5 (1822).
243. See, e.g., Federal Equity Rule V (1822) ("The plaintiff may amend his bill before the
defendant or his attorney or solicitor hath taken out a copy thereof, or in a small matter afterwards,
without paying costs; but if he amend in a material point after such copy obtained, he shall pay the
defendant all costs occasioned thereby."); id. Rule XV ("If upon argument the plaintiff's exceptions
shall be overruled, or the defendant's answer adjudged insufficient, the plaintiff shall pay to the
defendant, or the defendant to the plaintiff, such costs as shall be allowed by the court.").
244. See, e.g., id. Rule XXX (1822) ("The courts, in their sittings, may regulate all proceedings in
the office, and may set aside an dismissions, and reinstate the suits on such terms as may appear
equitable."); id. Rule XXXII ("The Circuit Courts may make further rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with the rules hereby prescribed, in their discretion.").
245. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
246. See, e.g., Russell v. Southard, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 139 (1851). But see Guar. Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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substantially revised only twice in the succeeding century-in 1842 and
in 1912.247 The latter revision was a comprehensive reform that modeled
many of the provisions of the Field Code, especially those dealing with
the joinder of parties.248
Meanwhile, the procedure in law cases was controlled by
congressional legislation requiring the federal courts to follow state
procedure "as near as may be., 249 The Conformity Act was unpopular
and true conformity seemed largely unobtainable.2 5 Noting the success
of equity procedure,2 5' the American Bar Association blamed legislative
control of federal practice for the problem and proposed that the power to
promulgate federal rules of procedure for law cases be turned over to the
United States Supreme Court.25 2 After years of debate and struggle,2 3
Congress passed a bill providing:
[T]hat the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power
to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United
States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure in civil actions at law. 54
The legislation further provided that "[t]he court may at any time unite
the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with more in actions
at law as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for
both . ... ,,25' However, the Court did not rush to the task; an advisory
247. See I Howard xli (1842) (92 equity rules); 226 U.S. 627 (1912) (81 equity rules). See also
infra notes 332-48.

248. See CLARK, supna note 213, at 23.
249. The text of one of the Conformity Acts appears in the Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255 §§ 5-6,
17 Stat. 196, 197.

250. Most people agreed that the Conformity Act was a failure. See, e.g., Charles E. Clark &
James Win. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure: L The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 401-11
(1935); Thomas Wall Shelton, Unformnity of Judicial Procedureand Decision, 22 LAW STUDENT'S
HELPER 5, 5 (1914). See also supra note 239.
251. See Clark & Moore, supra note 250, at 435 (Federal Equity Rules of 1912 were "the
substantial model for the new Federal procedure of the future").
252. William D. Mitchell, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure,in REPPY, supra note 214, at 75.
Of course, the Supreme Court already possessed the authority with regard to equity procedure. See
supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text. Moreover, the Supreme Court had rulemaking authority

for actions at law pursuant to 1842 legislation, but the Court never exercised that authority. See Act
of August 23, 1842, ch. 188 § 6, 5 Stat. 516, 518.

253. See Subrin, supra note 23, at 957-58, n.284.
254. 28 U.S.C. § 723(b) (1934).
255. Id. § 723(c).
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committee was appointed the following year. 5 6 Two years thereafter, a
set of uniform rules was promulgated, eliminating the distinction
between procedures for cases in equity and in law.257 "Under the new

rules the hideous Conformity Act [wa]s relegated to the limbo of 'old
unhappy, far off things." 58 In his address to the American Law Institute
Chief Justice Hughes stated the objective of the new rules:
It is manifest that the goal we seek is a simplified practice which
will strip procedure of unnecessary forms, technicalities and
distinctions and permit the advance of causes to the decision of

their merits with a minimum of procedural encumbrances. It is also
apparent that in seeking that end we should not be fettered by being
compelled to maintain the historic separation of the procedural
systems of law and equity.259
Carrying the torch lit by Blackstone 150 years earlier, the reformers
argued that procedure had a tendency to be obtrusive, and that it should
be restricted to its proper and subordinate role.26 ° The Chief Justice
transmitted the Rules to Congress over the dissent of Justice Brandeis,
and in 1938 the new uniform Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
"
effect.26
'
The philosophy and procedures of equity heavily influenced the tenor

of the new Federal Rules.262 One general and generous sentence
256. See William D. Mitchell, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in REPPY, supra note 214, at
79.
257. See generallv Subrin, supra note 23; Alexander Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1057 (1955).
258. Armistead Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 262 (1939).
See also Edson Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 6 (1938) ("I think no tears
will be shed by the bar of this country over the fact that the immense body of judicial decisions as to
what matters are or are not controlled by the conformity act no longer have any value except for the
legal historian.").
259. Charles Evan Hughes, Address Before American Law Institute, cited in 55 S. Ct. 35 (1935).
See also Clark, supra note 23.
260. For a description of Blackstone's vision, see supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
261. 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
262. See Subrin, supra note 23, at 970-82; Marcus, supra note 177, at 725 ("[A]s to the pretrial
portion of litigation, equity conquered law."); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
374, 376 (1982) (the relaxed procedures of equity allow activist judges to take control of litigation
throughout the pretrial stage); Weinstein & Hershenov, supranote 12, at 278-81 (offering examples
of how equity has dominated legal system through "modes of proof and trial," and the "varied
circumstances in which courts today turn to equitable remedies" in mass tort cases); Melissa A.
Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review .for the
Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REv. 527, 542-51 (2002) (discussing equity's triumph in mass tort trial
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applicable to all types of cases established a fluid standard of pleading.263
Parties could plead alternative theories. 264 Plaintiffs were able to pursue
novel theories of relief 2 65 Related and unrelated claims could be joined
in a single action. 66 Judges could hear the counterclaims and crossclaims of parties already joined in the filed action.2 67 As in equity, there
were numerous specialized devices through which judges could allow the
lawsuit to expand further in order to develop a more efficient litigation
2716
and class
unit-e.g., impleaders, 6 8 interpleaders, 269 interventions,"'
procedures); Laycock, supra note 12 at 53-54 ("The war between law and equity is over. Equity
won."). See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1292-96 (1976) (discerning in public law litigation the "triumph of equity"); I CHARLES E.
CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE Pref. (1930) (among other highlights of the volume
were "[tihe history of equity, and its triumph over law").
263. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a)(2) (1938) ("A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief.., shall
contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief .... ). Cf Federal Equity Rule 25 (1912) ("[h]ereafter it shall be sufficient that a bill in
equity shall contain, in addition to the usual caption ...a short and simple statement of the ultimate
facts upon which the plaintiff asks relief").
264. See FED. R.Civ. P. 8(e)(2) (1938) ("A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim
or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or
defenses ....[A] party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of
consistency and whether based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both."); id. 8(a) ("Relief in the
alternative or of several different types may be demanded"). Cf Federal Equity Rule 18 (1912)
("Unless otherwise prescribed by statute or these rules the technical forms of pleadings inequity are

abolished."); id. Rule 30 ("The answer may state as many defenses, in the alternative, regardless of
consistency, as the defendant deems essential to his defense.").
265. See Sibrin, supra note 23, at 974 (placing the Federal Rules in the context of New Deal
legislation).
266. See FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (1938) ("The plaintiff in his complaint ... may join either as
independent or as alternate claims as many claims either legal or equitable or both as he may have
against an opposing party."). Cf Federal Equity Rule 26 (1912) ("The plaintiff may join in one bill
as many causes of action, cognizable in equity, as he may have against the defendant.").
267. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a) (1938) ("A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any
claim ... which at the time of filing the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim ....
");id. I 3(b)
("A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party ....
"). 'f Federal
Equity Rule 30 (1912) ("The answer must state in short and simple form any counterclaim arising
out of the transaction which is the subject-matter of the suit ....).
268. See FED. R. CIV. P. 14 (1938) ("[A] defendant may move.., for leave as a third-party
plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him or to the plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him."). The Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 14 suggests that the impleader was a modern innovation developed in
England. See 1937 Adv. Comm. Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 14 (citing English Rules Under the
Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937)).
269. See FED. R.Civ. P. 22(1) (1938) ("Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined
as defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be
exposed to double or multiple liability."). See WILLIAM W. DAWSON, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
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actions."' Complementing the new pleading regime were new liberal
rules of discovery,272 and judges were vested with the authority to
"manage" the case through pretrial conferences273 and special masters.274
The Federal Rules reflected a philosophy that the discretion of
individual judges, rather than mandatory and prohibitory rules of
procedure, could manage the scope and breadth and complexity of
federal lawsuits better than rigid rules.275 Indeed, Rule 1 articulated this
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 262 (1938) (tracing the chronology of interpleader from the "old
equitable action" through state codes).
270. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (1938) ("[Alnyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate."); id.
24(b) ("[Alnyone may be permitted to intervene in an action ... when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common."). Cf Federal Equity Rule 37
(1912) ("Anyone claiming an interest in the litigation may at any time be permitted to assert his right
by intervention .... ").
271. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (1938) (detailing prerequisites and types of maintanable class actions).
Cf Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912) ("When the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.").
272. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (1938) (discovery rules). Cf Federal Equity Rules 47-58 (1912)
(discovery rules). There was no discovery at common law, where the courts typically relied on the
oral testimony of witnesses. See Marcus, supra note 177, at 726 (contrasting trial practices of law
and equity courts).
273. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (1938) ("in any action, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conferences to consider (1) The simplification of the
issues; (2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings; (3) The possibility of
obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof; (4) The
limitation of the number of expert witnesses; (5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues
to a master for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury; (6) Such other matters
as may aid in the disposition of the action."). Compare the English procedure known as the
"summons for directions," in ENGLISH RULES UNDER THE JUDICATURE ACT (The Annual Practice,
1937).
274. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a) (1938) ("[T]he court in which any action is pending may appoint a
special master therein."). Cf Federal Equity Rules 59-69 (1912) (discussing appointment and
powers of masters). See generally Resnik, supra note 262.
275. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 23, at 402 ("It should be for the court, in its discretion, not the
parties, to vindicate rules of procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly dispatch of
business, saving of public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribunals; and such discretion
should be reviewable only for abuse."); CLARK, supra note 213, at 31 ("The rules of practice should
simply point out the purpose to be subserved, leaving the application thereof to the discretion of the
trial judge."). Cf Charles E. Clark & James William Moore, A New FederalCivil Procedure 11.
Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1323 (1935) ("In fact if the vital provisions for a
completely unified procedure with clear specifications as to jury trials and waiver thereof are
adopted, and if flexible rules as to pleadings and parties, leaving much to the discretion of the trial
court, are drafted, we feel that the reform is assured of success, whatever the detailed provisions may
be."); Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29
A.B.A. REP. 395, 404-06 (1906); Clark, supra note 23, at 308; Charles E. Clark, The Challenge of a
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very purpose: "[The Federal Rules] shall be construed and administered
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action., 276 Commenting generally on the philosophy and durability of
discretionary rules, Professor
Carrington mellifluously recites: "Tight
277

will tear. Wide will wear.,

Like the Field Code, the reforms were directed exclusively to the
procedural problem: the 1934 enabling legislation provided that "said
rules shall neither abridge, enlarge nor modify the substantive rights of
any litigant. '278 The Supreme Court later confirmed that "[tihe Rules
have not abrogated the distinction between equitable and legal remedies.
Only

the

procedural

distinctions

have

been

abolished. 2

79

The

fundamental substantive characteristics that distinguished the regimes of
law and equity remained intact.28 ° Again, in the event of any substantive
conflict between law and equity, the latter was to prevail.28'

New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 443, 443-45 (1935) [hereinafter, Clark, The
Challenge]; Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, I CONN. BAR J. 67, 70 (1927); Charles E.
Clark, The Code Causes of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 830-31 (1924). See generally Bone, supra
note 161, at 62-66 (emphasizing the integration of equity into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
Marcus, supra note 177, at 725; Subrin, supra note 23, at 982-91 (federal rules modeled on
discretionary and flexible notions of equity practice).
276. FED.R. Civ. P. 1. See also ifra notes 422-27 and accompanying text.
277. Paul D. Carrington, A New Conjederacy? Disunionisin in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J.
929, 949 (1996) (quoting FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 195 (William G.

Hammond ed., 1880)). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 316 n. 10 (1999) (describing a system of laws as "those wide restraints that
make us free") (quoting COMMENCEMENT OFF., HARVARD UNIV. FORM OF CONFERRING DEGREES

12 (1998)).
278. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
279. Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368, 382 & n.26 (1949). See also Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999); Holtzoff,
supra note 238, at 130 ("[A]bolition of the procedural distinction.., does not extend to abrogating
the differentiation and demarcation between the substantive rules of equity and the substantive
common law."); Percy Bordwell, The Resurgence of Equity, I U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 750 (1934) ("The
abolition of the common-law fons of action was not intended to change the substantive
law ....There was no desire to destroy a single equity which anyone had had before the reform.
There was a desire to abolish a red-tape which seemed intolerable."); Dobie, supra note 258, at 262
("Of course, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are] applicable only to procedure. It is still quite
proper to speak of equitable rights, equitable remedies and equitable titles.").
280. See Palmer D. Edmunds, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 JOHN MARSHALL
L.Q. 291, 293-94 (1938) (discussing the practical significance of the distinction between law and
equity); James Pike, Current Trends in the Construction of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 16
CALIF. ST. B. J. 118, 120 (1941) (identifying three fundamental differences of law and equity).
281. See MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 16-22 (in matters of conflict or variance, the rules of equity
shall prevail); Pound, supra note 178, at 29 (equity should prevail "statute or no statute"); JOHN
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Many states, in turn, modeled the federal rules for their state court
procedures. In 1960, in the first comprehensive survey of state adoption
of the Federal Rules, Professor Charles Alan Wright concluded that, after
twenty years of operating under the Federal Rules, state procedural
systems were approximately evenly divided among procedural systems
modeled on the Federal Rules, the common law and the Field Code.282
Decades later, Professor John Oakley detailed "the pervasive influence of
the Federal Rules on at least some part of every state's civil
'
procedure."283
Although the remainder of this essay focuses exclusively on American
courts, it bears mention that the English likewise have effected a
procedural merger of law and equity.284 Deconstruction of the historic
separation between law and equity in England has been traced from
Blackstone to an 1828 speech by Lord Brougham,' 5 and a series of royal
commissions that led to a partial procedural fusion effected by the
Common Law Procedure Act of 1854.286 Over the course of the two

FOREST DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE ENGLAND AND AMERICA 1, ch. 368 (Da Capo Press
1970) (1895); Bordwell, supra note 279, at 742.
282. See WILLIAM M. BARRON & ALEXANDER HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§§ 9.1 -9.53 (Wright ed., 1970) (describing civil procedure reform in variety of states).
283. John Oakley & Arthur Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court
Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1368 (1986). But see id. at 1369 (discussing
lack of widespread textual identity between state and federal models); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching
Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1993) (describing
"recent blow[s] to uniformity" in procedural requirements among states); John B. Oakley, A Fresh
Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354 (2002/2003) (documenting erosion to
fundamental principles of procedural uniformity) (draft manuscript on file with author); Carl Tobias,
Charles Alan Wright and the Fragmentationof Federal Practice and Procedure, 19 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. 463, 464 (2001). See also infra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
284. For additional comparative materials, see Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity in the Canadian
Courts, in CASES ON EQUITY 9-10 (4th ed. 1948) (describing origins of law and equity and the
successful effort to fuse of law and equity procedures); Raymond Evershed, Is Equity Past Childbearing?, I SYDNEY L. REV. 1,4 (1953) ("the truthof the matter is, I am sure, that the so-called
'fusion' of law and equity was a procedural matter and (save incidentally and because procedural
matters cannot under our system sensibly be divorced form substantive law) the function of equity in
relation to the common law was not thereby changed").
285. Lord Chancellor Brougham's six-hour speech entitled "The Present State of the Law to the
Commons" raised numerous reform proposals. See generally Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of
Codification in the Conmon-Low World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 486-88 (2000); G.T. GARRATT,
LORD BROUGHAM (1935). On the reactions to Brougham's speech, see PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF
THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 244 (1965).
286. See 1954, 17 & 18 Vict., c. 125 (Eng.). See generally Holdsworth, supra note 150;
NEWMAN, supra note 92, at 52; ROSCOE POUND & THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, READINGS ON THE
HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON LAW 142 (3d ed. 1937)).
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subsequent decades, and coincident with the proliferation of codes in the
United States, the English Court of Chancery was abolished and
thereafter equity was administered in a division of a single court, the
High Court of Justice.28 7 As with the Field Code and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, fused only the
procedure of law and equity, leaving the substance of equity both intact
and predominant: "generally in all matters not herebefore mentioned, in
which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and
the rules of common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of
288
equity shall prevail.,,

IV. THE IMPAIRMENT OF EQUITY IN THE UNIFIED SYSTEM
The sesquicentennial of the merger of law and equity passed several
years ago without honorable mention.289 Most lawyers and law students
seem to be unfamiliar even with the factual underpinnings, much less the
significance of the merger of law and equity. 29' Nevertheless, equity
enjoys a potent, even if unappreciated legacy in our unified procedural
system. Many statutes and common law doctrines have incorporated the
fundamental equitable principle of individualized justice. This principle
is reflected in the evolution of broad principles as opposed to narrow

287. See Supreme Court Judicature Act of 1873, reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 543-50 (George Burton Adams & H. Morse Stephens, eds., 1930). See
generally HEPBURN, supra note 163; A. H. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND

AND WALES 1750-1950 (1980).
288. 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, §. 25 (11) (Eng.); 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (Eng.). See generally
Mr. Justice Lurton, The Operation of the Reformed Equity Procedurein England, 26 HARV. L. REV.
99, 100-01 (1912) (explaining that reforms made procedure distinctly subserviant to the demands of
the substantive law); Britain v. Rossiter, II Q.B.D. 123, 129 (1882) (the Judicature Act neither
creates new rights nor alters existing rights but merely changes procedure); see also Hogg, supra
note 216, at 245; DILLON, supra note 28 1, at 1, c. 368.
289. 1 could find no symposia celebrating (or lamenting) the anniversary. See also supra note 12
and accompanying text.
290. 1 make this assertion with confidence, but with merely anecdotal data. For example, I teach
the procedural history of law and equity in my first-year Civil Procedure course. See STEPHEN N.
SUBRIN, ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND CONTEXT 274-96 (2000) (recounting

historical background of civil procedure). However, my impression is that the students view it as a
passion peculiar to my historical perspective, rather than something intimately related to the course.
The same pattern holds true in my Remedies course, where I use the historical relationship of law
and equity to contextualize the doctrine. Cf DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:

CASES AND MATERIALS 7 (3d ed. 2002) ("The line between law and equity is largely the result of a
bureaucratic fight for turf; each set of courts took as much jurisdiction as it could get. Consequently,
the line is jagged and not especially functional; it can only be memorized.").
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rules,29' broad grants of discretionary authority,292 variable standards of
conduct,293 balancing tests, 294 lee ways of precedent, 295 and the
acceptance of legal fictions.296 Many of our fundamental legal principles

originated in equity.2 97 That equity intervenes when there is no adequate
remedy at law is a most familiar refrain.298 Courts routinely grant

preliminary and permanent injunctions to protect legal rights when there

291. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98, 158-62 (1991); Antonin

Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989); Robert F. Nagel, The
Formulaic Constitution,84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
292. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251-59 (1980); ALAN PATERSON, THE LAW LORDS

123-24 (1982).
293. See generally Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); James Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retkeat
from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976); Aaron Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between
Rules and Standards in Design Dejrct Litigation:Advancing Directed Verdict Practicein the Law of
Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 521 (1982).
294. See generally Robert F. Nagel, Liberals and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 319 (1992); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987); James
G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrineon the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 773 (1995).
295. See generally Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn't: When Do We

Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605 (1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of
Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68 (1991).
296. See generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 9 (1967); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine:

Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); MAINE, supra
note 3, at 17-36.
297. "[L]et us not forget that the court of chancery was the first to ignore the absence of a seal;
the first to recognize the discharge of a specialty by anything less than a specialty; the first to permit
a recovery on a lost instrument; the first to enforce a moral view of penalties; the first to treat a
mortgage as a mere lien; the first to hold anyone estopped by his falsehoods from proving a contrary
truth; the first to recognize any ownership in the beneficiary of a trust; the first to adopt the doctrine
of notice now enacted into recording statutes; the first to force parties to testify; the first to ignore
form for substance; the first to disregard all contracts and even judgments when procured by fraud;
and certainly the first and last court in historic times to devise remedies at all adequate for the
redress of wrongs." Frierson, supra note 32, at 412. See also supra note 85.
298. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002); United Airlines v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, 2001 WL 320870 (N.D. 111.Mar. 22, 2001); Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163 (1lth Cir.
2000); Reform Party of U.S. v. Gargan, 89 F. Supp. 2d 751 (W.D. Va. 2000). See also Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 381
(1992). See generally JAMES WILLIAM MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 65.06 (3d ed.

1999) ("A court ordinarily will grant injunctive relief only if another adequate remedy at law is
unavailable."); ROBERT N. LEAVELL ET AL., EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION & DAMAGES 11-

12 (5th ed. 1994).
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is no adequate remedy at law.299 Courts frequently exercise their broad
discretion to award various equitable remedies such as specific
subrogation,3 2 disgorgement, 3 3 and
performance,30 0 rescission,30
3
0
4
Occasionally, courts have used the awesome power of
restitution.
equity to create entirely new rights. 0 5
Yet the legacy of equity is unfulfilled in a unified procedural system if
the procedural apparatus administering jointly the substantive principles
of law and equity is not itself subject to the moderation and correction of
the jurisdiction of equity. In this Part I demonstrate, first, that the "all-

299. See generally Douglas Laycock, The Death of the hreparable hjioy Ru/e, 103 HARv. L.
REV. 687 (1990); Daniel J. Morrissey, S.E. C. Injunctions, 68 TENN. L. REV. 427 (2001).
300. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.6, at 826 (3d ed. 1999)
(contemporary approach is to compare damages and specific performance to determine which is
more effective in affording suitable protection to the injured party's legally recognized interest). See,
e.g., Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 91 v. United Tech. Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Conn. 2000).
301. See generally EDWARD SAMPSON THURSTON, CASES ON RESTITUTION (1940); Howard W.
Brill, Equitable Remiediesfor Common Law, 1999 ARK. LAW NOTES 1, 7 & n.97 (citing Kennedy v.
Strout Realty Agency, Inc., 490 S.W.2d 786 (Ark. 1973) (buyer entitled to rescind purchase of rental
property because of misrepresentation as to the water supply; buyer recovered all payments made on
the purchase price, together with compensation for improvements made on the property in good
faith)). See, e.g., Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 617 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1980).
302. See generally I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.3(4), at 604 (2d ed. 1993)
("Subrogation is another equitable remedy in which tracing is used to prevent unjust enrichment and
to give effective relief to the plaintiff."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. Mortgages § 7.6 cmt. a
(1997) (subrogation is an equitable remedy).
303. See generall , Daniel Friedmann, Restitution f)r Wrongs: The Measure of Recovery, 79 TEX.
L. REV. 1879, 1908 (2001). See, e.g., Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 184 (3d
Cir. 2001); BASF Corp. v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1994).
304. See generally Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity. An Analysis of the Principle of juust
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083 (2001). See, e.g., Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 755-56
(6th Cir. 1994) (declaring that restitution is a historical remedy in law and in equity), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1152 (1995). See also Smith, supra note 20, at 314 ("The remedies of cancellation,
rectification and specific performance were created in the Court of Chancery.").
305. See generallv William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, 56
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1993). See. e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1,17 (1971) (Burger, C.J.) (invoking the "judiciary's historic equitable remedial powers" in the
school desegregation context to require busing). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN
GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 TermForeword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979); MALCOLM M. FEELY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS (2000); GARY L. McDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1982)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's use of equity to implement a political vision that is inconsistent
with positive law). But see Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (limiting scope of substantive equity to rights existing in 1789).
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equity" characterization of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 3°6 may
be overstated because, in fact, the Federal Rules increasingly bear
resemblance to a strict law model. Second, I demonstrate an unfortunate
consequence of a strict law paradigm: procedural insufficiency and
hardship. I use recent mass tort cases to illustrate the mischief that can be
created by elaborate legislative drafting that fails to contemplate all
conceivable applications. Finally, I emphasize that procedural hardships
were not tolerated under dual systems of law and equity, because
procedural insufficiency in the law courts was a permissible basis for the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
A.

The Complication, Trivialization and Ossification of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure

Centuries of legal history confirm that flexible and discretionary rules
and standards of any form tend to rigidify over the course of time.3" 7
Professor Bayless Manning recognized this general trend more than two
decades ago, and coined the term "hyperlexis" to capture this
"pathological condition caused by an overactive law-making gland. 30 8
Moreover, "[i]t appears to be of the essence of procedure that it tends to
harden and solidify.

' 30 9

Procedural rules may develop in a dialectic, and

short simple rules expand as they become "more nuanced, textured and
complex."31 It is hardly surprising, then, that the discretion and
flexibility featured in the Federal Rules could suffer such an ignominious
fate at the hands of complication, trivialization and ossification-the
familiar pathogens of strict law.3 1

306. For sources detailing the equitable origins of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see supra
notes 262-67 and accompanying text. See also infra note 323.
307, See MAINE, supra note 3, at 19-21 (equity is a stage in the growth of law, whereby it is
expanded and ultimately fossilized). See generallv Pound, Justice, supra note 49, at 711 (comparing
law to the rules and formulas of the engineer, where the engineer is informed by the wisdom and
experience of predecessors); Evershed, supra note 284, at 9-13 (discussing equity and modem
legislation).
308. Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 767 (1977).
309. Charles E. Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and
Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 507 (1950).
310. Linda S. Mullenix, Lessons from Abroad: Complexity and Convergence, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1,
2-3 (2001); see also id. at 3 (referring to "textual sprawl").
311. See Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management Under the Amended Rules: Too Many
Wordsfor a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137, 157 (1994) (describing prolixity of 1993 amendment to
FED. R. CIV. P. 16).
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The most compelling evidence of this trend toward a model of strict
law is the number, pattern, and length of amendments to the Federal
Rules. Amendments are not intrinsically maleficent, 1 2 but their
prevalence is consistent with a paradigm of strict law. Indeed, one way of
testing the amount of discretion and flexibility that is built into a rule is
to test its durability. Presumably, a rule that is written without much
technical content and instead incorporates more generalized principles
that can be adjusted with each application could evolve over time with a
certain amount of resistance to wear and tear.'1 3 The reverse is true with
strict laws because the task of drafting is much more exact; the law must
contemplate all conceivable applications. 4 The virtue of "strict law" is
certainty in definition and application, creating predictability. 3

5

Yet the

passage of time leads to circumstances that were not initially
contemplated, and the law must be modified to some extent to retain its
certainty in definition and application.
The number of amendments to the Federal Rules is striking and is
increasing. Much, if not most contemporary procedural scholarship
focuses on the need for some procedural reform. 16 And all indications
suggest that a good portion of these reform efforts have been successful.
Indeed, the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enacted in 1938

312. Several commentators, however, have called for a moratorium on procedural reform efforts.
See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 841, 841 (1993) (Symposium); Carl Tobias, Silver Linings in Federal Civil Justice
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 857, 859-60 (1993) (Symposium) (citing Letter from Edwin J. Wesely,
Chair, Advisory Group for the Eastern District of New York, to Robert Keeton, Chair, Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Feb. 3, 1992));
Bryan J. Holzberg, Judicial Conference Approves Amendments to Civil Rules, 18 LITIG. NEWS 10, 10
(Dec. 1992) (ABA Litigation Section recommendation calling for moratorium)).
313. See supra notes 173-82, 262-77 and accompanying text. See also Johnson, supra note 19, at
352-53.
314. See generally supra note 5.
315. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
316. See, e.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are The Federal Discovery Rules Really in
Need of Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 521 (1998); Symposium, Turbulence in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: The 1993 Amendments and Beyond, 14 REV. LITIG. 1 (1994) (dealing with
1993 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front
Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AMER. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 217, 219-51; Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Discovery
Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform ": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1465 (1993); Earl C.
Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals To Amend the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 191 (1992) (proposing reforms to eliminate incentives for
lawyers to engage in discovery abuse); Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The
Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 733 (1988) (analyzing prospects for FED. R. CIv. P. 4 reform).
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included eighty-six rules-combinations of which were substantially
amended in each of 1948, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1970, 1980, 1983, 1985,
1991, 1993, 2000, 2001 and 2002. 3' 7 Another set of amendments is
already in the queue and will likely take effect on December 1, 2003.3"8
And the best may be yet to come.3 19 Only ten of the original Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have never been amended.3 20 Twenty six of the
original rules-nearly one-third of the original 1938 set-have been
amended at least five times.32' Fifty one rules-approaching two-thirds
3 22
of the original 1938 set-have been amended at least three times.
Trends in the number and frequency of amendments suggest a rapidly
decreasing shelf-life for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They also
suggest that the Federal Rules may not be as discretionary and flexible as
many suggest.

323

A second and related attribute of strictness is the length of the text of
the mandate. The task of developing a scientific and complete body of
rules that can be applied universally requires elaborate legislative
317. See FEDERAL RULES OF
PROVISIONS (Foundation 2003).

CIVIL PROCEDURE

AND

SELECTED

OTHER

PROCEDURAL

318. For the full text of the amended rules, see 71 U.S.L.W. 4253 (2003). The amendments were
transmitted to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2075 (2000). Unless altered by Congress, the
amended rules will take effect December 1, 2003.
319. See generally Cooper, supra note 28 (contemplating a set of more detailed pleading,
enhanced disclosure obligations, and restricted discovery rules for simple cases).
320. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2, 3, 10, 21, 39, 40, 61,64, 70 and 85.
321. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 14, 15, 17, 23 (see also 23.1 and 23.2), 24, 26, 28, 30, 32,
34, 37, 41, 45, 50, 52, 53, 54, 65, 71 (see also 71A), 77 and 81.
322. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62, 65, 68, 69, 71 (see also 7 1A),
72, 73, 77, 79, 81, 82 and 86.
323. For sources describing the discretionary nature of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see,
e.g., Subrin, supra note 23, at 970-82 (Federal Rules modeled on discretionary and flexible notions
of equity practice); Burbank, supra note 43, at 715 (noting trend toward delegating discretion instead
of making policy choices); David L. Shapiro, FederalRule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practiceof
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1769, 1975 (1989) (asserting that one of drafters' key goals was to
increase flexibility of trial judges); Carrington, supra note 43, at 2082 (stating Rules Committee
intentionally conferred discretion on trial judges); Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 793 (1989) (noting
1983 amendments to Rules increased trial judges' involvement and discretion in managing cases);
Carl Tobias, Judicial Discretion and the 1983 Amendments to the Federal Civil Rules, 43 RUTGERS
L. REV. 933, 936 (1991) (asserting 1983 amendments greatly enhanced trial courts' discretion and
substantially increased their control over litigation); Subrin, supra note 195, at 2023 (stating 1980
amendments to Federal Rules provided judges with responsibility to control discovery on a case-bycase basis); Bone, supra note 161, at 62-66 (emphasizing the integration of equity into the Federal
Rules). See also supranotes 262-77 and accompanying text.
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drafting to contemplate all future applications of that law.324 Again the
evolutionary pattern of the Federal Rules is consistent with these
generalizations about strict law paradigms; the many amendments
described above are leading to more and longer rules.3 25 The original
1938 set of eighty-six Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contained
approximately 29,000 words.3 26 The current version of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure includes eighty-nine rules and nearly 45,000 wordsmore than half again as many words as the 1938 version.3 27 A few of the
Federal Rules have become dramatically longer through the course of
amendments, 328 but the trend is certainly not attributable only to a few
outliers: the median length of a 1938 Federal Rule was two hundred and
forty seven words; the median length of a current Federal Rule is four
hundred and six words.329
Of course, these measures do not really even begin to capture the
contrast between the original and current procedural infrastructures. For,
as Professor Carl Tobias describes:
Federal civil procedure is now Byzantine .... [T]here are strictures
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as Title 28 of the
United States Code and dozens of substantive statutes. A stunning
array of local measures-including local rules; general, special, and
scheduling orders; individual-judge practices; and mechanisms that
courts adopted under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 to
reduce cost and delay-also govern cases in all ninety-four
districts. Many of the provisions are inconsistent or duplicative,
while a significant percentage are difficult to discover, master, and
satisfy .... The developments mean that federal practice is more

324. See generally supra note 5.

325. See Tigar, supra note 311.
326. My exact count is 28,883 words.
327. My exact count for the set of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effective through (and
including) the December 1,2001 amendments is 44,695 words.
328. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (the current version contains 1,005 words, nearly 4.5 times the
length of the original (1938) version); id. 23, 23.1, 23.2 (the current version of these rules combined
contain 1,300 words, well over three times the length of the original (1938) version of Rule 23); id.

26 (the current version contains approximately 3,484 words, well over four times the length of the
original (1938) version); id. 32 (the current version contains approximately 1,059 words, more than
three times the length of the original (1938) version).
329. The ratio at the median, then, is 1.65 times the original (1938) length.
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fractured than at any time since the Supreme Court prescribed the
original federal rules during 1938.331

This "bewildering panorama of requirements" exacerbates the
" '
hypertechnicality of federal practice.33
Complexity is a characteristic of strict law that is inconsistent with a
set of truly equitable rules. Importantly, neither prolixity nor complexity
is "inevitable. 332 A comparison of the history of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to the evolutionary pattern of the Federal Equity Rules,
which governed federal procedure in equity cases for well over a century,
is instructive. In stark contrast to our experience under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, the pattern of the Federal Equity Rules demonstrates
substantial periods of durability and resistance to prolixity. The original
set of Federal Equity Rules, effective in 1822, contained thirty-three
rules and a total of only slightly more than 2,500 words.

333

Soon

thereafter, in 1842, the Equity Rules were substantially revised into a set
of ninety-two rules containing a total of 9,202 words. In the succeeding
seventy years of practice under the Equity Rules, only seven of these
rules were amended, and only one rule was amended more than once.334
Only three new rules were added.335
In 1912, the equity rules were reorganized and substantially revised.336
The 1912 set of Equity Rules contained only eighty-one rules and a total
330. Carl Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedurefor the Tvent,-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 533, 533 (2002) [hereinafter, Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure]. See generally Carl
Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Sunset, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 547 (1998); Edward D. Cavanagh, The

Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990; Requiescat in Pace, 173 F.R.D. 565 (1997).
331. Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure,supra note 330, at 533.
332. See generally Cooper, supra note 28, at 1795 ("It may be inevitable that a continuing
revision process lengthens the rules and adds complexity to them. Doubts grow up around old
solutions, and new problems appear. The Civil Rules have not escaped this effect."). But see id. at
1795 ("It does not seem fair to charge the revision process with a descent into the naggling detail and
sterile ossification that have overtaken earlier procedural systems.").
333. My exact count is2,525 words.
334. Rule 13 was amended in 1875; Rules 18 and 19 were amended in 1878; Rule 40 was
amended in 1859; Rule 41 was amended in 1871; Rule 67 was amended in 1861, 1869, 1892 and
1892; and Rule 82 was amended in 1894. See generally HOPKINS, supranote 129.
335. Rules 92, 93 and 94 were added in 1863, 1878 and 1881, respectively. See generally
HOPKINS, supra note 129.
336. Professors Tidmarsh and Trangsrud have suggested that the 1912 rules were very different
from traditional equity practice, because the 1912 rules had been greatly influenced by common law
procedure, code pleading, and notice pleading. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD,
COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 59 (1998). Such an evolutionary pattern for

the Federal Equity Rules would be consistent with the ossification attributed to flexible and
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of only 9,442 words. 337 Thus, over the course of these seventy years, the
procedure in equity cases experienced a decline in the number of rules
and a negligible increase of less than three percent in the total number of
words. The Equity Rules of 1912 remained in effect until 1938 when
they were replaced by the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
purported to model the procedure of equity.338 Remarkably, the original
set of Federal Rules was more than three times the length of their 1912
mold. 339 The current Federal Rules are nearly five times the length of the
Equity Rules of 1912.340

To be sure, generalizations about the number of amendments to and
the textual girth of the Federal Rules cannot prove the emergence of a
strict law paradigm. However, the content of these amendments further
substantiates the hypothesis. 34' The contemporary class action is one of
the many procedures of the merged system borrowed from equity. 342 In

1842, the Supreme Court enacted Equity Rule 48, which provided in its
entirety:
Where the parties on either side are very numerous, and can not,
without manifest inconvenience and oppressive delays in the suit be
all brought before it, the Court in its discretion may dispense with
making all of them parties, and may proceed in the suit, having
sufficient parties before it to represent all the adverse interest of the
plaintiffs and the defendants in the suit properly before it. But, in

discretionary rules generally and to procedural rules in particular. See supra notes 307-10 and
accompanying text. And their suggestion that the Federal Rules may not be as "all equity" as we
long have thought advances considerably my thesis here.
337. The 1912 Federal Equity Rules contained 81 rules and 9,442 words.
338. See supra notes 240-277 and accompanying text.
339. The ratio is approximately 3.06.
340. The ratio is approximately 4.73.
341. See Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of Pleading Practice, 76 TEX. L. REV.
1749, 1778 (1998) ("For much of this century, the prevailing view has been that change in procedure
tends always toward the more relaxed and away from the more rigid. That certainly describes the
Federal Rules' treatment of pleadings. But one may doubt the universal attractiveness of unbridled
flexibility. More to the point, what goes up can come down, and change may move toward constraint
rather than latitude. In many ways, the last quarter century has produced changes in the rules that
sought to constrain rather than to liberate.").
342. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 394-97 and accompanying
text.
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such cases, the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and
claims of all the absent parties.343
This Rule was not amended for seventy years, until it was refined in
1912 by Equity Rule 38, which provided, in full, the following forty
words:
When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the whole.344
The original drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"adopted" this device of equity, but drafted a rule of three hundred and
ninety three words, nearly ten times longer than its model.345 Many
decades and amendments later, Federal Rule 23 and its textual progeny
currently bespeak 1,300 words, more than thirty times the length of its
primogenitor. 346 The evolution has added prerequisites to, a typology for,
and limitations upon a trial judge's discretion to certify a class.347
Further, earlier this year, the Court approved amendments to Rule 23 that

343. Equity Rule 48 (1842). See generally HOPKINS, supra note 129. This codification announced
a pre-existing rule of equity that was not codified at all. See. e.g., West v. Randall, 29 F. Cas. 718,
No. 17,424,2 Mason 181 (1820).
344. The rule promulgated in 1842 was not amended prior to this revision in 1912.
345. See supra note 271. See generally John G. Harkins, Jr., Federal Rule 23-The Early Years,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 WASH. L.
REV. 21 (1996); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN
CLASS ACTION (1987).
346. See generally John Leubsdorf, Class Actions at the Cloverleaf 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 453 (1997);
Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 923 (1998).
347. See HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS 867 (3d ed.
1992); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615 (1997); Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of
Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (1996); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Beyond the Class Action Rule.- An Inventory of Statutory Possibilities to Improve the Federal Class
Action, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 186 (1996); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13 (1996); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 1257 (1995); Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual
Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L. J. 561 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class
Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth. Reality, and the "ClassAction Problem ",92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979).
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would revise and lengthen two of the existing sections and add two new
sections.348
B.

ProceduralMischiefin Mass Tort Cases

In this section I offer an example of procedural mischief occasioned
by a textual rule that increasingly may leave too little discretion for
judges to reach the fair, just and efficient result. The dynamics of certain
mass tort claims can impose extraordinary demands on the judicial
system. 34 9 The challenges presented by cases involving millions of
plaintiffs can place strains on existing mechanisms to effect
consolidation for discovery and pretrial management, and resolution by
trial or settlement.350 Included among the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure that are bursting at their seams are Rules 19, 20, 22, 23, 24,
42, 49, 51, and 53.351 1 focus on only one of these Rules here, but the
problem is-or, at least is becoming-endemic to the broader procedural
infrastructure. The problem is this: "a court facing a complex case must
choose the most efficient procedure that violates no normative

348. See supranote 318.
349. There is much literature about mass tort actions. See Shapiro, supra note 347, at 915 n.2
(listing dozens of significant works in the field); Peter Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional
Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 913 (1998); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate
Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413
(1999); Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and InquisitorialJustice, 87 GcEO. L.J. 1983
(1999); Roger Trangsrud, Federalism and Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2263 (2000);
Cooper, supra note 42; Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategyfor Federal and State
Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867 (2000); Richard A. Nagareda, Future Mass
Tort Claims and the Rule-Making/Adjudication Distinction, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Georgene
Vairo, Judicial v.Congressional Federalism: The Inplications of the New Federalism Decisions on
Mass Tort Cases and Other Complex Litigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1559 (2000); David
Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 393 (2000); Paul D. Rheingold, Prospectsfor Managing Mass Tort Litigation in the State
Courts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 910 (2001); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districtingin
Mass Tort Litigation.- An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 883 (2001); Francis E.
McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (2001);
Waters, supra note 262; Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort
Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2002).
350. See general/v Paul Niemeyer, Report on Mass Tort Litigation, 187 F.R.D. 293, 304-05
(1999); see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (if the district
court could close "thirty cases a month, it would [still] take six and one-half years to try these cases
and [due to new filings] there would [still] be pending over 5,000 cases").
35 1. See generally supra notes 349-50.
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component of adjudication., 352 But the existing adjudicatory system is
structured in a way that, for the most part, contemplates the
individualized resolution of disputes.353 To be sure, there are numerous
aggregation mechanisms, including class actions, which contemplate a
certain collective justice. 54 According to many commentators, the
procedural prerequisites drafted to identify those actions where the rule
might be most efficiently used are now a major source of inefficiency,
unfairness and uncertainty.355 Indeed, the undesirable outcomes flowing
from flaws inherent in the existing structure of Federal Rule 23 have
satisfied few if any of the constituencies affected by class action
procedure.356
In the context of mass tort class actions, the procedural questions are
truly extraordinary. Yet no matter how bizarre or unprecedented the
phenomenon,357 empirically or theoretically unsound the technique,358 or
inefficient or unfair the application,359 the certification of a mass tort
class action can focus on the particulars of a Federal Rule to the
exclusion of these contextual factors. 36" For example, in Ortiz v.
352. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limnits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1804-05 (1992). See also Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 527
U.S. 815, 867 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("judges can and should search aggressively for ways
within the framework of existing law ...to avoid a massive denial ofjustice.").
353. See Niemeyer, supra note 350, at 303. See also supra notes 42-43.
354. See Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
779, 783-84 (1985); Rosenberg, supra note 347; Cooper, supra note 42.
355. See generally Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass
Torts, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 595 (1997); Trangsrud, sttpra note 354, at 793; PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT
ORANGE ON TRIAL (1987).
356. See generall , Richard L. Marcus, Benign Neglect Reconsidered, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2009
(2000); Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and Realities of Class Action and
Other Large Scale Litigation, II DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 179 (2001); Linda S. Mullenix, Some
Joy in Whoville. Rule 2309, a Good Rulemaking, 69 TENN. L. REV. 97 (2001); Victor E. Schwartz,
Federal Courts Should Decide Interstate Class Actions: A Call for Federal Class Action Diversity
Jurisdiction Reform, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483 (2000); Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class
Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in
Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2000); Leubsdorf. supra note 346.
357. Seesupra note 39.
358. See generally Amy Gibson, Cimino v. Raymark Industries: Propriety of Using Infirential
Statistics and Consolidated Trials to Establish Compensatoy Damages for Mass Torts, 46 BAYLOR
L. REV. 463 (1994).
359. See infra note 379.
360. I am not suggesting that all mass tort cases turn on procedural technicalities. Nor am I
suggesting that all procedural issues involve the interpretation of Federal Rules. Indeed, mass tort
cases can raise thorny issues of personal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, venue, conflict of
laws. Technical issues do arise, however, and attention here is given how courts address those issues.
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FireboardCorp.,36 1 the Supreme Court for the second time in three years
rejected a settlement in a class action case "prompted by the elephantine
mass of asbestos cases. 362 The opening line of Justice Souter's majority
opinion declared: "This case turns on the conditions for certifying a
mandatory settlement class on a limited fund theory under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(l)(B). '363 As it did in Amchem Products,Inc. v.
Windsor,364 the Court methodically and strictly applied the prerequisites
for certification, and ultimately rejected the class action settlement,
notwithstanding its acknowledgment
that the settlement was both
3 65
fair.
procedurally
and
substantively
Of particular interest, the Ortiz Court acknowledged that "this
litigation defie[d] customary judicial administration. 366 Ironically,
custom prevailed nevertheless. Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the
Court's decision and, in a separate opinion, acknowledged the
insufficiency of the outcome but demurred to creativity: "Under the
present regime, transactional costs will surely consume more and more
of a relatively static amount of money to pay these claims. But we are
not free to devise an ideal system for adjudicating these claims ....
Unless and until the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are revised, the
367
Court's opinion correctly states the existing law.
In Amchem and Ortiz, the Court upheld the general principle that Rule
23 requires structural protections for absent class members that class
action settlements and their proponents must respect. More specifically,
the Court in Ortiz held that for a class action settlement to qualify as a
"limited fund," the settlement proponents must prove the limits of the

361. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
362. Id. at 821. For articles discussing this decision in depth, see Deborah R. Hensler, As Time
Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1899 (2002) (symposium);
Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacv in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV.
337; George M. Cohen, The "Fair" isthe Enemy of the Good Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation and
Class Action Settlements, 8 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 23 (2000); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures
Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (2000); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of
Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001).
363. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also id. at 830 ("The nub of this case is the certification of the
class under Rule 23(b)(l)(B)."). See Marcus, supra note 356, at 2028, n. 102.
364. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
365. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821. See generally Cohen, supra note 362.
366. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821; see also id. at 866 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting a Judicial
Conference report that referred to the mass of asbestos cases as "having 'reached critical
dimensions' threatening 'a disaster of major proportions"').
367. Id. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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fund by more than their agreement, protect class members from the class
counsels' conflict of interest in settling the claims of their clients outside
the class, create separately represented subclasses for serious conflicts of
interest among class members, and justify the failure to exhaust the entire
fund.368 The rule of law exists in the class action setting, the Court
essentially says, despite the enormous pressures to bend, skirt, or ignore
the rules. 369 But when does attention to the rule of law become a
preoccupation, a fetish?
As the majority in Amchem and Ortiz took pains to note, the issues
before the Court in the two cases arose out of "near-heroic efforts" by the
plaintiffs' lawyers, defense counsel, and district court judges to resolve
litigation and thereby to make the best of a bad situation. ''370 The class
action settlement that the district judge had approved in Georgine v.
Amchem Products, Inc.,371 would have settled all future asbestos personal
injury claims, except the claims of those who chose to opt out, against
the consortium of asbestos defendants. 372 The class-action settlement that
was approved by the district judge in Ahearn v. FibreboardCorp.373 and
later challenged in Ortiz would have settled virtually all future asbestos
personal injury claims against the defendant Fibreboard on a mandatory
basis. 374 Notwithstanding their sympathies with the district courts'
efforts, in both cases the majority concluded that Rule 23 does not permit
the resolutions that the parties had negotiated and the district court
judges had approved.375
The Federal Rules, thus, may constrain judicial inventiveness. Courts
generally accord the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the binding status
of statutes.376 Judges may apply the letter of the rule notwithstanding
368. Cohen, supra note 362, at 25.
369. Id.
370. Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See Hensler, supra note 362, at 1903.
371. 157 F.R.D. 246, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
372. Hensler, supra note 355, at 1903-04.
373. 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995).
374. Ahearn, 162 F.R.D. at 517.
375 Hensler, supra note 355, at 1904.
376. See, e.g., Beasley v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 518, 527 (E.D.S.C. 1948) ("Of course, the
Court and all the parties are bound to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure just the same as they
would be required to obey a statute."); Bardney v. United States, 959 F. Supp. 515, 525 (N.D. Ill.
1997) ("the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not rules that a district judge may opt to
disregard"); Winkelman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 48 F. Supp. 504, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (rules have the
same effect as a statute and are as binding upon the courts as upon counsel), affirmed, 136 F.2d 905
(2d Cir. 1943).
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"worthy goals and loftily-stated purposes" supporting a contrary result. 377
They may even celebrate an insistently narrow construction.378 Judges
may admit of "inefficiencies" or "frustration" generated by the
application of rules. 3 79 They may distance themselves from-or even
apologize for-results that they suggest are foreordained.38 ° Or courts
may express a preference for a result that "must be obtained by the
process of amending the Federal Rules, not by judicial interpretation. 3 8'
Courts generally seem reluctant to use their equitable powers to correct
procedural insufficiencies.5 2 The notable exceptions here help to prove
the rule.383

377. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 27 (1986) (applying the letter of Rule 15).
378. See, e.g., Healy v. Pa. R.R., 181 F.2d 934, 937 (3d Cir. 1950) ("[l]t cannot be gainsaid that
certain formalities are indispensable to 'just, speedy, and inexpensive' litigation, and these attributes
of our federal judicial system are forthcoming only upon adherence to, rather than upon rejection of,
the Rules."), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 935 (1950); Pan Am World Airways v. U.S. Dist. Ct., Cent. Dist.
of Cal., 523 F.2d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 1975) (Schackne, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
an "overly technical" reading of Rule 42 and for "contemplat[ing] the wrong question. The question
is not whether some rule permits the action proposed, but whether any rule, statute or logical concept
forbids it").
379. See Henderson v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 131 F.R.D. 560, 565 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (recognizing
"virtue" of more expansive reading of Rule 34, but declining since "text cannot be rewritten to avoid
inefficiencies that they might produce"); Kapco Mfg. Co., Inc. v. C & 0 Ent., Inc., 1986 WL 13753
(N.D. III. 1986) (expressing "frustration" that process due under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"epitomizes litigation run amuck"); Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J.) ("The Supreme Court insists that federal judges carry out the rules of procedure,
whether or not those rules strike the judges as optimal.").
380. See Tuke, 76 F.3d at 157. See also Amnchen, 521 U.S. at 620.
381. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163,
168 (1993) ("Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against municipalities under
§ 1983 might be subjected to the added specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result
which must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial
interpretation.").
382. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (relying on FED. R. Civ.
P. 8(a) concerning denial of motion to dismiss); Guthrie v. Am. Broad. Co., 733 F.2d 634, 637 (4th
Cir. 1984) ("Whatever inherent powers the district courts may once have had, they now have no
power to issue a deposition subpoena unless expressly or impliedly so authorized by the Rules.
Neither plaintiff nor the District Court has identified any authority in support of such an
extraordinary notion of'inherent power' exceeding the scope of the Rules."); Guilford Nat'l Bank v.
S. R.R., 297 F.2d 921, 925 (4th Cir. 1962) ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
liberally construed, but they may not be expanded by disregarding plainly expressed limitations. We
are not prepared to depart from the explicit language of Rule 34 when viewed in the context of the
entire discovery section.").
383. See Schuck, supra note 349, at 974 n.148 (speculating that "some judges in mass tort cases,
such as Jack Weinstein, Robert Parker, and Thomas Lambros, sometimes compete to be the most
innovative"); Waters, supra note 262, at 552-53, n.104 ("By employing an amazing variety of
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Courts are more inclined to wait for Congress or other rulemakers to
find solutions.384 Accordingly, either the insufficiency persists or it leads
eventually to an amendment which, in turn, tends to makes the rule even
longer, more specific, and more likely to work a hardship when it, in
turn, is applied in a particular situation. As this pattern of hardship-andamendment repeats, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure increasingly
resemble a strict law paradigm, and the impairment of equity becomes
even more pronounced.
C.

The TraditionalModelfor CorrectingProceduralInsufficiencies

In addition to the more conventional forms of relief, 5 traditional
equity interfered to offer relief in cases where common law processes
were defective or too complicated.38 6 "Situations too complicated for the
flexible and innovative approaches to both procedural and substantive law, these specialists have
become 'adept at routinizing the extraordinary."') (quoting Schuck, supra note 349, at 956).
384. See supra notes 376-83 and accompanying text. See also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo,
S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322 (1999) ("When there are indeed new conditions
that might call for a wrenching departure from past practice, Congress is in a much better position
than we both to perceive them and to design the appropriate remedy.").
385. For a discussion of the doctrine and cases where the cause of action involved the
maintenance or protection of an equitable right, estate, or interest, see, e.g., JARIUS PERRY, TRUSTS
§ 22 (1874) (cestui que trust); 2 LEONARD JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 1093
(1881) (mortgagor's equity of redemption); POMEROY, supra note 216, § 124 (rights of assignees of
choses in action); CHARLES BEACH, MODERN EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 287 (1892) (rights of
equitable lienors). There were (and are) also purely equitable remedies, which were (and are)
administered by courts of equity, and not by courts of law. These remedies do not necessarily depend
upon the estate involved for their equitable character. They are equitable because they can only be
obtained in courts of equity. A suit for quieting title, or for removing a cloud upon title by the
cancellation of an adverse instrument, may result in the establishment of a legal estate; but the
remedy nevertheless is within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court of equity. A suit for the specific
performance of a contract is within this exclusive jurisdiction, although an action might be
maintained at law for the recovery of damages for the breach of the contract sought to be enforced.
See JAMES W. EATON, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 7, 30-31 (1901). See also supra
notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
386. In addition to circumstances discussed infra in the text, there are many situations where
procedural insufficiency justified equitable intervention. For example, equity would interfere where
the plaintiff had a valid defense at law, but it was doubtful whether he could plead it in an action at
law. See, e.g., Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 692 (1895) (sustaining a suit in equity on a void
judgment where defendant was estopped to question the judgment, but where it was doubtful
whether that issue could be raised by the pleadings in an action at law). When parties were not
competent witnesses in common law courts, equity might give relief because of the difficulty of
proof caused thereby. See, e.g., Taylor v. Merchs. Fire Ins. Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 390 (1850)
(addressing a suit to enforce a contract to issue a fire insurance policy after the loss had occurred
where proof of the terms of the proposed policy would be difficult at law, though the court also
relied on the fact that specific performance would clearly have been decreed before the loss and that
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common law were easily amenable to the procedural devices of
equity.

'387

Even after the crystallization of equity jurisprudence in the

nineteenth century,388 in order to deny the jurisdiction of equity, the
remedy at law had to be as plain, certain, prompt, adequate, full,
practical, just, final, complete, and efficient as the remedy in equity.389
For example, equity interfered in the name-and with the imprimaturof efficiency to avoid the injurious effects of a multiplicity of actions.39
Describing the contrast between law and equity in these instances,
Professor Chafee wrote:
A common-law action soon came to be a two-sided affair, usually
with only one plaintiff and one defendant but sometimes with
several plaintiffs or defendants tightly bound together as joint
obligees or obligors, etc. Except in such joint situations, however, a
dispute of one person against many persons usually had to come
before the law courts, if at all, in the form of many separate actions.
Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to have a single suit
event did not defeat equity jurisdiction). Where a purchase of land was, after the conveyance,
rescinded for fraud, equity might give relief by allowing the purchaser to recover the price paid,
because the common law court had no means of revesting the title in the vendor. See. e.g., Bullard
Shoals Mining Co. v. Spencer, 95 So. t (Ala. 1922). Equity could also aid in enforcing a common
law judgment against equitable or concealed assets. See, e.g., Overmire v. Haworth, 51 N.W. 121
(Minn. 1892); State Bank of Ceresco v. Belk, 94 N.W. 617 (Neb. 1903).
387. Barbour, supra note 61, at 854.
388. See supra notes 112-25.
389. See supra notes 136-46.
390. The reference to a "multiplicity of actions" can be confusing because equity exercised
jurisdiction in four types of cases involving a multiplicity of actions-(i) where the nature of the
wrong is such that at law it would be necessary for the injured party, in order to obtain complete
relief, to bring a number of actions, arising from the same wrongful act against the same wrongdoer;
(ii) where a party institutes, or is about to institute, a number of successive or simultaneous actions
against another party, all depending upon the same legal questions and similar issues of fact; (iii)
where a party claims a common right against a number of persons, the establishment of which would
require a separate legal action brought by him against each of such persons, and which are of such a
nature that they might be determined in a single suit in equity brought against all of such persons;
and (iv) where a number of persons have separate and distinct rights of action against the same party,
arising from the same cause, governed by the same legal rule, and involving similar facts, and the
circumstances are such that the rights of all may be settled in a single suit. See generally I
POMEROY, supra note 101, §§ 243-275, at 318-377. References herein to a "multiplicity of actions"
refer to group (iv). See also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

§ 178 (2d ed. 1948) ("the plight of a defendant at law, subjected to one hundred and ten separate
actions arising from the same accident, many of the actions being brought in different counties and
some of them set for trial in the different counties at the same time, so that it would be impossible
for the witnesses for the defense to attend each trial, is one that calls for some sort of relief if it can
be given") (citing S. Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 47 So. 274 (1908)).
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in chancery, which was accustomed to handle polygonal
controversies .... [I]t was an obvious waste of time to
try... common question[s] of law and fact over and over in
separate actions at law ....

It was much more economical to get

everybody into a single chancery suit and settle the common
" '
questions once and for all.39
Thus, a court of equity would hear a controversy to prevent a multiplicity
of suits, even if the exercise of such jurisdiction called for adjudication
on purely legal rights and to confer purely legal relief.392 Moreover, when
the number of plaintiffs or defendants were too numerous to join in a
single suit, equity would permit a few of the litigants to represent the
many in connection with an equitable bill of peace, the ancestor of the
contemporary class action.393
Of course, Professor Yeazell's remarkable historical inquiry suggests
that today's class actions are not true lineal descendents of the English
equity devices. 394 Although Chancery intervened to prevent a multiplicity
of suits at common law, for the most part, these aggregations were in the

391. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 200-01 (1950).

392. See Oelrichs v. Spain (Oelrichs v. Williams), 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211, 227 (1872) (an
adequate remedy at law does not exist where a multiplicity of actions are required to obtain complete
relief). See also Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Blair, 130 F. 971, 977 (1904); Mills v. Chicago, 127 F. 731, 735
(1904); Smith v. Bivens, 56 F. 352, 353 (1893); Sanford v. Poe, 69 F. 546, 546-48 (1895); Preteca v.
Maxwell Land Grant Co., 50 F. 674, 676 (1892); Dinsmore v. S. Exp. Co., 92 F. 714, 720-21
(1899); Bausman v. Denny, 73 F. 69, 70 (1896); Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Chi. & E. 1. R. Co., 141
F. 785, 795 (1905); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 144 F. 458, 468 (1906); Tift
v. S. R. Co., 123 F. 789, 790-95 (1903); Del., L. & W. R. Co. v. Frank, 110 F. 689, 695 (1901); Tex.
& P. R. Co. v. Kuteman, 54 F. 547, 553 (1892).
393. See POMEROY, supra note 101, § 269, at 367-68 ("[T]he jurisdiction may and should be
exercised, either on behalf of a numerous body of separate claimants against a single party, or on
behalf of a single party against such a numerous body, although there is no 'common title,' nor
'community of right' or of 'interest in the subject-matter,' among these individuals, but where there
is and because there is merely a community of interest among them in the questions of law and fact
involved in the general controversy, or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or
against each individual member of the numerous body."). See generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL,
FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987); CHAFEE, supra note

391, at 200. See also Watson v. Nat'l Life & Trust Co., 162 F. 7, 7-12 (1908); United States v. Old
Settlers, 148 U.S. 427, 480 (1893); Bames v. Berry, 156 F. 72, 73 (1907); Am. Steel & Wire Co. v.
Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Union Nos. I & 3, 90 F. 598, 606 (1898); Soc'y of Shakers v.
Watson, 68 F. 730, 741 (1895); McArthur v. Scott, 113 U.S. 340, 404-06 (1885); Ayres v. Carver,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 591, 593-96 (1854); Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 288, 302 (1850);
Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 108 (1897); United States v. Coal Dealers' Assoc., 85 F. 252, 260
(1898); Bailey v. Tillinghast, 40 C.C.A. 93, 99 F. 801, 807 (1900).
394. See generally YEAZELL, supra note 393.
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nature of declaratory judgments, rather than damage actions. 95 Further,
virtually all of the ancient collective litigation cases concerned disputes
about some traditional duty owed by one party to the other.396 Professor
Yeazell thus contends that courts tolerated early group litigation solely

because it assisted in reinforcing social norms between and among
preexisting social groups.397 One might argue, then, that the class suit
was developed in English chancery primarily to enable the plaintiff to
obtain relief for himself, and not as an all-purpose technique to cure

procedural insufficiencies presented in the law courts.
Yet the relevance of the history of equity here is not about finding a
specific analogue. Rather we must consider what the equity courts would
have done had they been faced with the contemporary crises.398 Indeed,
the procedural devices in equity were descriptive, not technical, and a
precise statement of their scope is impossible.399 Most important, to some
extent or other, procedural insufficiency was an independent ground for
equitable action.4"' Accordingly, if procedural insufficiency is no longer

395. See id. at 148-51.
396. See, e.g., Brown v. Booth, 23 Eng. Rep. 720 (Ch. 1690) (suit by vicar against parish miners);
How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, 23 Eng. Rep. 277 (Ch. 168 1) (suit by lord of manor against tenants).
See also Tribette v. R.R., 70 Miss. 182, 188 (1892) ("There must be some recognized ground of
equitable interference, or some community of interest in the subject matter of the controversy, or a
common right or title involved, to warrant the joinder of all in one suit; or there must be some
common purpose in pursuit of a common adversary, where each may resort to equity, in order to be
joined in one suit; and it is not enough that there is a community of interest, merely, in the questions
of law or fact involved."); Lehigh Val. R. Co. v. McFarlan, 31 N.J. Eq. 730 (1879); Nat'l Park Bank
ofN.Y. v. Goddard, 131 N.Y. 494 (1892); Hanstein v. Johnson, 17 S.E. 155 (1893); N. Pac. R.R. v.
Amacker, 46 F. 233 (1891).
397. See Stephen Ycazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a Histoly of the Class
Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 877 (1977). See also Bone, supra note 161, at 32, n.86.
398. In fact, part of Yeazell's thesis is that the modern-day class action developed in response to
changing social and economic issues that accompanied industrialization and the entrepreneurial
nature of society. See YEAZELL, supra note 394, at 39-40 (asserting that the evolution of the modern
day class action device over the past eight centuries was not a consistent and unified development,
but rather a fragmented and broken one). Cf Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative
Forms: Reconceiving the Histomy of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 222-26
(1990).
399. See CHAFEE, supra note 391, at 149-295. See also Wyman v. Bowman, 127 F. 257, 264
(1904) (equity court's broad discretion re multiplicity suits to be exercised upon consideration of,
inter alia, "the substantial convenience of all parties") (emphasis added); Hosmer v. Wy. R. & 1.
Co., 129 F. 883, 888 (1904) (citing authorities); Hale v. Anderson, 188 U.S. 56, 77 (1903);
Buchanan Co. v. Adkins, 175 F. 692, 791 (1909); Hyman v. Wheeler, 33 F. 629, 630 (1888); De
Forest v. Thompson, 40 F. 375, 377 (1889).
400. See supra notes 75-78, 146-48 and accompanying text.
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an independent ground for invoking the moderating and corrective
function of equity, the jurisdiction of equity is impaired.
V.

THE RESURRECTION OF EQUITY TO CURE PROCEDURAL
INSUFFICIENCIES

The moderating force of equity ensures just results in each application
of the strict law and also fulfills an essential role in the dialectic
evolution of the law.4"' The legal historian John Millar captured this idea
well:
Law and equity should be in continual progress, with the former
constantly gaining ground upon the latter. Every new and
extraordinary interposition is, by length of time, converted into an
old rule. A great part of what is now strict law was formerly
considered as equity, and the equitable decisions of this age will
unavoidably be ranked under the strict law of the next.4"2
As the procedural infrastructure of our unified system grows increasingly
formulaic and prescriptive,4"3 judges can and should supply any
deficiencies created or ignored by strict applications of that procedural
law.40 4 Further, the fair, just and efficient application of substantive law
should be accommodated by procedural rules that feature broad judicial
discretion, rather than elaborate legislative drafting that is undertaken to
contemplate all conceivable applications,

401. See Beale, supra note 127, at 25 ("In a system which has, separately, law and equity, the
doctrines of equity represent the real law."). See also Mullenix, supra note 310, at 2-3 (referring to
the dialectic of complexity and simplicity in procedural reform).
402. 2 JOHN MILLAR, AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 358 (1789). See also
Munger, supra note 49, at 50-51 (discussing the history and progress of equity "from conscience to
precedent"); Bordwell, supra note 279, at 749 ("The equity of today becomes the right of
tomorrow."); FREDERIC R. COUDERT, CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE 1 (1914) ("On the one side is made
an appeal to progress, on the other to precedent.").
403. See supra notes 307-48.
404. Cf Bordwell, supra note 279, at 749 (expressing "hope for a militant equity that will repeat
the conquests of former days").
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"Mildening" the Application of ProceduralRules With Equity4 °5

Since its beginnings, equity has been the extraordinary justice
administered to enlarge, supplant, or override strict law that has become

too narrow and rigid in its scope. A separate system of equity was free to
exert this reforming purpose, and for centuries prior to the merger, "the
two systems had been working together harmoniously."4" 6 Some
commentators have suggested that equity requires structural autonomy to
perform this "high office"-to act "as a check upon strict law and in
opposition to it."'4° 7 For example, Pomeroy demonstrated that, in merged

systems:
The tendency ...has plainly and steadily been towards the giving

an undue prominence and superiority to purely legal rules, and the
ignoring, forgetting, or suppression of equitable notions ....In
short, the principles, doctrines, and rules of equity are certainly
disappearing from the municipal law of a large number of the
states, and this deterioration will go on until it is checked either by
a legislative enactment, or by a general revival of the study of
equity throughout the ranks of the legal profession.4 °0

Arguments for a separate system of equity likely are antediluvian, 4 9 but
the virtues of equity should not require the formal establishment of dual

405. The corrective function of equity is a power that the Anglo-Saxons called "mildening law."
See SMITH, supranote 53, at 209.
406. See MAITLAND, supranote 7,at 17.
407. Emmerglick, supra note 67, at 255.
408. POMEROY, supra note 101, at ix. See also Cooth v. Jackson, 6 Ves. Jr. 39 (Lord Eldon). See
generally Frierson, supranote 32, at 411 (expressing doubt about "whether the fullest benefit of the
principles of equity has ever been attained under the amalgamated system").
409. Of course, three states currently maintain separate law and equity courts. The Delaware
constitution vests the state's judicial power in several courts, including "a Court of Chancery." DEL.
CONST. art. 4, §1. The constitution of the State of Mississippi provides for a chancery court with
jurisdiction in equity cases. See MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 159. And under the Tennessee constitution,
the judicial power is vested "in such Circuit, Chancery, and other inferior Courts as the Legislature
shall from time to time ordain and establish ...." TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 1.In November 2000,
Arkansas voters approved Amendment 80, which rewrote virtually the entire judicial article of the
state Constitution of 1874. One of the amendment's "fundamental purposes [was] the merger of law
and equity." In re Implementation of Amendment 80: Admin. Plans Pursuant to Admin. Order No.
14, 345 Ark. Adv. App. (June 28, 2001 ) (per curiam).
My limited and preliminary inquiry into the systems of these states suggests, however, that none
of the three operate dual systems in the traditional sense. See John J. Watkins, Law and Equity in
Arkansas-Or. Why to Support the Proposed Judicial Article, 53 ARK. L. REV. 401, 436, n.421
(2000) (suggesting that, in Delaware, the chancery court is largely but a specialized tribunal for
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systems.4"' Query whether a more sophisticated understanding of the
origins of equity and the mechanics of the merger could cure some of the
insufficiencies that inhere in the unified system. Indeed, we await the
"revival of the study" urged by Pomeroy, as doctrinal infidels further
subjugate equity within a paradigm of strict procedural law.4 1 I advocate
that district judges invoke the jurisdiction of equity to avoid the
application of procedural rules in those unique circumstances where the
outcomes produced by rigid application of the rules are deficient.
More prominent use of the term "equity" may restore the dialectic
with strict law that should inhere in the procedural infrastructure. 4 2 That
dialectic has faded, as reformers seem resigned, if not committed to the
assumption that all innovation must occur from within the infrastructure
of the Federal Rules. Notwithstanding the procedural merger of law and
equity, federal judges are vested with the equity jurisdiction that was
exercised by the English Court of Chancery at the time the Constitution

corporate law matters; in Mississippi, "the division between law and equity has little jurisdictional
significance"; and in Tennessee, "the chancery and circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction in
most civil cases by virtue of a statute that dates to 1877"). The State of New Jersey also maintains a
separate chancery division of its superior court. See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3. But as in the state of
Delaware, the structure is driven by an effort to "develop[ ] special expertise and abilities with
regard to complex corporate law matters." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AD Hoc COMM. ON Bus.
COURTS, THE STATUS OF BUSINESS COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES (Nov. 4, 1999), available at

http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/buscts/ctsurvey.html.
410. See generally POMEROY, supra note 101, §§ 40-42, 41-43. See also Livingston's Lesse v.
Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 547 (1833) ("It is true that the separation of common law from equity
jurisdiction is peculiar to Great Britain; no other of the states of the Old World having adopted it.");
DILLON, supra note 281, at 386 ("The separation of what we call equity from law was originally
accidental, or at any rate was unnecessary; and the development of an independent system of
equitable rights and remedies is anomalous and rests upon no principle.").
411. For sources suggesting a declining interest in the study of equity, see supra notes 12 and
290. For sources suggesting the trend toward certainty in procedural reform, see supra notes 289348 and accompanying text. Cf Procedurein the Federal Courts: Hearing Before House Comm. on
the Judiciary on H.R. 2377 and H.R. 90, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1922) (Statement of Thomas W.
Shelton) ("1want to suggest that one of the great criticisms of our present system is that it is utterly
impossible for a client, in many instances, when his case is thrown out on a technicality to
understand why. That is an important thing. As I said over in the Senate the other day, when arguing
this matter, this is one of the things that is making Bolshevists in this country."), cited in Subrin,
supra note 213, at 320 n.78. But see Cooper, supra note 42, at 1944 ("[1I]t may be better to leave
judges free to adapt to the challenges without interference from statutes and rules framed for the last
war by Congress and the rulemaking committees.").
412. See Frank, supra note 12, at 895 (The word equity "instills in the judge a different mood, one
of elasticity and fairness. Nothing is more absurd than the saying: 'A rose by any other name is just
as sweet.' If the rose were called the 'bloody-nose flower,' it might well be odious."').
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was adopted and the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted. 4 3 This
jurisdiction included the authority to offer relief when the cumbersome
procedures of the law courts were defective or when the procedural

system itself was administratively overwhelmed.4 4 The mandate
permitted equity to consider not only the interests of the plaintiffs, but
also the defendants and the judicial system." 5 The merger of law and
equity was only procedural, 4 6 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

neither abridged nor modified the substantive rights in equity. 41 7 Yet the
substance of equity, which has pervasive even if subtle influence
throughout the substantive law,4" 8 is largely quiescent in the procedural
419
context.
Using equitable discretion to avoid the application of a Federal Rule
raises two bundles of structural issues that I can only identify here, but
then must take a wide arc around and save for another day. First, there
are separation of powers issues presented if a federal court does not defer

413. See supra notes 75-78, 130-46, 278-81 & 385-400 and accompanying text, See also Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 335 (1999) (recognizing
preservation of substantive equity rights existing in 1789).
414. See Barbour, supra note 61, at 858 (equity could overcome defects that inhered in the
procedure of the law courts and "dealt easily with situations which baffled the common law"); JOHN
MITFORD (LORD REDESDALE), PLEADINGS IN CHANCERY 112 (New York, John S. Voorhies, 3d ed.
1833) (jurisdiction of equity exercised where, infer alia, "the principles of law, by which the law
courts were guided, give a right, but the powers of those courts were not sufficient to afford a
complete remedy, or their modes of proceeding were inadequate to the purpose ... [or] where the
courts of ordinary jurisdiction were made instruments of injustice").
415. See. e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379, 381 (D.N.Y. 1962) ("A law suit is
not a game but a search for truth. The ends of justice are served, not by giving one side a vested right
to exhaust the other, but by affording both an equal opportunity to a full and fair adjudication on the
merits."); Gen. Mill Supply Co. v. S.C.A. Serv., Inc., 697 F.2d 704, 711 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The
parties might jointly desire a trial by ordeal or trial by battle, but the public interest would not allow
this. The public interest demands a seemly and efficient use of judicial resources towards the just,
speedy, and inexpensive remedy spoken for in FED. R. Civ. P. I."); Active Prods. Corp. v. A.H.
Choitz & Co., 163 F.R.D. 274 (D. Ind. 1995) (relying upon Rule I to implement an electronic filing
system called "Complex Litigation Automatic Docket" in complex superfund litigation); hi re Paris
Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 69 F.R.D. 310, 322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (decision on the claims of
plaintiffs on issue of products liability alone would avoid prejudice to any party and was the best
way to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the whole cluster of controversies
and lawsuits). See also supra notes 385-400 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 211-88 and accompanying text.
417. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1934).
418. For a discussion of the potent legacy of equity on the development of substantive law, see
supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text. See also Bordwell, sup~ra note 279, at 750.
419. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Foreword, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1993)
("Equity, however large its triumphs, has long been trailed by challenges to its legitimacy.").
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to procedural rules that have been adopted pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act.4"' Second, there are Erie issues presented if, in a diversity
case, the source of law upon which a federal court relies to invalidate the
operation of a Federal Rule is a general federal common law of equity.42
Neither of these structural issues, however, spoils the role for equity
that I propose. Indeed, the very essence of the tradition of equity is
incorporated within the mandate of Federal Rule 1: that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. ' ' 4" Thus the
equitable discretion to avoid the application of a Federal Rule is
contemplated by the procedural infrastructure itself. Reference to the
construction of the Federal Rules suggests some flexibility in
interpreting the applicable language of the rules. The reference to the
administration of the Federal Rules invites even more flexibilitysuggesting a more fundamental or threshold inquiry into the relevance of
a Federal Rule.423 Yet courts invoke Rule 1 rather infrequently.
Occasionally Rule 1 is cited in the context of resolving a lacunae or

420. See Carrington, supra note 277, at 967 (concluding that Congress' power over the federal
courts is limited both by inherent powers and by the constitutional requirement that they be
independent in "'perform[ing] the core judicial function of applying law to fact in ...cases and
controversies') (citing Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and
Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697 (1995)). See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2001).
See also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S 626 (1962) (Rule 41 did not abrogate the federal courts'
inherent authority to dismiss for failure to prosecute); Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional
Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283
(1993); cf Stephen B. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (1986) ("[W]hen the Supreme Court
has exercised the power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal Rules, we should regard
those Rules, if valid, as if they were acts of Congress."). See also Chambers v. NASCO, 501 U.S. 32
(1991) (recognizing some inherent power of the federal courts but declining to define that power or
identify extent to which Congress may limit it).
421. Like common law, federal courts in equity lost the power to define substantive rights, but
retained the power to regulate procedure. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The
conundrum here, of course, is that the segment of equity that intervened to cure procedural
insufficiencies of the law courts is neither procedural nor substantive, but falls somewhere between
the two. See generally John T. Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173 (1999). For
the status of general federal common law, see Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and
FederalCommon Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2002).
422. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.See also supra notes 3-8, 385-400 and accompanying text.
423. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (defining "administer" as to "manage or
conduct ... discharge ...[or] execute").
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nonexistent norm.424 Rule I is also cited intermittently as an additional
justification for the straightforward application of another procedural
rule.4 25 Similarly, courts also will justify particular applications of
procedural rules by referring to the "spirit" of the Federal Rules.4 26 But

424. See, e.g., D.L v. Unified Sch. Dist., No. Civ.A. 00-2349-CM, 2002 WL 31296445, at *2 (D.
Kan. Oct. 1,2002) ("Though Rule 59(e) is silent as to whether the court may order such relief on its
own initiative, the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the rule's silence to be without significance, given
the court's inherent powers ....FED. R. Civ. P. I"); W. Res., Inc. v. Union Pac. R. Co., No. 002043-CM, 2002 WL 1822432, at *2 (D. Kan. Jul. 23, 2002) ("given the textual ambiguity of Rule 45
combined with the repeated attempts of the Plaintiff to effectuate personal service, and the cost and
delay that would result by requiring further attempts at such service, this Court thus joins those
holding that effective service under Rule 45 is not limited to personal service") (citing FED. R. Civ.
P. 1);United States v. Star Scientific, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 482, 484-85 (D. Md. 2002) ("The
language of Rule 45 clearly contemplates that the court enforcing a subpoena will be the court that
issued the subpoena. However, this language must be read in light of the underlying purposes of the
rule, which include 'protect[ing] ...persons who are required to assist the court by giving
information and evidence .....
'")(quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 45, Advisory Committee Notes, 1991
Amendment, citing FED. R. Civ. P. I).
425. See, e.g., Wells v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 1:02CVI30GR, 2002 WL 1610902, at
*3-4 (S.D. Miss. June 25, 2002) (citing FED. R. CIv. P. I in support of its conclusion to transfer
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404); Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mark. In-Store, Inc., 2002-1 Trade
Cases 1 73,676, 2002 WL 664067, at *I (N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2002) ("apply[ing] FED. R. Civ. P. 24 in
light of Fed. R. Civ. P. l's mandate"). The U.S. Supreme Court cited Rule I in this context in
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) ("Summary judgment procedure is properly
regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as
a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action.' FED. R. Civ. P. I"). The vast majority of contemporary citations to Federal Rule I are
quotations of this portion of the Celotex opinion. See, e.g., Bombard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 238 F.
Supp. 2d 464, 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); Lupo v. Voinovich, 235 F. Supp. 2d 782, 788 (S.D. Ohio
2002); FDIC v. Schuchmann, 224 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1336 (D.N.M. 2002).
426. See, e.g., United States on behalf of Mar. Admin. v. Cont'l 111.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 889
F.2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir.1989) (discretion of the Court with regard to motions seeking leave to
amend "must be exercised in terms of a justifying reason or reasons consonant with the liberalizing
'spirit of the Federal Rules'); Nieto v. Kapoor, 210 F.R.D. 244, 246 (D.N.M. 2002) ("outright
refusal to grant the leave [to amend] without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an
exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the
Federal Rules") (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)); Hurlburt v. Zaunbrecher, 169
F.R.D. 258, 260 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (putting defendant on notice "that, although she is technically
entitled to insist upon service in strict compliance with Rule 4(e), in the opinion of the court such
insistence violates the spirit of the Federal Rules as expressed in Rules I and 4(d)"); Hartley &
Parker, Inc. v. Fl. Beverage Corp., 348 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1965) (court refused to reverse
judgment on ground that failure to verify answers to admissions under Rule 36 resulted in technical
admission of truth of statements, particularly when proof clearly refuted truth of any such
admissions; "the spirit of the federal practice [is] to accord substantial justice over mere technical
contentions"); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Beard, 45 F.R.D. 523, 525 (D.S.C. 1968) ("spirit of the
federal rules" contemplates avoidance of circuity or multiplicity of litigation); Gonzales v. Sec. of
the Air Force, 824 F.2d 392, 396 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1987). (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is "contrary to the spirit of Federal Rule I" to require the plaintiff to file
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very rarely will courts avoid the straightforward or even rigid application
of a procedural rule, notwithstanding Federal Rule 1 and the proverbial
"spirit" of the Federal Rules.427
Unfortunately, the historical understanding of equity is freighted with
the baggage of "natural law., 428 In the tradition of separate systems of
law and equity, the strict law was subordinate to principles of reason and
conscience as determined by the law of God.429 With common
philosophical and religious systems of morals, universal standards of
justice could be divined in earlier times.4 3 ° In contemporary discourse,
however, consensus as to the content of those standards is unlikely, and
thus any invocation of morality can be highly controversial and
analytically suspect.43' Implementing the principles of equity need not,
however, introduce a system wedded to natural law. Since Blackstone's
scientific explication of their respective roles two centuries ago,

and serve the defendant within the 30 day statutory time limit when the statute makes no mention of
service).
427. See supra note 383 and accompanying text. See also In re Simon II Litigation, 211 F.R.D. 86
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.) (using FRCP I in conjunction with equitable maxim that ensures
where there is a wrong there is a remedy); Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale, 159 F.R.D. 528 (D. Cal.
1995) (just, speedy, and inexpensive determination requires that court exercise its discretion to
extend the time period for serving process when process was served one day late); TPI Corp. v.
Merch. Mart of S.C., Inc., 61 F.R.D. 684, 692 (D.S.C. 1974) (notwithstanding considerable contrary
authority, court permitted permissive intervention because justice required that the party requesting
intervention be granted it); Rollerblade, Inc. v. Rappelfeld, 165 F.R.D. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1995)
(extending time for service of process under Rule 4(m)).
428. See Walter Wheeler Cook, Equity, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 582 (1931)
("The most common of the non-technical meanings of equity, one in which lawyers themselves not
infrequently use the word, is as a synonym for 'natural justice."); Pound, Justice, supra note 49, at
702 (characterizing equity as "justice without law").
429. See Christopher Saint Germain, Doctor and Student' or, Dialogues Between a Doctor of
Divinity and a Student, in THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 37-51, 144-47 (photo. reprint 1988) (1518), cited
in Joel Edan Friedlander, The Rule of Law at Century's End, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 317, 337 (2001).
See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 290
(1993) ("The natural-law school treats law essentially as the embodiment in legal rules and concepts
of moral principles derived from reason and conscience.").
430. See Roscoe Pound, Juristic Science and the Law, 31 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1060 (1918).
431. See generally Francis J. Mootz, 111, Law in Flux: Philosophical Hermeneutics, Legal
Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311 (1999); Randy E.
Barnett, A Law Professor'sGuide to Natural Law and Natural Rights, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
655 (1997); Stephen Feldman, From Premodernto Modern American Jurisprudence: The Onset of
Positivism, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1997); Ronald M. Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U.
FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982). For a comprehensive bibliography, see James V. Schall, The Natural Law
Bibliography,40 AM. J. JURIS. 157 (1995).
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procedure has been conceptually divorced from substance.432 Within this
time-honored framework, procedure was separated from and
subordinated to substance.433 The procedural infrastructure is but an
ancillary set of rules of "etiquette" designed to ensure the application of
substantive law. 434 The application vel non of a set of purely functional
procedural rules should not implicate the philosophical and religious
values that make natural law and equity problematic. Indeed, if those
values were implicated in the decision whether to apply the procedural
rule, this would suggest that there is substantive content beyond the
scope of procedure and within the scope of substance where,
incidentally, the principles of equity enjoy greater influence.435
Equity's charge to deliver "individualized justice" also incites fears of
unabashed and unprincipled judicial activism. 436 In this regard, Professor
Chafee once remarked of the authority of chancellors: "0, it is excellent37
4
[t]o have a giant's strength; but it is tyrannous [t]o use it like a giant.
But equity is no tyrant. Equity was, and remains, a supplementary law; it

432. Toran, supra note 195, at 378-79, n.165, n.169 (describing procedure as "an unclogged
artery through which substantive rights could flow").
433. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
434. See Roscoe Pound, The Etiquette of Justice, 3 PROC. NEB. ST. B.A. 231 (1908). See also
Charles Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected h the New Federal Rules (Pt. 1), 15 TENN. L. REV.
551, 551 (1939) [hereinafter, Clark, Fundamental Changes]; see also Clark, The Challenge, supra
note 275.
435. See supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
436. Charges of judicial activism used to be the province of conservatives. Liberals have joined
that chorus as congressional legislation becomes increasingly vulnerable to a more conservative
Supreme Court. For scholarship addressing this topic of judges exceeding their proper authority, see
generally Stephen F. Smith, Taking Lessons From the Left?: Judicial Activism on the Right, 2002
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 57-80 (2002); David P. Bryden, A Conservative Case for JudicialActivism,
Ill PUB. INTEREST 73 (1993); Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Centurys End, 43 J.LEGAL EDUC. 27,
32-36 (1993); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS
SECURITY (1991); Earl Maltz, The Prospects of a Revival of Conservative Activisn in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629 (1990); Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Activism: Even on the Right
/1s Wrong, 95 PUB. INTEREST 57 (1989); STEVEN C. HALPERN & CHARLES M. LAMB, SUPREME
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT (Lexington Books 1982); DAVID FORTE, THE SUPREME COURT:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VERSUS JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17 (D.C. Heath, 1972); Alpheus T. Mason,
Judicial Activism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385 (1969); and ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). See also Jack
B. Weinstein, Justice and Mercy-Law and Equity, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 817, 818-19 (1984) (noting
that the approach of the nineteenth century French judges "who abandoned rules of law completely
and instead engaged in ad hoc decision-making according to the equity of the cases" was
"individualism run riot").
437. CHAFEF,supra note 391, at 303.
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was designed "not to destroy the law but to fulfill it."4 38 If a Federal Rule

requires a particular result, it should, in most instances, be applied as
written. But procedural rules are "but an aid to an end and not an end in
themselves.,

439

Accordingly it must be more important that fair and

efficient applications of substantive law be facilitated than that
predictability and uniformity be assured through rigid adherence to
existing procedural rules.44 °
Importantly, the scope of the exercise of equity is limited to the
individual case. 44' Faced with procedural insufficiencies, courts will
often disclaim responsibility and authority for "amending" the procedural
rules.442 In Amchem, for example, Justice Ginsburg wrote that "The text
of a rule thus proposed and reviewed limits judicial inventiveness. Courts
are not free to amend a rule outside the process Congress ordered., 443 But
equity does not require judicial amendment; indeed equity does not
accommodate it. The purpose of equity "was to provide a tribunal where
the hardship of particular cases might be relieved; the purpose was not to
provide general rules of law. '444 The introduction of equity into the
procedural context thus is not an invitation for judges to effect wholesale
revisions to the applicable Rules. For example, judges could not, under
438. See MAITLAND, supra note 7, at 17. See also CLARK, supra note 191, at 1 (equity
"supplements" existing rules of law by reference to current standards of morality); Manuel
Rodriguez Ramos, Equity, in TIHE CIVIL LAW: A COMPARATIVE ESSAY, 44 TUL. L. RtV. 720, 724
(1970) ("Equity ... is nothing more than reason or natural justice, that is, a supplement to the written
law.").
439. Clark, FundamentalChanges, supra note 434, at 551.
440. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. i (1969).
441. This scope thus may be more limiting than the type of "equitable" review suggested by
Professor Bauer and by Judge Moore. Their arguments for broadening the interpretation of Federal
Rules stem primarily from the Congressional delegation to the courts of the authority to make the
Federal Rules in the first instance. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration
of the Supreme Court s Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 720, 720 (1988) (arguing that because the Supreme Court promulgates the Rules,
federal courts are "fully justified in taking an expansive view of the Federal Rule under scrutiny,
giving it a liberal reading if that is required to fulfill the purposes of the Rule or to do justice
between the parties before the court"); Karen Nelson Moore, The Supreme Courts"Role in
Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,44 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1093 (1993) ("Given
substantial, although largely unexercised, powers of the Court in the promulgation process, a more
activist role in the interpretative stage, one that considers purpose and policy, is appropriate.").
442. See supra notes 376-84 and accompanying text.
443. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
444. Campbell, supra note 4, at 11. See Smith, supra note 20, at 310 ("Law, like surgery, loses a
certain number of patients. It has been the function of equity to cut down this loss, not by an entire
abrogation of the general rule ... but by a modification of the rule in the particular case.").
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the authority of equity and in contravention of Federal Rule 8(a), impose
heightened pleading standards in all civil rights cases simply because to
do so would further the efficient administration of justice.445 Nor could
the Federal Rule 23 prerequisites to certification of a class action be
summarily ignored.446 Rather, equity could offer relief from hardship or
mischief created by a particular application of a procedural rule.447
The historical continuity of equity should be channeled through
moderate and restrained interpretations of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. No principle dictates that a court enforce to the outermost
limit the mandate of a particular Federal Rule. An unforgiving
interpretation of a Federal Rule is inconsistent with the broad judicial
discretion that is the principal reported accomplishment of the Federal
Rules.448 Such an interpretation is also inconsistent with Federal Rule
1.44 Procedural insufficiencies typically will present a conflict between
the principles of equity, on one hand, and a particular Federal Rule on
the other. 45" As with any conflict analysis, these interests should be
balanced. 45' Thus, when the application of a Federal Rule is unfair,
445. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 954
F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1992), reversed, 507 U.S. 163 (1992). See generally William W. Schwarzer, Rule
II: Entering a New Era, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 7 (1994).
446. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (identifying prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality
and adequacy).
447. See supra notes 75-78, 86-90, 146-48 and accompanying text.
448. See Bone, supra note 161, at 98-100; Subrin, supra note 23, at 946-48. See also Charles
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J.447, 448-49 (1936) (describing
the new rules as "modern, elastic and sleek"). See also supra note 323.
449. See supra notes 422-27 and accompanying text.
450. See, e.g., Tyson v. City of Sunnyvale, 159 F.R.D. 528, 530 (D. Cal. 1995) (just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination requires that court exercise its discretion to extend the time period for
serving process when process was served one day late); TPI Corp. v. Merch. Mart of S.C., Inc., 61
F.R.D. 684, 692 (D.S.C. 1974) (notwithstanding considerable contrary authority, court permitted
permissive intervention because justice required that the party requesting intervention be granted it);
Rollerblade, Inc. v. Rappelfeld, 165 F.R.D. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1995) (extending time for service of
process under Rule 4(m)); Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Nev. 1993) (postponing
responsive pleadings until motion for summary judgment was considered in order to ensure a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of action); Lawhorn v. Atlan. Ref. Co., 299 F.2d 353, 357
(5th Cir. 1962) ("If one hauled into court as a defendant has a claim but the adversary plaintiff has
not, the nominal defendant ought to be allowed to name the time and place to assert it ....The
Rules should be construed in such a manner as to do substantial justice. Under the pain of foregoing
permanently a 'valid counterclaim' by such a putative defendant, the rules ought not to be construed
in any such barratrous fashion.").
451. See generally DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS

179-80 (6th ed. 2001); Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963).
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inefficient, too complicated, or otherwise deficient, the applicability of
that rule should be re-examined with a view to a more moderate and
restrained interpretation.452 Within this framework, correction is a
product of either the policy and purpose of the traditional principles of
equity, or their proxy, Federal Rule 1.453 The ability of equity to correct
problems stemming from application of strict law modernizes and
reforms the legal doctrine while also boosting its societal legitimacy.
Equity is a fundamental method by which the law has sought to meet
changing conditions.454 Legislative amendment cannot, of course, correct
the mischief created by changed conditions; at best, amendment avoids
the hardship in subsequent cases, and only then if the mischief were to
repeat. 55 Moreover, the legislative amendment may itself create
problems upon changed circumstances. 56 Equity thus plays an important
role in the growth of the law, and without that engine, "our law will be
'
moribund, or worse."457
Equity was a court of vast jurisdiction, and occasionally throughout
history was eminently progressive in increasing its authority. 458 Hardship
and mischief created by the procedural infrastructure need not be
tolerated. On behalf of the state, equity has stood in this breach since
time far beyond memory. Why not now? Our courts are not inferior to
those of our ancestors. The jurisprudence of the twenty-first century is
not beneath that of the 14th century.4 59 The administration of equity
452. See, e.g., Smith v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 22 F.R.D. 108, 113 (D.N.Y. 1958) ("Rules of
procedure, like principles of substantive law, should be interpreted to meet the challenge of changing
conditions of life and litigation .... Problems created by [the mobility of Americans to travel
abroad] can be solved by our law's inherent flexibility."); United States v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 6
F.R.D. 352, 354 (D. Mo. 1946) (court was "loathe" to give strict construction to Rule 33 "absent the
showing that such is necessary to promote the ends of justice").
453. The traditional principles of equity may be more limited after Grupo Mexicano, but that case
should usually be distinguishable since the relief sought there was not the type of relief "traditionally
accorded by courts of equity" and because it had been "specifically disclaimed by longstanding
judicial precedent." 527 U.S. at 322.
454. See SMITH, supra note 53, at 209 (crediting Sir Henry Sumner Maine for the famous dictum
that there are three methods by which the law has sought to meet changing conditions: (i) fictions;
(ii) legislative amendment; and (iii) equity). See also Johnson, supranote 19, at 352-53.
455. See generally Manning, supra note 308, at 767.
456. See Cooper, supra note 42, at 1944 ("[lit may be better to leave judges free to adapt to the
challenges without interference from statutes and rules framed for the last war by Congress and the
rulemaking committees."). See also supra note 312.
457. Bordwell, supra note 279, at 749.
458. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. See also SIMKINS, supra note 177, at 6.
459. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 112.
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requires skill, nerve, good judgment, detachment, compassion, ingenuity,
and the capacity to sustain confidence. 46" But such is the task of
judging.46 Judges routinely administer the substantive principles of
equity in the application of substantive law.462 Procedure, too, outside the
context of the Federal Rules has been dramatically influenced by the
substantive principles of equity. 463 Formalistic interpretations of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are inconsistent with and unnecessary within a
unified system of law and equity.
B.

Accommodating Equity in the Construction of ProceduralRules

Application of the substantive principles of equity is best
accommodated by succinct and generalized procedural rules that accord
judges broad discretion. A proposal that our unified system of law and
equity be administered by modem, elastic and sleek procedural rules
should be relatively uncontroversial. Of the various fronts where the
rules-standards war have been fought,46 4 the rhetoric of discretionary
standards has clearly prevailed on the civil procedure battlefield.4 65
Indeed, the complication, trivialization and ossification of the Federal
Rules seems to have commenced in spite of our allegiance to a set of
rules that despises formality.466 My effort here is to urge a commitment
and return to more flexible and discretionary rules of procedure that
reflect the rhetoric and the common perception that the Federal Rules are
"all equity. 467
460. See GEOFFREY HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 65 (1978).
461. See David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2090
(1997) (broad discretion in the hands ofjudges may be "a risky and uncomfortable state of affairsbut it is always risky and uncomfortable when our well-being lies in the hands of heroes").
462. See supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
463. See generallv Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 12; Subrin, supra note 23, at 970-82;
Marcus, supra note 177, at 725; Resnik, supra note 262, at 376; Waters, supra note 262, at 542-51;
Laycock, supra note 12, at 53-54. See also Chayes, supra note 262, at 1292-96 (discerning in public
law litigation the "triumph of equity"). See also supra note 323.
464. See generally Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 379 (1985); see,
e.g., Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 749 (1982); Erwin Griswold,
The Judicial Process, 31 F. B. J. 309, 314 (1972); Joseph Singer, The Player and The Cards.
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. I, 12-13 (1984).
465. See Clark, supra note 448, at 448-49; Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: The Last Phase-Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of
the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937). See also supra note 323.
466. See supra notes 307-48 and accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 307-48 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, strict definite rules have their virtues.468 Some interests
may require the protection of more comprehensive, predictable and
uniform mandates.469 In criminal or commercial law contexts, for
example, one can argue that it is better to have a bad rule that everyone
knows than a new and better rule of which no one is certain.47 ° Similarly,
a formalist procedure may advance certain values.4 7' Indeed, some argue
that judicial discretion threatens the internal morality and general
legitimacy of law by undermining the notice and publicity requirement of
rules, which are fundamental elements of a legal system in the formalist
tradition.47 Moreover, even in the context of procedural rules, strictness
and definiteness have an illustrious pedigree. The common law courts
embraced certainty, predictability and uniformity as primary norms and
celebrated the technicality that engineered that system.47
But the merger of law and equity changed our ability to
(micro)manage procedure. An autonomous system of equity enjoyed the

468. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. See generally Schlag, supra note 464, at
400-01 (cataloging the superficial virtues and vices of rules and standards).
469. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 355. Cf Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,
406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of
law be settled than that it be settled right").
470. See Sony Corp. v. Bank One, 85 F.3d 131, 145 (4th Cir. 1996) (Widener, J., dissenting)
(crediting certainty as the cardinal principle for more than 200 years of commercial law); Bradley M.
Elbein, The Hole in the Code: Good Faith and Morality in Chapter 13, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 439,
485-87 (1997); Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as ProsecutorModel of Environmental
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome-Independent
Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 355-56 (1988) (articulating the need for uniformity in criminal law);
Stephen G. Bene, Note, Why Not Fine Attorneys? An Economic Approach to Lawyer Disciplinary
Sanctions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 907, 921-22 (1991) (discussing role of predictability in calculation of
benefits and costs of criminal activities under general theory of deterrence); Christopher A. Wray,
Note, Corporate Probation Under the New OrganizationalSentencing Guidelines, 101 YALE L.J.
2017, 2036 (1992) (stating that predictability in sentencing scheme fosters deterrence).
471. See generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Idea and Nonparty
Preclusion,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Frank 1. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation
Access Fees: The Right to Protect Ones Rights (Part I), 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153 (1973); John R.
Allison, Ideology. Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657 (1994); Jerry
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due ProcessCalculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976); Robert A. Bush,
Dispute Resolution Alternatives and Achieving the goals of Civil Justice: JurisdictionalPrinciples
for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893 (1984); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-39
(1971).

472. See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALtTY OF LAW 35 (2d ed. 1969) (stating that it is "very
unpleasant to have one's case decided by rules when there was no way of knowing what those rules
were").
473. See supra notes 156-72 and accompanying text.
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flexibility and discretion to prevent hardship caused by procedural
insufficiency and to fulfill the curative purpose of equity.474 A unified
system of law and equity seems less capable of accommodating
individualized justice. 475 And more and longer procedural rules will
never anticipate all of the eccentricities that fate or human ingenuity are
"virile enough to devise., 476 Roscoe Pound recognized this and favored a
flexible procedural system that granted judges liberal discretion "despite
his emphasis on certainty. '477 Similarly, Charles Clark insisted on
flexibility and discretion "even when pragmatism dictated the need for
478
more detail and complexity.
The potent legacy of equity in various non-procedural contexts
demonstrates that judges can be more than umpires.479 Procedural rules
could likewise be drafted with more discretion to allow and encourage
judges to apply their judicial skill. 48" The solution, then, is to avoid
elaborate amendments tailored specifically to address particular
" ' Such
procedural insufficiencies.48
amendments perpetuate a cycle that
leads to the creation of further procedural insufficiencies that, in turn,
require still more elaboration. 482 That cycle could be broken with broader
and more discretionary forward-looking rules that facilitate vigor and
common sense and efficiency and fairness in their application.
One need not be especially creative to develop talking points for
equity-based reforms to the Federal Rules. Prior to the merger of law and
equity in 1938, the federal courts operated courts of equity for more than
a century under the Federal Equity Rules. A comparison of the current
procedural rules to their professed source, would be an obvious

474. See supranotes 86-90 and accompanying text.
475. See supranotes 307-84 and accompanying text.
476. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 113.
477. Toran, supra note 195, at 374 (citing Bone, supra note 161, at 98-100 and Subrin, supra
note 23, at 946-48).
478. Toran, supra note 195, at 376 (citing Subrin, supra note 23, at, 956-66, 977, 995-96;
Resnik, supra note 43; Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958: Two
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 448 (1958); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, PART II, CIVIL CASES (1934)).

479. For a discussion of the potent, if unappreciated legacy of equity in contemporary
jurisprudence, see supra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
480. See Frierson, supra note 32, at 404.
481. For a discussion of the increasing number and length of amendments to the Federal Rules,
see supra notes 307-84 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 307-10 and accompanying text.
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baseline. 83 In the context of class actions, for example, consider the old
Federal Equity Rule which provided in its entirety that:
When the question is one of common or general interest to many
persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may
sue or defend for the whole.48 4
Would we not trust the reasoned, intelligent discretion of judges trained
for their task to apply this rule and to satisfy as many competing
demands as that particular application of the rule presents? 4 5 The
certification of class actions can, of course, destroy individual rights, and
I do not intend to devalue the many difficulties presented by mass
solutions.8 6 However, in situations like Amchem or Ortiz, for example, a
district judge applying this broad discretionary rule would be permitted
to balance all of the difficult issues and competing interests of the
various parties to determine whether litigation as a settlement class
would be appropriate and fair and efficient. Indeed, the Supreme Court
suggested in both of these cases that the proposed settlement was both
substantively and procedurally fair and that the settlement proposed an
efficient resolution of a phenomenon that defied customary judicial
administration.487 Yet the classes in those cases could not be certified, the

483. For a discussion of the relationship between the Federal Equity Rules and the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, see supra notes 240-77 and accompanying text.
484. Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912).
485. See generally Johnson, supranote 19, at 354.
486. For critiques of aggregation, see, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps:
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1056 (1995) (the district court
approved a "tainted settlement ... [lt]o help rid the court system of the terrible burden imposed
by ... asbestos litigation"); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility:
The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 847 (1987) ("the move toward collective
[as opposed to individual] responsibility in tort law is not, on the whole, a sensible development");
Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Complex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALl
Proposal, 10 J. L. & COM. 1 (1990); and Trangsrud, supra note 354. For a defense of aggregation,
see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213 (1990); Bone, supra note 471; Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (1997);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiff's Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. I
(1991); and Rosenberg, supra note 347; and David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing
Risk-Based Claims in Mass Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1996). See generally Shapiro,
supra note 347; Tidmarsh, supra note 352.
487. See supra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
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Court explained, because the elaborate Federal Rule 23 imposed
substantive, err "structural" protections of its own.488
The ultimate result in Amchem or Ortiz might have been the same
even under a broad discretionary rule. Even so, it should not have been a
procedural rule that dictated the result. 48 9 A broad and discretionary rule

would not impose structural requirements and would instead bring into
relief the competing interests at stake. Procedural rules should not,
indeed cannot, enlarge, abridge or modify substantive rights. 49" The
primary and ultimate issue in those cases was protection of the due
process and other substantive rights implicated by the settlement class. 491
Interpretation and application of strict definite procedural rules instead
dominated the Court's attention.492
In light of the increasing strictness of the procedural infrastructure, it
is perhaps not surprising that many proposed reforms for the resolution
of mass tort claims are looking to bankruptcy courts as a forum and
model. 493 Bankruptcy courts, of course, are courts of equity; 494 but there,

488. See supra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
489. See generallv Koniak, supra note 486, at 1056 (describing a "tainted settlement... [t]o help
rid the court system of the terrible burden imposed by ... asbestos litigation.").
490. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
491. See generally Berry, supra note 45.
492. See supra notes 368-75 and accompanying text.
493. See generally Cooper, supra note 42; Hazard, supra note 362; Weinstein & Hershenov,
supra note 12, at 303, 320; Thomas E. Willging, Appendix C.- Mass Torts Problems and Proposals:
A Report to the Mass Torts Working Group, in REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 187 F.R.D. 328, 387-404 (1999); Alan

N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-ThreateningMass Tort Liability,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045 (2000); Joseph F. Rice & Nancy Worth Davis, The Future of Mass Tort
Claims. Comparison ofSettlement Class Actions to Bankruptcy Treatment of Mass Tort Claims, 50
S.C. L. REV. 405 (1999); Sheldon S. Toll, Bankruptcy and Mass Torts: The Commissions Proposals,
5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363 (1997); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 846, 855 (1984); Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy,
104 YALE L.J. 367, 383 (1994); Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort
Bankruptcy." A Prelimninamy Inquir, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43 (2000); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The
Dilenmna o/the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1457 (1995) (finding bankruptcy
reorganization superior to class action for resolving mass torts while protecting interests of future
claimants); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser, Inproving Treatment of Future Claims: The
Unfinished Business Left by the Manville Amendments, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 487, 488 (1995)
(asserting that bankruptcy court is the "best forum" for mass tort future claims cases). See also
AMERICAN
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COMPLEX

LITIGATION:

STATUTORY

RECOMMENDATIONS

AND

ANALYSIS 12 (1994) ("Serious questions ... can be raised as to whether bankruptcy courts can cope

with the massive litigation ancillary to a complex reorganization proceeding, as well as whether they
can achieve equity between early- and late-filing claimants."); Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in
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too, the traditional flexibility and discretion of equity seem to be mired
within a very detailed code495 and an extensive set of procedural rules.496
Indeed, bankruptcy courts seem to be equity courts largely in name
only.497 But the successful-and equitable-resolution of mass tort
claims should not require escape to an alternative system, as the
substantive principles of equity should inhere in the unified system of
law and equity administered pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Procedural rulemakers can have their cake and eat (at least some of) it
too. Future amendments to the Federal Rules should feature flexibility
and discretion. Elaborate legislative drafting to contemplate all
conceivable applications can create hardship and mischief. Thus we
should be skeptical of strictness, and tolerate rigidity only in
circumstances where the norms of certainty, predictability and
uniformity are particularly compelling. In circumstances where those
norms are present, but are not particularly compelling, suggested
limitations or applications could be included in the rule but relegated to a
secondary, illustrative or non-binding status.
Specifically, I recommend three techniques that procedural rulemakers
could use to suggest, without imposing constraints on the discretion and
flexibility of judges. First, rulemakers can signal suggested applications
of procedural rules through more elaborate promulgation of Committee
Notes. The Rules Enabling Act requires that amendments include "an
explanatory note... and a written report explaining the body's
Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1695, 1702
(1998) (criticizing National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposal, and bankruptcy approach
generally, questioning whether bankruptcy approach is truly improvement over class action
approach).
494. See Hon. Marcia S.Krieger, "The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity ":What Does that
Mean?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 275 (1999). See also infra
note 493 and supra note 497.
495. See II U.S.C. §§ 1-1330.
496. See F. R. BANKR. P. 1-9032.
497. See Krieger, supra note 494, at 310 ("From historical, procedural, jurisprudential and
practical perspectives the bankruptcy court is not a court of equity. It is, instead, a specialized court
of limited jurisdiction applying statutory law that embodies a particular, often changing, social
objective."); Steve H. Nickles, Another Way of Thinking About Section 105(A) and Other Sources of
Supplemental Law Under the Bankruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 7, 16 (2000) ("Equitable principles
and rules, however, are not a source of general authority to act beyond or different from the
Bankruptcy Code. So, even if there is a real and lawful basis for bankruptcy judges to assume the
role of equity chancellors, this role gives them little reason or room to add substantive, supplemental
law to the Bankruptcy Code."); Jason A. Rosenthal, Courts of Inequity: The Bankruptcy Laws'
Failureto Adequately Protect the Dalkon Shield Victims, 45 FLA. L. REV. 223, 226-32 (1993).
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action., 498 The Advisory Committee frequently articulates the purpose of
a rule or an amendment in these Committee Notes, and offers guidance
on future interpretations.'" "Over the years, the Notes have increased in
significance, and they now play an integral role in the rulemaking
process."5 °° Thus in many circumstances the procedural norms of
predictability, certainty and uniformity might be satisfied by articulating
the desired applications in Committee Notes. This technique would allow
rulemakers to signal particular desired outcome, but would not rigidly
constrain district judges.
Second, procedural rulemakers could recognize a hierarchy of rules
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, subordinating procedural
rules of particular application to primary meta-rules containing broad
discretionary mandates.5" For example, a broad discretionary class
action rule (perhaps similar to the old Federal Equity Rule or to the
current Federal Rule 23(a)) could be adopted as a primary and dominant
rule. Suggested applications of or limitations upon the general
498. 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988).
499. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1112 (2002) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 4, Advisory Committee
Note (1993) ("The general purpose of this revision is to facilitate the service of the summons and
complaint."); FED. R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Note (1993) ("[a] major purpose of the
revision [to Rule 26(a)] is to accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case"); id.
Advisory Committee Note (2000) (stating that the amendments "restore national uniformity to
disclosure practice [and] to other aspects of discovery"); FED. R. Civ. P. 30 Advisory Committee
Note (1993) (explaining that the aims of new Rule 30(a)(2)(A) are to assure judicial review before
any side takes more than ten depositions without consent of other parties and "to emphasize that
counsel have a professional obligation to develop a Mut. cost-effective plan for discovery"); FED. R.
Civ. P. 33 Advisory Committee Note (1993) ("The purpose of this revision is to reduce the
frequency and increase the efficiency of interrogatory practice."); FED. R. Civ. P. 45 Advisory
Committee Note (1991) (listing five purposes for the amendment); FED. R. Civ. P. 53 Advisory
Committee Note (1991) ("The purpose of the revision is to expedite proceedings before a master.");
FED. R. Civ. P. 77 advisory committee's note (1991) ("The purpose of the revisions is to permit
district courts to ease strict sanctions now imposed on appellants whose notices of appeal are filed
late because of their failure to receive notice of entry of ajudgment."); FED. R. Civ. P. 50 Advisory
Committee Note (1991) ("Paragraph (a)(1) articulates the standard for the granting of a motion for
judgment as a matter of law. It effects no change in the existing standard."); FED. R. Civ. P. 50
Advisory Committee Note (1993) (reaffirming that "the 1991 revision ...was not intended to
change the existing standards under which 'directed verdicts' could be granted")).
500. Struve, supra note 499, at 1112. Indeed, the article suggests that, because of the uniqueness
of the Congressional delegation to the Supreme Court of the rulemaking authority, the Courts should
accord the Notes "authoritative effect." Id. at 1103. If Professor Struve's proposal proves to be as
persuasive as it is fascinating, my recommendation that the Notes be used as secondary, illustrative
and non-binding signaling would obviously be ineffectual.
501. Of course, I suggest in Part V.A., supra, that Federal Rule I outlines such a dominant
purpose.
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principle(s) could be expressed separately." 2 Such a framework would
avoid the hardship created by strict applications, either because the
particularized rule could be narrowly construed in light of the broader
mandate or because the particularization could be expressly subordinate
to the primary mandate. Although none of the current Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure reflect this organization, one might consider the Federal
Rules of Evidence as a possible model. °3 Federal Rule of Evidence 403,
for example, provides broad discretionary prerogative for a judge to
exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .... ,504 Rules 404 through

415 then target specific circumstances that may curb that discretion in
particular circumstances. 50 5 A similar structure of meta- and subordinate
procedural rules could allow procedural rulemakers to limit discretion
while allowing the principles of hierarchy to avoid hardship and mischief
that could be created by strict and technical applications of subordinate
rules.
Finally, procedural rules could simply be drafted with more hortatory
and less mandatory language. A renewed commitment to discretionary
and flexible rules could provide a durable corpus of procedural rules that
would not require constant tinkering by amendment. Although a new
structural framework for procedure may be unnecessary, rulemakers
might consider something entirely new. The Restatements of Laws, for
example, tend to follow a model where the governing rules are stated
broadly with certain finer points relegated to a secondary and often non-

502. Suggested applications could refer to the current typology of actions contained in Federal
Rule 23(b); suggested limitations could be those currently detailed in Federal Rule 23(c).
503. 1thank and credit Professor Peter Nicolas for suggesting this interesting analogue.
504. FED. R. Ev[D. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.).
505. See FED. R. EvID. 404 ("Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct; Exceptions;
Other Crimes"); id. 405 ("Methods of Proving Character"); id. 406 ("Habit; Routine Practice"); id.
407 ("Subsequent Remedial Measures"); id. 408 ("Compromise and Offers to Compromise"); id.
409 ("Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses"); id. 410 ("Inadmissibility of Pleas, Plea
Discussions; and Related Statements"); id. 411 ("Liability Insurance"); id. 412 ("Sex Offense Cases;
Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition"); id. 413
("Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases"); id. 414 ("Evidence of Similar Crimes in
Child Molestation Cases"); id. 415 ("Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual
Assault or Child Molestation"). See Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D.N.J.
1996) ("FRE 413-415 'are permissive rules of admissibility, not mandatory rules of admission')
(quoting Memorandum from Department of Justice to United States Attorneys 3 (July 12, 1995)).
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binding status as "comments" or "illustrations". 506 Similarly, the Model
Code of ProfessionalResponsibility provides layers of Canons, Ethical
Considerations and specific Disciplinary Rules. 50 7 In both of these
examples, the multiple layers of authority accommodate the overactive
lawmaking gland 518 with minimal interference to the controlling
fundamental principles. These models could provide a way for
procedural rulemakers to signal certain outcomes, without risk of
creating procedural hardship and mischief.
All three proposals for modifying the construction of procedural rules
underscore the significance of discretion and flexibility. In a unified
system of law and equity, the procedural infrastructure must allow the
substance of equity to flourish. Until judges are inclined to invoke equity
as a justification for avoiding the application of a procedural rule that
would create hardship, 5 9 it is especially important that the moderating
force of equity be incorporated into the procedural infrastructure through
discretion and flexible rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
The wisdom of dual systems of law and equity was the ability of the
latter to correct the substantive and procedural deficiencies of the former.
The genius of a unified system of law and equity was the notion that the
substance of law and equity could be merged procedurally without
affecting the substance of either law or equity. But a problem is
presented when the procedural infrastructure of the unified system begins
to interfere with the traditional jurisdiction of equity. This phenomenon
is underway. And unless the principles of equity are allowed to trump the
rules of the procedural infrastructure charged with the administration of
its substantive principles, traditional equity is impaired.

506. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 4.1 (1981) (including restatement of
Validity of Disabling Restraint, with comments and illustrations); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 73 (including restatement of Changed Conditions supporting relief from judgment,
with comments and illustrations).
507. See generally Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning & Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of
Potential Conjlicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REV. 913, 941 (1994) (explaining that
Canons define what conduct is expected of attorneys; Ethical Considerations are guidelines for
attorneys to act ethically; and Disciplinary Rules are minimum standards required of attorneys).
508. See supranote 455 and accompanying text.
509. See supra Part V.A.

